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It is a serious and noble act. It is based on technology 
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It is a promise of the future; it requires courage and 
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It is a collective activity and a condition of growth; 
without growth the morale of managers cannot be high. 
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. - . This thesis attempts to untangle the complexities of capital invest-
ment decision making by an in depth -::r;-eview and analysis of the literature 
on the subject which has grown since World War II in discontinuous and 
widely spread bi ts. Then,, this autho-r tries to weave these isolated 
threads of knowledge into some kind of comprehensive whole. 
The major facets of the capital investment process which are so 
· treated are: unce~-tainty and risk, the many criteria employed for evalu-
ating investments, the cost of capital and its many ramification's, 
~' 
. 
utility· theory,, and game theory. Several recommendations for future 
I 
/ 
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/ 
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/ 
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./ 
I. 
research pr~jects are also given. A brief review of game theory is in-
cluded ~~- an appendix. 
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PREFACE 
r 4". 
- .. 
This· thesis deals with capital i-nvestments and the inherent de-
cision making problems and processes faced by management. The com-
plexity of the capital investment process is overwhelming. The lack of 
a basic theory has been the biggest handicap in the practice ,of capital 
budgeting. To help supply this important need, earlier researchers 
such as Irving Fisher and Lord Keynes, and recent theorists such as 
Joel Dean, Vera and Friedrich Lutz, and Ezra Solomon, 1 have structured 
a theoretical framework within which the decision maker could operate 
on a sounder and happier basis. The literature on capital budgeting has 
grown accordingly, but in discontinuous and widely spread bits. To the 
f, best of our knowledge, no one has attempted so far to take these isolated 
threads of knowledge, unravel them and weave them into a comprehensive 
whole. It is the principal purpose of this thesis to undertake such 
-
an attempt. As a result, it is hoped that this thesis would be of 
' f 
-··assi~·ance to the decision maker by helping to present a clearer under-
standing of the more important factors that must be·considered in 
capital budgeting. 
• 
~-·· 
:a.· 
'"t. • 
1 Refer ·to· Appe~<M.x 4 for a more complete list of recent'1:nvestigator~. 
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CHAPTER I Ilfl'ROOOCTION ·'·· -. -~--
'"" -
... 
1.1 · General 
Members of upper management are the strategists.upon whom-the 
~rviva11 and sucG~ss of the firm depends. They: 
"1. Must decide what opportunities are to be pursued and 
what risks are acceptable. 
2. Must decide on scope and structure, and especially on 
the right balance between specialization, diversifi-
cation, and integration. 
3. Must decide between time and money, between building its own or 'buying' -- i.e., using scale of a business, 
merger, acquisition and joint venture -- to attain 
their goal. 
4. Must decide on an organization structure appropriate 
to its economic realities, its opportunities and its program for .performance" (10, p. 203). 
Investment decision making pervades directly or indirectly, each 
of these situations •. Today, more than in the past, investment de-
cisions, especially capital investments, are probably the most 
important and at the same time the most difficult decisions that 
confront top management. 
Uncertainty, which is the main element in management investment 
decisions, exists because of the need to account for the future. 
"We "know only tw_o things about the future: 
, - a. It cannot be known. 
..... b. It will be different from what exists now and from 
what we now expect • 
1 Industrial fir.ms in- general have a chance of only 24% ot surviving five years and Bf only 19% of being in business ten year~ after their beginning. (21, p. 192) 
, 
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These assertions are not particularly new or particularly 
striking. But, they have far-reaching implications. Business 
------ ·---- . 
. these last ten or twenty years has accepted the need to work 
systematically in making the future. But long-range planning 
does not and cannot aim at the elimination of risks and un-
certainties. That is not given to mortal man. The one thing 
·-
.... · 
-. 
he can try is to find, and occasionally to create, the right 
risk and to exploit uncertainty. The purpose of the work on 
making the future is not to decide what should be done tomorrow, 
but what should be done today to have a tomorrow" (10, p. 173). 
Up to the present, most management decision making has been based 
on art~ intuition, experience, and rules of thumb, perhaps because the 
scientific techniques, employed by operations research and other manage-
ment sciences, have reache4 only as high as middle managemen~ and 
seldom, if ever, higher. The importance of upper management strategic 
decisions has caused several academic disciplines to focus on this 
problem. Some modi operandi which have been generated by science in 
its frontal attack on uncertainty are discounted cash flow, utility 
............ 
functions, game theory, linear and dynamic programming, and industrial 
~ 
dynamics • 
1.2 Capital Investment --.Importance and Definition 
The importance of capital investment can be best gauged by the suma 
of money invested each year in both profit making and non-profit making 
projects. It has been reported that in 1959: 
"$37 billion were· -spent on non-farm producers' plant and 
equipment. $5 billion were spent on farm equipment and 
on construction and $3 billion ori other private con-
struction including religious, ·education~!, social and 
recreational, and hospital and instutional. 
$4 billion additional were invested in inventories. 
Expenditures for research and development totaled 
approximately $12 billion. Additional billions were 
invested in working capital by industry. Many ad-
ditional billions were spent for capit~l purposes by. 
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'• 
federal, state and local· governments." (3, p. 185) 
By 1965, investments of U.S. companies in plant and equipment 
· alone· were approaching $50 billion a year. Another $50 billion went 
__ into acquisitions, development of new products, and other investment 
,. ... 
expenditures; 1 all together, nearly 15% of the U. S. gross national 
product. 
Capital investment is synonymous, from an operational point of 
view, with capital budgeting, which in turn can be defined as the 
planning of the use of dollars to purchase capital. Prof. Barish 
defines capital budgeting as expenditures "in which the company's 
funds are committed for projects which will return the invested funds 
and profits during future periods", (3, p. 185). " It should constantly 
be borne in mind that the budgeter sees the business from the point 
of view of the dollar of profit. For him, the business is not pri-
marily producing goods. First of all, it produces dollars of sales 
at a cost per dollar resulting in a profit per dollar", (23, p. vi). 
'\ 
Accordingly, capital is wealth and it is expected to produce more 
wealth. 
Capital budgeting includes replacements, improvements and ad-
ditions to plant and equipment. It also includes land for plant sites 
and intangibles such as p~t~nts, · tranchises, and trademarks. Research 
may also be considered a part of the capital budget, mainly because 
~--; 
-. 
, 
-----..-....· /····-- ....... 
many research projects usually require se~ral years for commerciali-
, 
·zation and are therefore capl_talized expense. 
1 
"Businessmen plan in 1966 to increase capital spending 15j", Time 
'' 
. '' Ma1azine, December 31, 1965, T~e·Economy, p. 64. 
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There are at least two very esse~al char9rteris_tics of a capital. _ _( 
' 
'<) " 
budget or investment: \ 
·t 
----~--
-~ 
1. ~ - .. .. Uniqueness - "Bach,,project constitutes a distinct income, 
ff ( gain, degree of urgency, 23, p. 233). Various tech-
niques can be applied to appraise the value of a capital 
budget. However, each particular capital budget must 
also be cqnsidered for its unique characteristics to get 
a real understanding of its value. 
... 2. Time - There are at least four different facets of time 
-relative to budgeting. 
(a) One deals with the time period from conception of 
(b) 
a project to its final write-off. Time is required 
. " " for capital to be weaned to the point where it 
itself is productive. Then, from that point on, 
more time is required for the capital to produce 
an amount equal to the original investment and 
then prof it. 
' 
Another time concept deals with long and short 
range budgeting. Generally, long range planning 
budgeting extends 3-5 years into the future and 
incorporates an e~timate of the future amounts of __ , 
. I . 
funds that will be available, or should be availa- _ 
ble for capital e_,cpenditures in each year of a 
planning period. Accordingly, it is indicative 
of capital additions. It is by means of the 
planning budget that management can be certain 
• 
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1. -- 1 
. 
. that the capital cQIDDlitments of the firm are in 
agreement with its dynamic business environment. 
r· 
--The long range--planning budget may or may not 
consist of individual proposals for capital 
expenditures. Usually, it covers areas of future 
expenditures rather than specific proposals for 
replacement or expansion of facilities. " A word 
of caution, however, is necessary. The long range 
planning budget must not become definitive. The 
capital expenditure proposals included in a five 
year forecast should remain only as concepts. It 
should not be required that a proposal be in-
. ' 
.. ' 
.... 
cluded in the long range budget before it can be <P• 
included in the short range budget. It is dif-
ficult to believe that useful replacement expendi-
" 
tures can be forecasted that far in advance, 
(14, p. 27). 
On the other hand, the short range finance or ~ r , f 
capital budget is the means by which management 
' " . " attempts to harmonize the cost of expenditure 
proposals with the-available funds or needed 
funds, for the next year, or in some cases, the 
.. the next two years. The modus operandi of this 
harmonization depends upon the willingness and 
I) 
/; (' 
... . 
~: 
I , 
I 
·-. 
·....---..... -
. ~ ... 
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.. 
capability of the firm to supplement available 
capital funds by borrowing or by sale of ad-
ditional equity securities. Accordingly, short · 
range budgets, depending upon source, can be 
classified as follows: 
. (1) Rationing Budget - such a budget usually 
indicates the probable allocation of a 
I 
given amount of expenditure~ I ts functions~ 
internally generated, are limited to depreci-
ation charges and retained earnings. 
(2) Financing Budget - this type of budget uses 
external money sources, i.e., borrowing or 
issuing new equity securities. Generally, 
with this type of budget, all proposals 
which meet a predetermined minimum of eco-
nomic worth will be implemented. 
''Obviously, a firm that has access to money 
markets and is willing to use them is better 
able to implement acceptable proposals than 
a firm entirely dependent on internally generated funds. However, f inns that do not finance externally do not necessarily lack 
sufficient capital funds; a firm may generate 
enough capital funds from its depreciation 
charges and retained earnings to maintain its plant and equipment and provide for desired growth. This would seem more likely in a non-inflationary period, than in the period of 
rising prices. Continuing inflation causes 
the replacement cost of some facilities to be greater than the original histo~ical cost. This means that the funds provided by a 
depreciation charge based on historical cost 
are usually insufficient for ~eplacement. 
The situation is complicated by the fact that 
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Internal Revenue Code requires the use 
of historical cost depreciation for 
federal tax purposes. The tax bill is higher when the depreciation dedµction is based on historical costs than it would be if current costs were used, and the 
result is smaller after tax income for 
use in the business. Because the re-
tained earnings after taxes plus the 
financial depreciation fail to provide 
the increased capital funds needed, re-placement of facilities and expansion are hampered." (14, p. 30) 
(c) The third facet of time can be viewed as a 
stochastic process. The problem posed by this 
concept to management deals with the acceptance 
or bypassing of·· a curre~t invest-ment opportunity 
in light of future possible investments available 
to the firm or the decision maker. For example, 
suppose that the firm is faced with the choice 
of investing now in an alternative which meets 
its acceptable critical investment opportunity 
index, e.g., present value or internal rate 
l 
... 
. of return, or waiting until the next decision 
) 
making date when an investment with twice the 
value of this marginal one will be available 
with a probabili~y of .85. It may very well 
be to the firm's advantage to reject a present 
investment opportunity in hopes of using its 
disposal;>le assets to Aaccept a more profitable 
investment in the uncertain future. Of course, 
the -amount of disposable assets, e.g., retained 
: ,, 
. ..... 
~-- -
:~· 
... 
l 
• i 
' 
I 
' i 
·I 
. ' 
, I 
'\' 
, .. 
ft 
., 
,, 
i,. 
r 
-1:.. -
... 
')< I 
·, .. 
t . 
. ,~ 
t 
\ 
' ' 
\---,-
\ 10. .• 
•' profits, and the amount of time such assets 
- .. 
.... can remain unproductive are prime factors to 
be considered. The firm's decision makers, no -- --·--- - ~-----------
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doubt, subjectively take the above factors into 
consideration. But, how accurate, how analytical 
is their analysis? The analysis of such a 
problem involves dynamic programming. In a 
doctoral thesis, J. L. Fisher (82) summarizes 
hi~approach as follows: 
"As developed in this thesis, the decision-making problem consists of two distinct stages. Firstly, 
· the decision maker is interested in determining 
optimal decision rules for accepting or rejecting investment opportunities. Secondly, given these 
optimal decision rules, the decision maker is 
interested in whether he should hold the dis-
posable assets he currently has or should these disposable assets be transferred to some other 
activity where they will be more productive. The problem of determining the maximum amount of 
assets the decision maker sho~ld hold 1s examined in each of the cases studied. By simultaneously 
adjusting the discount factor and the probability 
of an offer, we can approach as closely as de-
sired the continuous decision-making problem." 
. , .... 
Another reference to dynamic programming for such 
a stochastic investment problem is (42). 
,(d) A fourth facet of timing involves possible re-
visions to· planned budgets, usually the short-
~ange budgets, to accommodate changing circum-
stances. The revision capabilities are usually 
inherent in the time period between budget 
planning sessions, whether it be quarterly or 
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monthly or even weekly. Generally, the length 
. 
of time between revisions of the short-range 
budget should be in inverse relationship to-.the 
. degree of its definiteness. For example, when -
the budget includes proposals in conceptual 
form, and allowances are made for substitution 
of better proposals, the budget period need not 
be less than the fiscal year. On the other hand, 
in cases where only those proposals included in 
the budget will be implemented, the budget period 
should be as short as possible to permit faster 
implementation of proposals originated after the 
budget had been drawn up. 
1.3 Who Are the Decision Makers1 
: . . 
.-· 
Who decides which project is to be pursued and which project is to 
be bypassed? Who are the firm's decision makers? 
In any corporation all authority ultimately rests with-the board of 
directors; however, the degree of delegation of this authority varies 
from firm to firm. It is not unusual to find that in some firms, the 
board of directors has delegated this authority to act in capital 
expenditure completely; i.e., nQ_. capital expenditure proposals are 
approved by the board. Antithetical to this approach, we also find 
some boards of directors finally approving or rejecting all proposals. 
1 This section ·is largely based on the findings of Prof. Donald F • Istvan of Indiana Univer§ity, who, in 1960, conducted an investment decision study of 48 of the country's largest firms. (14) • 
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'< The reason usually given for this complete lack of delegation can be 
summarized as follows: Present capital expendi~ures are the framework 
from which future profits are created; the board of directors is 
directly responsible to the stockholders for these future profits; 
·therefore, only the board of directors should be responsible for present "' 
capital expenditure. Such an attitude, however, contains a fallacy in 
reasoning. Since the board-of directors is finally responsible to the 
siockholders for all actions undertaken by the firm, the premise should ~ 
hold true not only for capital expenditures but for all decisions. It 
has been noted by the decision makers themselves that where approval 
for all proposals is retained by the board of directors, the admini-
strative processing of the proposals may be slowed down by a bottleneck 
at that level. 
Where there is a delegation of authority, it can rest in a com-
mittee composed of high level officers and individual members of the 
board, with an executive vice-president, with various divisional vice-i 
presidents, or with certain functional managers. In 'some firms, the 
board of directors grants a blanket approval for a maximum amount of 
expenditure to a subordinate official of the firm. This official is 
then allowed to authorize expenditure of this amount of money. The 
plan allows a plant manager, for instance, to approve proposals that 
do not exceed $5,000 each, but he is .. :-'limited, perhaps, to a $50,000 
total of such approvals throughout the year. This technique can 
greatly facilitate the processing of many smaller p~oposals. 
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---·- ·we usually find that the person or group to whom authority is dele-
gated varies in relation to the amounts of money involved. A typical 
breakdown of authority and size of expenditure is given in the following 
table: 
Size of Expenditure Decision Maker 
' Over $200,000 Board of directors or specified ' 
top management committee 
$100,000-$200,000 President or chairman of the 
board of directors 
$25,000-$100,000 Vice-president in charge of 
divisio11 
$5,000-$25,000 Plant Manager 
Under $5,000 Persons delegated by plant 
manager 
It is interesting to note the results of Prof. Istvan's findings of 
48 majo-r firms of the United States which have been summarized as 
follows: 
N b f H Del t d um er ow ega e 
< 
Authority Completely ' 4-Committee 
Delegated by Board of 
-
6 I-Executive Vice-Directors President 
I-Various Divisional 
Vice-Presidents 
No Delegation of -
Authority 6 
-
-,, Various Degrees Usually in Accordance 
of Delegation 36 with Above Table 
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CHAPTER I I THE ROLE OF UNCERTAINTY 
Because "the only sure thing in this world is the past, but all 
·-· ttl 
we have to work with is the future in inv~stment planning, a careful 
review of what is uncertainty and its role in capital investments is 
pertinent. 
2.1 What is Uncertainty? 
Although uncertainty and risk both refer to a situation in which 
future outcomes are imperfectly known, there is a definite difference 
between the two. The risk situation is charact1erized by the following: 
a. The probabilities of all alternative possible outcomes 
" are known • 
··-c.· 
b. It is repetitive in nature. 
c. It possesses a frequency distribution from which obser-
vations can be drawn. 
d. It is possible to generate,inferences from these obser-
, . 
yations by objective, statistical methods. 
As an example, almost any of the phenomena against which insurance 
can be drawn, can be classified as risks. The reason for this lies in 
the fact that " " adequate statistics have been compiled about the relative 
frequency of each event. Situations under uncertainty, on the other· 
hand, possess the following criteria: 
1 
a. The situation is unique. There is no possibility of 
"experiment"' replication. 
(18, p. 199) . 
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b. Its frequency distribution cannot be objectively 
defined. 
... 
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Most investment decisions belong to thts classification. The general~ 
term uncertainty can be further differentiated into the two classes of 
II ft t . t d It b . t • ff t • t -~ure uncer a1n y an su Jee 1ve uncer a1n y. " " Under pure uncertainty 
or ignorance the decision maker is aware that one of several possible 
.... 
things is true but he does not know the relative probabilities of their 
truth or if it is even meaningful to talk about probabilities. This 
dilemma can be illustrated by an example employed by Savage: Suppose you 
are making an omelet, have broken five good eggs into a bowl, and contem-
plate a sixth, as yet unbroken egg. Two conditions or states are pos-
f ( 1 E) " tt ( ) sible or this sixth egg: State = 1 = good, State 2 = E2 = 
'' '' rotten. Now, you plan either to break the egg into the bowl with the 
five good eggs (Act 1 = A1 ), or break it into a saucer for inspection 
(Act 2 = A2), or throw it away without breaking (Act 3 = A3). A final 
result or consequence matri~ coti\d be generated as follows: 
El " 
rt 
E2 
ft 
rotten " - good -- -
1 
Al Six-egg omelet. No omelet 
destroyed. 
and five good eggs 
A2 Six egg omelet and a Five egg omelet and a saucer to 
saucer to wash. wash. 
A3 Five egg omelet and one Five egg omelet. 
good egg destroyed. 
--
Luce and Raiffa offer hypothetical conditions which could turn 
.. . 
,-- ____________ ··- ---this case of "pure" uncertainty into one risk. · "Suppose the husband -
a. scientifically minded farmer - 'knows.,. that in a random sample of · six 
----- -- --
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eggs,- the conditional probability of the sixth egg's being rotten when 
the other five are good is 0.008 .. Thus, he may view breaking the sixth. 
.! 
egg into the bowl as the lottery:- 0.992 probability of the six egg 
omelet prize and 0.008 probability of the no-omelet and five good eggs 
destroyed prize. In other words, an ~ priori probability distribution 
" " " " over the states good and rotten allows one to structure the problem 
as one of decision making under risk - as a choice among lotteries", 
,. 
(16, p. 277). It is also interesting to note that in this case, the 
true state between E1 and E2 cannot be affected by any $strategy. Either 
~f::-.1 ,.,. the egg is rotten or it is not rotten and the decision maker can do 
nothing about this. 
Under a condition of "pure uncertainty, the strategy or action that 
a decision maker will employ will depend upon the criterion he uses. 
But, different criterion will usually generate different strategies. Let 
us investigate some of these criteria based upon attitude; e.g., pessi-
mistic, optimistic, of the decision-maker. 
Because a pay-off matrix will be germane to the overall analysis, 
let us consider the following payoff matrix: 
• [J. 
\ 
. El E2 E3 E4 
. 
~ 3~ 3 0 3 
A2 1 1. 1 ~ 3 ' ' . 
A 0 5 0 0 3 
A4 2 4 0 0 
Let E. = {E. } where E. is a "state of the world" • The set E is ex-
.. ,, J J . 
. '' haustive and mutually exclusive. Savag~ defines the world as the object 
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about which the person is concerned", and a state of the world "as a 
description of the world, leaving no relevant aspect undescribed'', 
(25, p. 9). 
'/ 
A = {Ai J where Ai denotes a course of action; i.e., a function which 
assigns a payoff or consequence to each state of the world. All possible 
courses of action are represented by the matrix. As an example, if the 
state of the world is E2 and the decision maker chooses action A3 , then 
his payoff is 5. 
If the decision maker is an extreme pessimist he will assume that 
- the worst pc;>ssible consequence will result due to the most unfavorable 
state of the world. Accordingly, he would pick the smallest payoff in '-.4 
each row and then select the action in which this minimum is greatest. 
·' In other words, the criterion is to select that strategy which is the 
maximum among the minima, hence the name - maximin1 . This criterion is 
'-
'{:~-.,. 
usually associated with tl1e name ··of Abraham Wald. Mathematically, the 
choice of action can be expressed as: 
where Q .. is the payoff resulting from A. and E .• 1J 1- J 
In the example matrix, the conservative decision maker will elect 
A2 as his course of action. 
If the decision maker is an extreme optimist or an inveterate 
_gambler, he will select the row containing the largest payoff, i.e., .. 
' 
1 It ~is interesting to note that in a two-p·erson zero sum game invol-
ving a saddle point, this is the best strategy to play. 
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A3·• · This strategy has been labeled maximax, (maxiDD1m maximorum) by the 
game theorists. 
In 1951, Hurwicz attempted a generalization of "t:J}e_maximum criterion 
to-make it less pessimistic. This resulted in a possible compromise be-
tween the extreme pessimist and the extreme optimist. Hurwicz suggested 
an index of optimism1 , a , which is some preselected number between O and 
I 
. 
1. This means that the decision maker would determine mjx { a mtx Qij + 
(1-a) min Q .. _L. If a - O, Hurwicz criterion reduces to the maximin . i 1JJ 
criterion; and if a= 1, the criterion becomes maximization of maximum 
gain. If a=!, the Hurwicz rule, in the example matrix, leads to the 
choice of A3 • Because Hurwicz's criterion only takes into consideration 
the worst and the best for each action, it is not too appealing from a 
normative point of view. 2 However, this criterion may have some merit 
because it illustrates how business men make their decisions. 3 
Another criterion, called the "Principle of Insufficient Reason" 
is usually associated with the nam~s of Thomas Bayes and P. S. Laplace.4 
This criterion attempts to change uncertainty into risk. The argument is 
that if we are really ignorant of the probabilities with which each state 
of nature will occur, then we ·should assume that all of them are equally 
1 Some writers refer instead to a degree of pessimism • 
·2 
Good definj_tions and exampl~s of normative and descriptive theories 
.are given by William J. Morris, (21, Chapt. 13). 
3 For illustrations of a descriptive approach to economic decision making, refer to (26, Chapt. 2). 
4 Bayes originally suggested the criterion but Laplace was responsible for the first extensive use of it. (Lancelot Hogben, Statistical Theory, G. Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1957, p. 21). However, Luce and Raiffa in~(16, p. 284) state that Jacob _Bernoulli, (1654-1705), first formulated the "Principle of Insufficient Reason". 
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"This principle is extremely vague, and· its indiscriminate use has 
led to many nonsensical results. Writers since Bernoulli's time have 
attempted to add qualification to the principle and to specify limited 
interpretation so as to avoid some of the more blatant contradictions", 
(16, p. 284) • 
.. The last1 criterion which will be considered is the Regret Cri-
terion proposed by Leonard J. Savage (25). When a decision maker 
employs this criterion, Savage suggests that he really wants to minimize 
the-regret he will experience after he has actually received the specific 
'j 
payoff resulting from his selection of a strategy. 
A regret matrix2 can be computed from the original payoff matrix by, 
subtracting each element from the largest element in its column. 
Thus: 
E1 E2 --E 3 E4 
Ai 0 2 1 0 
.. .... 
' 
A2 2 4 0 0 
A3 3 0 1 3 
A4 l 1 l 3 
, . 
.. 
~. 
The decision maker selects the action; i.e., row in which the maximal 
element is the smallest. This leads to a choice of A1 • Chernoff in 1954 
• 1 See Luce and Raffia, Chapter 13 for a description of other criteria. 
2 This is equivalent to the opportunity cost matrix calculated from a given payoff matrix in certain inventory problems. 
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has adequately criticized this criterion and its several drawbacks. Luce 
and Raiffa (16, pp. 281-2) give a two-page summary of these comments. 
a... . 
-. J 
-·· 
.. 
The decision criteria which have been considered have given three 
different results. This is a disturbing state of affairs and wo~ld force 
·. 
one to seek a more scientific and systematic approach to the problem of 
• '' ft decision making under pure uncertainty if possible. Critical analysis of 
1 the short-comings of each criterion have been given by many investigators 
and will not be included here. 
'' ft . If a pure uncertainty were an acknowledged reality in the business 
" " \ world, then it would pay to continue investigations along these lines. 
One could then seek to modify or convolute in some fashion the criteria 
just described. But, before wasting our energies in this direction, the 
. f " " reality o pure uncertainty in the business world must be established. 
"Pu " re uncertainty means total ignorance. B " . " ut, a feeling for the 
future of experienced executives and forecasts based upon statistical 
studies give a "validity"2 to subjective probability and lotteries. This 
permits a quantification of the judgment of the responsible decision maker 
concerning what the facts may be. '' ' Subjective probability is axioma-
tized by properties somewhat similar to those of objective probabilities, 
but it is then shown that subjective probability possesses the defining 
1 Milnor, J., in Games Against Nature, John Wiley & Sons, 1954, 
details 10 axioms which he things a good decision rule ought to 
satisfy. None of the criteria we have considered thus far satisfy 
al 1 1-0 axioms • 
2 There are two schools of thought on subjective probability. One 
admits its usefulness and validity; the other refuses to recognize 
it. The latter appear to be in a minority. 
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. l property of a subjective (Fechnerian) sensation scale as the ·term is used 
in psychophys.ics", ~Jl6, p !' 36) . -Hence, a further study of subjective 
probabilities leadsdirectly._into a review of the utility. 
is covered in Chapter V. 
2 .2 Investment Uncertainty and Forecasts 4 
·"' 
--
This subject-
Capital investments based on capital budgeting involyes forecasting. 
Generally; in order for a f_irm __ t_o_select a proper investment alternative, 
·it must make some assumption or some forecasts about future sales. In 
fact, forecasting may very well be the most important variable to be con-
sidered in evaluating alternatives, since the goal of forecasting is to 
- determine just what the future holqs-~ore. This is a frontal attack 
--
on total ignorance. 
The traditi~al explanation of the dependence of the capital budget 
on the economic forecast is as follows: 
"In order to decide how much a company should invest or what kinds 
of assets, it should acquire, we need a sales forecast for the firm -- to 
establish its anticipated level of activity. 
But the firm's sales forecast cannot be made without some estimate 
of what the industry is going to do, and this industry's saies forecast 
in turn depends in large measure on the predicted level of activity in 
the economy as a whole. 
Q.E.D.--the capital budget of any individual firm has a unique and 
" ( important relation to the general economy forecast. 43, p. 115) 
1 Fechnerian sensation can be taken as a~ equivalent to utiltty. e - .. -
.. . - ', . 
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In his textbook, (38), Prof. Rufus Wixon discusses this relation-
ship between budgets and forecasts in two chapters and then concludes: 
"It is evident that the only answer to these questions is that successful 
forecasting is necessary if a firm is to do satisfactory planning and 
consequently the right kind of budgeting." 
.. 
In other words, the firm wants to know what to invest in and how 
much to invest. This depends among other things, upon future sales, and 
we can never know in advance just what they will be. 
Although forecasting is not an exact science and although " estimates 
1 are but estimates", it still allows the decision maker to use subjective 
judgment, in the form perhaps of subject.ive probability, to rank a 
preference among alternatives. 2 In some firms this is all that is done 
to select the best alternative; i.e., just look at the most promising 
'· 
sales forecast. But, in other firms, sales forecasts or other rellted 
forecasts, such as future precent of market, are taken as the startillg--------·-
point for the employment of other indices of relative preference. For 
the latter group of decision makers, forecasting merely served -t,I reciiice · 
the ignorance about .the future and to give them a mathematical beginning 
point. Thus, the starting point is usually an estimate--a pit of un-
certainty--but this is the best that can be done. Hence, there is some 
gamble involved, and it is impossible to make sure that every decision 
, ... - -
will turn out as planned. The decision maker tries to increase the odds 
'I 1 A reference Prior Sinclair use.s· in describing budgeting--(29, p. 4). i 
., 2· For example, sales forecasts may 
,, ff 
. expand?, What size plant shall 
more research and development of 
" more?. 
------- ------ -- --- -
th t . "Shall answer e ques ions, we 
invest in 
how much 
. " " we build?, Shall we 
this product? If so, 
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of success in his favor as much as possible. How he does this is des:.. 
cribed in the next chapter. All of these methods involve some inherent 
aspects of uncertainty;. e.g., future rates of return, level of business 
activity, actions of competitors, costs of production, future availa- ----· 
bility of improved models of machines, etc. 
-C 
2.3 General Analysis of Risk and Uncertainty In Capital Investments 
• 
A general analysis by .this author of the omnipresent factors of risk 
· (in the gambler's sense) a~ uncertainty in capital investments reveals 
·-w 
that the sources from which these fa~ors origi:;.=te are mainly five in 
number: 
a. Lack of Sufficient Numbers of Same Type Investments 
As a general rule, .on:\,y a few of any particular type of 
investment have been made in the past, which could serve 
as a guide for designating a reasonably accurate average 
return and probabil~ty of realizing same. The law of 
large numbers or the law of averages in such cases is 
inoperative and totally meaningless .. 
b. Forecast Errors Due to Ignorance of Interacting Factors 
How well does the forecaster know the interactions of the 
pertinent factors? For example, in .trying to predict 
the sales potential of0 - a new product, are the inter-
actions between prices, income, taste, and competitive 
. -
products fully understood? 
.q 
The answer is undoubtedly 
negative in nature; and yet, the very structure of al-
most all investment decision making processes is built 
. ' 
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upon _forecasts. 
c. Environmental Changes in the Future 
Almost all aspects of the businessman's world are dynamic 
in nature. How well does the decision maker know the future 
prices and demand of his products? Can a _v_iolent change 
in the market completely destroy any demand for his product? 
They may attempt to account for these fluctuations or 
changes through.a probability method of weighing future 
returns . But the accuracy of knowing how the future will 
change, qualitatively and quantitatively is always open to 
doubt. The world of capital investments is not the static 
homogeneous environment of the laws of physics. 
d. Personal Bias and Habits of Decision Maker 
By nature, decision makers generally belong to the optimistic 
school or to the pessimistic school. In addition, they may 
be influenced by personal habits, hunches, and predilections.-
It ---~s possible that bias and prejudice f9.r or against certain 
, . 
investment proposals can be influential on a subconscious 
level. 
e. Inaccuracies Attached to the Analysis Method 
Each method of analysis to be examined in Chapter III has 
certain built-in assumptions about risk and uncertainty. In 
fact, most of the common methods avoid treating risk or else 
regard risk for all alternatives_ as equal. The completeness 
of proposal details, equally careful treatment of all 
proposal items, accuracy of these item estimates, etc., may 
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I ' 
be open to doubt and thus generate uncertainty and risk. 
Concerned persons, fa-ced with these .·foregoing risks and uncer-
tainties, generally attempt to counteract or at least to mitigate this 
,. 
effect in their estimates by turning to probability analysis and when 
. .. 
' , 
. 
necessary to subjective probabilities. It is these estimates which are 
usually the starting points for the techniques described in Chapter III. 
As a rule, top management is given various estimates; e.g., pro-
jected size of market for a new product, costs of production, income 
l I "- \..J from the new product, effects of competition on income, etc. from dif-
ferent departments or individuals. The final decision maker(s) must 
integrate or convolute those various estimates to arrive at a con-
clusive yea or nay for the proposal. It is imperative that if a mean-
ingful decision is to be the end product of all estimate integration, 
that these estimates be made using a consistent and uniform basis. 
However, it is the opinion of this writer that some confusion and error 
does exist on an operational level because of differences in estimation 
philosophy. Probably, the chief sources of such error stems from: 
(a) The confusion between expected (average) and most likely 
estimate. Many individuals, responsible for generating~ 
estimates fail to inform the recipient of this information 
as to-what their estimate really ~ans. For example, 
assume a firm is making plans to modify one of its major 
products and is interested in determining this effect on 
gross sales. The following data has been estimated: 
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. . -
Probability of 
Occurrence 
Income From Final Weighed 
Sales Effect 
(1) .. s:ize of :Market ·continues 
1 Unchanged 
.25 _ $150,000 $37,500 
(2) Size of Market Increases .50 225,000 112,500 
(3) Size of Marked Decreases, due 
to Possible Introduction of 
better product and/or modifi-
cation fran competition .25 50,000 : 12,500 
I I 
Expected (Average) Sales= $162,500 
An estimate for this event can be the most probable result 
which is that the size of the market increases with an income 
of $112,500 or it can be that the overall expected sales is 
1 $162,500. The entire analysis of profitability could be 
based on either one. Urtle~-s the estimator informs management 
which estimation base he used, he is adding error, at the 
very beginning, to whatever ~valuation process must employ 
his estimate. It is easy to see how such error is compounded 
when different estimators, using different bases, give their 
findings to the decision making body. 
(b). The equal treatment of subjective probabilities when the 
estimator's confidence are markedly different for each 
estimate. No doubt, the best 'form of estimation involves 
objective probabilities. However, in the face of risk 
and uncertainty, it is often necessary to use subjective 
probabilities based on experience and intuition. However, 
1 It is possible to view this as the use of the mode versus the mean 
for estimating. 
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:i.t is often found that the estimator is·mucn·more 
confident of some estimates than others. 'This can be 
·-
~~~~-due to more experience in one area than another or the _,.. 
,, 
greater accumulation of data on one phase t·han on 
·-
th If th 1 . " " b . d d th o ers . e examp e in a a ove 1s use , an e 
estimator claims that "3" is almost pure guess work, 
but he is a lot surer and more confident of the other 
·two projections; we should, but have not, reflected 
this difference. In fact, the use of the average 
weight assumes that all states are given with equal 
confidence; which is not realistic in many cases. 
This causes us to consider the next potential source 
of error. 
(c) The transfer of uncertainty to other estimates when 
subjective probability is used. By its very nature, 
subjective probabi~ity has inherent uncertainties. The 
estimator usually feels that he is not so completely 
ignorant of the situation that he should use the Laplace 
principle of insufficient reason, but at the same time 
he is not so expertly informed. He usually has some 
prior information or prior belief about the proba-
bilities in question. 1 But, because the sum of the 
1 The most ideal situation would be one in which the estimator could actually plot his prior distribution (f(p) vs p) with sufficient 
. -
-,., approximation. _Mathematically, the ideal convolution woul-d involve a prior distribution to represent what he believes, a utility function to represent what he wants, and a distribution to represent what he knows. 
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probabilities must add up to one, the uncertainties 
peculiar to one probability must be reflected in the 
remaining probabilities. To return to the example 
in "a". If the estimator is still unsure of "3" but 
he claims that "" . "" 2 is twice as probable as 1 ; then, 
., 
----
depending upofl what probability is assigned to "3", he 
has automatically determined •'1" and "2" probabilities • 
In effect, w~at the estimator has done, is help to 
distribute his greater uncertainty from one projection 
to all projections within the system . 
. , 
(d) The difference in meaning, the "most optimistic" and 
"most pessimistic" estimates have for different people. 
These terms are not as definite and universal as is 
generally supposed, but rather have some vagueness 
incorporated within their usage. For example, if an 
estimator looks at the following table: 
Projection Effect 
A 
B 
C 
D 
E 
F 
G 
.. ,.. 
-
.. ,' 
. .;_;. 
-
-
-
···-
··.·-
·-. 
-· 
-
-
-
-
Probability of Occurrence 
15° 
14 
14 
14 
14 
14.5 
14.5 
.__ . "':-----·-· ---
Is he to say that the most likely project effect is~ and totally 
ignore the six other equally probable effects? What does most likely 
~· mean in this case? Similarly, when the estimator gives a 
-
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~ 
value 'for the " most pessimistic " effect, what does he mean? Is he 
stating that under no conditions would he expect anything worse to 
occur, or merely that in one out of a hundred such situations would 
,. 
he expect the results to occur. Confusion increases when terms such· 
1: 
as "moderately optimistic" or "reasonably pessimistic" are employed by 
the estimators or decision makers in place of the "most pessimistic" 
or "most likely". 
The question which must be answered now is: Assuming that all of 
the above inconsistencies, co~fusion and error do exist, is there an 
operational solution? This author believes that the use of confidence 
limits or levels may be the answer. The work by Hess and Quigley (59), 
appears to bear this assumption out. The use of confidence intervals 
involves statements or tabulations which represent estimates as: 
"Estimated chance of being Achieved or Exceeded" or "Estimated Chance 
of being Equal to or Less Than". The first could apply to anticipated 
sales and the second to expected costs for a new product. The ability 
to convolute these limits helps to eliminate even more confusion and is 
a· major advantage of this technique. For example, if a decision maker 
~s trying to estimate the profitability of a project and is given the 
following data: 
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Est·imated Chance of Being 
Anticipated Sales of New Product". Achieved or Exceeded 
------·-·· --
~ .w.;..- ------ ---· -· 
$80,000 
73,000 
60,000 
40,000 
90% 
70% 
40% 
15% 
. . 
i, 
. 
.... )• ·-· 
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and Projected Gross Cost--
$65,000 
61,000 
59,000 
46,000 
... 
Estimated Chance of Being 
Equal to Less Than 
90% 
70% 
50% 
38j 
If he treates the confidence levels as probabilities, then the sum. 
or difference of their estimates has at least the same-confidence level 
as is given by the product of the two confidence levels of which it is 
composed. Hence, an expected profitability of ($80,000-$65,000) = 
$15,000 = (.9)(.9) = 0.81. Also: (Some Amount Less than 80,000) -
(Some Amount Above $65,000) = (.10)(.10) = .01. 
Several other convolutions-jean be evolved. Such manipulations and ,, 
presentation to a decision maker are much more meaningful than the single 
expected value for the average profit. Ideally, this author believes, 
that probability distributions, for all factors are the most meaningful. 
The computer can be used to convolute these distributions or a manual 
method employing Monte Carlo techniques can be used on the cumulative 
,. 
\ 
distributions for each factor. ~ese distr-ibutions-~incorporate- t~e ---------:-·------------~ 
. , ' 
critical risk dimension and thus allow management to make a quantitative 
assessment of these involved risks in evaluating a particular investment. 
The~chances of achieving a minimum desired return or of losing money 
.,_ 
can then be determined • 
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. alAPTER III CRITERIA FOR EVAUJATlNG INVBSTIIINTS 
3.1 General 
In spite of the fact that the survival of a firm may depend upon 
its investment decisions, "the procedures used to help management make 
,n 
investment decisions are frequently almost unbelievably primitive" 
(4, p. 2). All available alternatives are seldom given careful 
ana-lysis. In fact-, "even when there is an investigation of alternatives, 
the ,\information obtained is generally not used in a manner likely to 
lead to effective final decision", (4, p. 2). 
Prof. Donald Istvan, after conducting personal interviews of 48 
major companies on capital budgeting problems, stated, 
"Two striking conclusions are to be drawn from this study. 
The first is that there has not been extensive adoption among 
the firms studied of the theoretically superior techniques of 
capital expenditure analysis. This is especially true in the 
area of economic evaluation. The second is that this investi-gation has failed to disclose any basic agreement among the 
managements of the companies regarding the degree of concern 
and effort that should be expended on the development and 
implementation of a capital expenditure decision making process. There is not even any general agreement among the number firms 
of a given industry", ( 14, p . 97) . 1 
These conunents should serve as a stimulus to investigate in depth ~ 
the more generally used methods of evaluating·investmen~ proposals. 
What are the merits and shortcomings of each? Why is it that each 
r-----~--~.,i~~~--=e=-t.hod_ u,5ual~ __gilz_e.S- differ.ent--I!ank.i-ng--Of- -investment- al ternati-ves?-·--
It behooves management today, because of the very nature of today's 
l 
l 
! . 
' • 
. 
! 
\ economic business environment, to acquaint itself with the various 
1 Prof. Istvan then proceeds to give, in detail, what he believes 
are the reasons for this situation. 
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aethods and to employ the best. J 
Most of the methods to be reviewed·-have the following character-
istics in connnon: 
a. An estimate of the firm's cost of capital is required. 
b. Estimates are needed of the incremental cash flows antici-
pated from a proposal over time. 
I 
c. Estimates are required for the incremental cash outlays 
required to implement each proposal. 
d. The overall, basic goal\employed is profit-maximization. 
e. The risks involved or the future make-up of the assets 
and liabilities that will be determined in part by the 
investment decisions currently being made, are not con-
sidered . 
It has been agreed that because a final selection by management 
1. ........... 
·, 
is seldom made on the basis of such economic analysis, the method used 
is inconsequential. This may be true if the executive(s) making the 
final decision is (are) acquainted with all the pertinent uncertainties· 
and problem areas. But, as a general rule, in the larger firm, the 
executives responsible for the decision making are fed the data by some 
subordinate group. In these cases, the method used to evaluate alterna-
.1 
tives may be very important, since the various techniques in common use 
..... .. 
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today give different ranking to identical sets of investment proposals. 
"Subs~antial improvements in efficiency and income may result if a more 
adequate measure can be discovered and widely adopted", (4,- p. 10). 
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3.2 Payback Period 
In 1954, Joel Dean referred to the payback period method as 
.. 
"unquestionably the most widely used measure of investment worth"=,---
- (47, p. 121). In 1961, Pr.of. Donald F. Istvan found that 34 out of the 
48 major firms he interviewed "do make use of the payback measure of 
'-
''---. 
acceptability", (14, p. 91). Although recent articles and textbooks on 
capital budgeting are quick to point out the weaknesses of this method, 
"the payback period remains one of the ·simplest and apparently one of 
the most frequently used methods of measuring the economic value of an 
----, ' " investment, (4, p. 17). 
A proposal's payoff period is defined as the ratio of its ~ost to 
its annual earnings before depreciation. 1 If an investment is expected 
to produce a stream of cash income that is constant from year to year, 
then the payback period can be determined by dividing the total original 
cash outlay by the amount·- of the annual cash anticipated income. But, 
if the anticipated income is not constant from year to year, then the 
payback period is determined by adding up the income expected in suc-
cessive years until the total is equal to the original outlay. 
The proposal's rate Qf profit, r, with reference to payback, can be 
calculated as follows, where: 
~ . 
C = cost of a given alternative or proposal. 
" Et= earnings before depreciation that the alternative is 
expected to provide in year t. 
1
" Prof. Barish defines "the payoff ~iod as the till18 required for an 
investment to pay for itself through the net operating advantage or 
,, revenue which would result from its installation". (3, p. 387) 
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n - the number of years the equipment is expected to last. -
Sn the scrap value of the equipment at t ~-- = n. -
r - the alternative's expected rate of profit. __ -
I' 
,.-'---'-- -
standard discount --r ormula: 
~ 
; 
Using the 
~- -~- ---· -
E1 E2 Et En+Sn C - + + + + (l+r) 2 ••• (l+r)t (l+r)n l+r 
Sn Assuming that E1 = E2 = E3 = En' and that (l+r)n· is- smalt in relat-100 to 
· C, we obtain the simplified formula: 
\ 
n 
C = I: 
t=l 
Finally, 
-~· 
When the planning period is sufficiently large, that is, n is a large 
number, the above formula simplifies into 
r = E/C 
But, E/C is the reciprocal of the p~yoff period. Therefore, it· is 
noted that: 
a. If the proposal will earn the same amount for~ver, its rate 
__ -.--,----,-,,---,-,--~--1oi...r..f--r ...... e ....... t ...... u ..... r..-.n :Ls simply the reciprocal of 1 ts payoff . 
b. If the proposal will last a finite number of years, the rate 
of return, r, is at most the reciprocal of the payoff period 
and smaller than this by the amount equal to ~ [i~r J n 
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Thus, we ha~e a reiationsliip betwe~n the payoff period and a pro-
posal's rate of return. The margin of error, ~ [l~rr' decreases as the 
life of the alternative increases. ft For example, a statement such as 
'This investment will be paid out in three years' is equivalent" in many 
companies to a 33% rate of return, either_by direct calculation or by 
\ implication". (60, p. 35) 
Prof. Barish (3, p. 388) states, "Let us note that the payoff period 
is another interpretation that can be given to the present value factors 
for annuities". But, he does not give the required conditions; i.e., 
assuming that an investment with a return equal to the cost of capital 
of the firm earns equal income each year, the maximum payback period is 
equal to the present value of a dollar per period for n periods_dis-
·counted on the basis of the cost of capital. For example, if a machine 
has an economic life of 15 years and the rate of return is 10%, the 
present worth table for $1 for 15 years at 10% gives 7.606. This indi-
cates that the maximum capital recovery takes place in 7.6 years: 
C Payback Period= E 
Payback Period= pr 
n 
where pr= present value of a dollar per period for n periods dis-n l 
r 
I ! . 
counted at an r rate o_f~i_n_t~-r~~st~·~· ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~r~ ----------
C = cost of a proposal 
E = earnings before depreciation 
"Because of the- --li-m-i ting assumptions, especially equal annual 
proceeds, this formula is not useful in making decisions, but 
it is useful in showing the absurdity of 
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7 
certain· payback conventions.'~ (4, p. 33) 
Basically, tpe cash payback period index has two weaknesses: 
a; It fails to give any consideration·'_to income earned ...,~ -
1 after the payback date. 
b. It fails to take into account the differences in the 
timing of proceeds earned prior to the payback date. 
------- .--
These weaknesses can easily be illustrated by use of the following 
table: 
TABLE I 
Investment Costs and Income to Show Weaknesses of Payback Method 
INCOME 
Investment Initial Cost Year 1 Year 2 Year 3 Payback.Period Rank 
A 10,000 10,000 
·1 1 
B 10,000 5,000 5,000 5,000 2 2 
C 10,000 2., 000 4,000 12,000 2 1/3 3 
D 10,000 10,000 3,000 3,000 1 1 
E 10,000 6,000 4,000 5,000 2 2 
Although both investments A and Dare ranked as 1, Dis definitely 
, 
'·. better. Any useful investment index must make such a diff·erence known. 
":"-
. 
Also, Band E are ranked the same,' but investment Eis sup~rior to 
---~-
·- ---------~ 
-~ ----
investment. B since the · only dif.ference between both investments is the 
$1,000 of investment E in Year 1, which is available one year earlier. 
Joel Dean prefers to list the weaknesses of this method as follows: 
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a. "Payback tends to overweigh the importance of liquidity 
.. 
' as a goal of the capital-expenditure program. 
, b. "It ignores capital wastage. By confining analysis to 
the project's gross earnings it takes no cognizance 
c • 
of its probable economic life • 
"It fails to consider the earnings of a proje,ct after 
the initial outlay has been paid back." (47, p. 24) 
.. ~ ...... 
..... 
/ 
, 
When Prof. Istvan's statement: " Even where correctly employed, that 
is as a measure of liquidity, complications in calculations can arise 
because, just as with the simple rate of return, investment can be con-
sidered as init.ial, average,· gross, or net of salvage value. Advantage 
can be before or after financing costs, capital consumption, and income 
taxes", (14, p. 88), is investigated mathematically, certain ·1nteresting 
relationships evolve. For instance, consider: 
a. Average Investment: 
A formula involving average investment return can be written 
as: 
E-D 
r = le 
where E = annual equal earnings before depreciation 
D = yearly depreciation amount 
-··· ....... 
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C = cost of the alternative 
I 
r = annual return rate 
n = life.of project 
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But, D = C/n because annual depreciation is equal to the 
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cost di-vided by the life of the ·proposal's equipment. 
Therefore, by substitution, 
- __ ..... __ -- --
--
-- -- -·--- - ------ - ~----------------'-------" -_ - ~- ____ , 
- ·---------
2E 2 
7"'--- r = ---- - -
C n --------- ----
And, 
2E· r = -C 
· ...... 
as. n-+m 
Which means that as the project's life extends far into the 
future, the rate of return approaches twice the reciprocal ·of 
the payoff period. Accordingly, while the error term, which 
we noted earlier in the general formula disappeared, the error 
in the average investment becomes E/C and r = (2) x (E/C). To 
help compensate for this error, it has been suggested that the 
full cost be used: 
E-D _ E 1 
rt = C -C - n • 
This tends t0c,give more conservative results. 
b. After-Tax Rate of Return: 
Let I= D + (E-D)(l-i) 
C C C 
= - + (E - - - Ei + --i) n n n 
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where, i - income tax rate, I --
-
annual income before depreci-
ation and after tax 
D - depreciation amount, '- assuming straight line 
_/ depreciation C/n -
-
If we assume i = a.so, we have: 
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· 2 2n 
; If we substitute thts value of I," for B, the pre-tax income, in ' " 
the original rate of return equation, r = -E/C - E/C [ 1 Jn -
--~-- i+r ' 
we have: 
r' = ..!. + _!_ _ [E + 1-J x [ 1 Jn 2C 2n 2C 2n l+r D 
Hence, the after-tax rate of return approaches one-half the 
·\ 
- --- --pre-tax rate as n becomes larger. Myron Gordon has shown that, 
"for n equal to the payoff period the error in the payoff 
reciprocal is not small, but for n 50% greater, the error is 
negligible. The error remains negligible for all values of n 
greater than this value." (55, p. 53) 
In favor of the payback method, Prof. Istvan stat-es, "As a 
measure of capital recovery, a correctly calculated payback 
figure1 is unrivaled. The greatest virtue of the payback 
measure is its extreme simplicity". (14, p. 90) A manual 
in eval.uating investment proposals for the Imperial Oil 
Limited2 claims, "The Payback Method is not common as a 
measure of the profitability of an investment, and it is 
satisfactory to determine whether a proposal is extremely 
... 
. ... 
, 
attractive or not wor-t~ f_~~tb,er ~tu_dy . __ HaweY-er,---it is ---- ----------~-~----------~-~=,;:;:---_-_ --··---· .._. ---------
i 
; 
f } 
i 
\ 
·-
- . ···_::--<-- ~ ._·.:..~ 
1 A correctly calculated payback measure employs: 
a. Net operating advantage before depreciation allowance. b. Net operating ·advantage on a year by year basis rather th~ any type of average adva.ntage. 
c. Initial investments before salvage recovery on the proposal but 
after salvage on any replaced facilities. 
2 The Discount Method of--Evaluating Investment Proposals, Marketing 
ae·search, Imperial Oil Limited, Toronto, Canada, April 12, 1955. 
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\ inadequate as a final judge of the majority of projects 
lying between _ -these extremes. " 
Joel Dean agrees with the above when he stat.es, " . Pay-
· back can serve as a coarse screen to pick out high-prof it 
projects that are so clearly desirable as to require no 
refined rate-of-return estimates and to reject quickly 
those projects which show such poor promise that they do 
not merit thorough economic analysis. In addition, it may 
be adequate as a measure of investment worth for companies 
with a high outside cost of capital and severely limited 
internal cash-generating ability in comparison with the 
volume of highly profitable internal investment opportuni-
ties." (47, p. 123) 
3.3 Rate of Return 
3.31 External-Present Value Method 
A sequence of returns E0 , E1 , E2 ••• En is said to have at present 
the discounted value of: 
En 
+------(l+r1)(l+r2> + •• + -----------(l+r1) (l+r2> ••• (l+rn) 
where r. is the __ annual __ int_e_re_s_t_ ___ (discount) ~ ---r-a:te-.- ---Di-sceunt-ing-~- calc~- ---· --- · -1----------~--
r/ 
•. -
- :1: 
lations are usually simplified by assuming that the interest rate does 
1 " d A borrower and a len er agree on an interest rate, while a de~ision 
maker uses a discount rate." (18, p. 14) 
2 
''Discounting is characterized by the fact that it proceeds from future to present, inversely to the passage ot passage of time. Phy~ically the stream of services flow parallel with time, begin-
ning with the asset invested." QB, p. 11).,. ,.. a 
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·.'° 
--- --- --- - ---------------
- -- --- - The conventional investments are characterized by having one or 
more periods of outlays (or income) followed by one or more periods of 
.. cash income (or outlays). The nonconventional investments have one or 
l • 
more periods of outlays (income) interspersed with periods of positive 
(-negative) cash· flows. The pattern is important when one attempts to 
calculate an internal rate of discount since the nonconventional 
investment tends to give rise to multiple rates. 
If one employs continuous rather than discrete discoupting, the 
present worth of a cash stream can be written as: t 
. 
I~ J T E(t) e-(jt) dt 
0 
. ... 
where Tis the life of the project, E(t) is a continuous return function 
rather than the sequence of returns El' Ev •• • E2 , ••• En, and ej = l+r. 
The employment of either discrete or continuous functions has pre-
sented a problem to some investors. In fact, even when one employs 
discrete calculations, the problem of annual, semi-annual, or quarterly 
compounding has been raised as an issue. Actually many of the major 
---------------------=fr1r· ntta-ne--i-a-l-out-1-ays from a business occur at discrete intervals;·e .g., 
quarterly taxes, quarterly dividends, monthly salaries, semi-annual 
interest, etc. However, many of the financial inf lows occur s·omewhat 
~ntinuously. If this is so, ''no particular compounding interval is 
•; 
• l 
< 
exactly appropriate." (30, p. 132) 
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Actually, the difference between annual discrete compounding as 
against continuous compounding is small. As rates and time period 
liecome higher, the relative :·difference in presen_t values becomes 
significant. "But, because the present values Qf distant sums fall 
~ very sharply at high rates of discount, the absolute difference in 
C 
__ __final results obtained in solving for rates of returns is minor." 
' 
, (30, p. 132) The following table and graph will serve to illustrate 
these points: 
N 
1 
5 
10 
15 
20 
25 
TABLE II 
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN CONTINUOUS (C) AND ANNUAL (A) DISCOUNTING 
INTERVALS • PRESENT VALUE OF OOE DOLLAR DUE AT END OF N YEARS. 
5 percent 
C 
.9512 
.7788 
.6065 
.4724 
.3679 
.2865 
A 
.9524 
.7835 
.6139 
.4810 
.3769 
.2953 
10 percent 
C 
.9048 
.6065 
.3679 
.2231 
.1353 
.0821 
A 
.9091 
.6209 
.3855 
.2394 
.1486 
.0923 
~-~--1 
15 percent 
C 
.8607 
.4724 
.2231 
.1054 
.049.8 
.0235 
A 
.8696 
.4972 
.2472 
.1229 
.0611 
.0304 
20 percent 
C 
.8187 
.3679 
.1353 
.0498 
.0183 
.0067 
A 
.8333 
.4019 
.1615 
.0649 
.-0261 
.0105 
... 
R. M. Adelson in a footnote does not seem ~o agree completely: "This~-
~---,......, ~-_____ ---..._____...___ct i on.-(hetween-.con-t inuous.. .and---di-scr~te--4-iscount ing-)--doe-s-~ot-
) 
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t ,-
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,' ~ 
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f 
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affect the arguments ,here ·but it "is worth noting that it can make con-
d 
" ( ) siderable ifference to certain numerical results, 39, p. 20 • But, 
Barish states, "In performing interest calculations, there is no real 
advantage to using continuous compounding", (3, p. 64) ~ Pierre MassJ 
... 
--~~---~~ '---·--·· -.· 
I • 
G. 
/ 
{ 
., 43. 
believes the only advantages, if any, of using continuous over dlscrete · 
--'. 
" 
discounting are theoretical since, continuous discount rate, permits a 
---·---~---more concise notation and a more direct use of the advantages -of the · differential and integral calculus", (18, ,p. 16). < 
·-. 
,' 
J 
\ # 
The present value method, by reducing a sequence of future returns 
to a single number or index, allows the decision-· maker to rank order 
proposals •. _ If two sequences of returns (_E0 , E1 ,_E2---Ei1.)--and (E0 ', -E-~-E2' , --E
0 ') with present values equal to I and I' , are such that I > I' , 
the first will be preferable to the second. If I= I', they are equiva-lent from the standpoint of present worth only. However, most writers 
seem to employ net present value as their criteria because it allows one 
the immediate advantage of accepting or rejecting any proposal and then 
allows for proper ranking of acceptable proposals.· This method is 
executed as follows: 
a. Choose an appropriate rate of interest. 
b. Compute the present value of the cash flows expected 
from the investment. 
c. Compute the present value of the cash outlay required 
by the investment. 
/) 
d. The present value of the inflow minus the present value 
of the outflow is the net present value of the invest-
ment. 
e-. Accept all independent investments whose present value 
is greater than or equal to zero. Reject all investments 
whose present value-is less than zero. 
f 
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. 
'f. Rank order all acceptable proposals on basis of 
.... ,<I. 
-.. 
-· 
magnitude of present value. 
-·---·---
The choice of the proper discount rat_e_ can affect either the accept/ ___ __.._.,.. _________ -
reject criterion or the relative ranking or both\ _How does one decide 
upon the proper discount rate? Is it the cost of capital? Is it a fixed 
? 
rate that management has instituted regardless of the fluctuating 
marketing to take into account the l~ng range effect of the proposal? 
Is it meant to include a buffer factor for uncertainty? Is it meant to 
. '-
take into ;consideration the cash requii: .. ements of the owners? Is the rate 
based on the type of investment; i.e., independent, mutually exclusive, 
complementary, or substitute? There cannot be one correct answer since 
no two firms are identical in resources, investment potential, financial 
set-ups, ability to handle uncertainty, reasons for inve_stment, and 
sources of funds. Accordingly, "it should be appreciated that compu-
tations using the present-value method are indications rather than numbers 
with 100% certainty and accuracy. It should be stressed that any decision 
(' 
about investments must in the last analysis be based on as complete a 
consideration of all the relevant factors as it is possible to provide, 
and that the probable present value of an investment proposal is only 
/ 
one factor although a very significant one, that must be considered in 
arriving at a final decision", (4, p. 101) • 
. Although some writers give different reasons for using the present 
value method, only one is really valid; i.e., to determine whether the 
investment yields more income than alternative uses of the same amount __ 
o 1 
... of . money. Uncertainty and personalized time preferences of investments 
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46 • \ 
are not val·id e~ough reasons for the employment of this technique. If a 
decision-maker uses the present value technique to discount for un- ----
certainty, he is assuming that the probability of a dollar of estimate·d 
cash actually materializing will decrease each year by a fixed percentage 
of the probability in the preceding year. Of course, the amount of per-
centage decrease eacli year depends upon the rate of interest. "In 
_particular, the application of present value discount factors to pre-
liminary estimates of expected cash flows will not ordinarily. be an 
accepted way of adjusting for risk." (4, p •. 55). It must be noted that 
'' '' if, in acceptable cases, the present worth method is used to account 
for uncertainty, then, it must be applied a second time to account for 
time differences in the value of money. 
"Since discounting, as generally defined, is truly relevant only to 
situations of perfect liquidity and no uncertafnty, it is not surprising 
to find that most attempts to incorporate risk into these criteria have 
resulted in considerable confusion." (39, p. 23) If the decision-maker 
does not pretend that uncertainty does not exist and if he does not 
merely use his intuition, what are some of the recommended techniques 
to- incorporate uncertainty into the present value method? (The fre-
quently stated procedures of shortening the expected life of an asset, 
estimating earnings very coµservatively or using higher discounting 
rates for riskier proposals are not included in this group.) 
, 
a. Method 1 - Recommended by Prof ij. Bierman and Smidt, 
(4, Chapt. 9). 
1. Determine the present value of net -cash flows 
for three different series of events: 
~ 
--· -·---
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47. 
(a) Most Probable 
(b) Reasonably Pessimistic 
(c) Reasonably Optimistic 
t ·.-= 
- --
-
2. Weigh the three present values, using the best 
information or using standard weights such as 50% for 
most probable and 25% for optimistic predictions •. 
3. The sum of the three weighted present v~lues may be 
.• used to represent the present value of the investment 
taking uncertainty into consideration. 
b. Method 2 - As presented by Prof. Robert Schlaifer, 
(26, Chapt. 2) • 
This modus operandi is actually similar to Method I, 
but it assigns values to outcomes according to their 
utility rather than their present values. The proba-
bility of each outcome is also accounted for in the 
product of utility and probability; i.e., expected 
utility. Of course, the determination of corporation 
utility values may not be readily determined. 
c. · Method 3 - Joel Dean's Proba~ility Multiplier • 
. " 
,. A probability of occurrence factor, (0 < factor s 1), 
relative to the estimated earnings for each project 
,. for eacµ year is employed. The probability factor is 
f 
smaller for more distant~years to reflect greater un-
certainty. " This method is capable of fine discrimi-
nation among years as well as among projects~ It is 
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particularly ~ppropriate when the whole return from 
• the investment becomes sharply more uncertain at, some ,. 
future date'', - (9, p. 31.) • 
Actually, the search for better decision making 
in the face of uncertainty has generatedJother models; 
,,if\ 
/ \ 
- ----·--
,. ft e.g., dy-namic and stochastic programming. This area . . 
(of uncertainty consideration) is still in its infancy, 
and there is little that can presently be brought 
effectively into the investment decision of a complex 
• . ft corporation. (4, p. 132) 
:3 .3 Rate of Return 
3.32 Internal--Discounted Cash Flow Method1 
.. . ,. 
Inherent in this metqqti is the present value concept, but without 
_J 
the choice of an " . " arbitrary rate· of interest. The basic procedure is 
to find a rate of interest that will make the present value of the cash 
income expected from an investment equal to the present value of the 
cash outlays required by the investment. By a process of trial and 
error, the approximately correct rate of interest can be determined. 
This method is identical to the technique long employed by financial 
circles for computing the expected rate of yield to maturity of a bond 
which is purchased for an amount different from its face value. For 
example, a 5% $1,000 bond, which matures in 5 years, and has a net 
purchase price of $1.044.52 will yield 4%. 
1 Other terms used to define this technique are internal rate of 
return on investment, present value return on investment, profit-
ability index, investor's method, yield of an investment method, Keynes' marginal efficiency of capital method, and the scientific . r 
method. 
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A: main appeal of the internal rate of return method "is that the 
.... ~-. internal rate of return for a proposed project may be computed without 
a knowledge of the market rate of interest", (44, p. 20). But, 
< according to Pierre Masse, "if ·one ·takes time to think the matter over, 
this apparent facility is only an evasion", (18, p. 23). Profs. Bierman 
and Smidt hold the s.ame opinion: "The yield of an investment must be 
_compared with the cost of capital. The cost of capital is no less im-
portant to yield (i.e., internal rate of return method) tha_n to present 
value, although it enters at an earlier stage in the computations of the 
present value method", (4, p. 35). This is especially evident when the 
decision maker employs a reference or cutoff rate in an accept/reject 
action of a proposal: 
.;: .. 
a. First, the decision maker ranks all investment proposals 
in descending order ac·cording to their internal rate of 
return . 
b .. Second,,he accepts all investments whose profit yield or 
internal rate. of return is as great or greater than the 
cost of capital .. 
-- -···t. 
.J 
,,. 
The relevance of the cost of capital to the internal rate method 
can also ·be noted simply by interpretlng what is meant b-y an internal 
rate of return of a conventional investment: " It represents the high-
est rate of. interest an investor could afford to pay without losing 
money, if all the funds to finance the investment were borrowed and 
the loan was repaid by application of cash proceeds from the invest-
-
ment -as they were earned . " ( 4, p. 26) 
-
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I It is not a,1w·ays possible to obtain a unique rate of return for a 
l . 
---- r"l: 
--- , 
given proposal. Under certain circumstances, it is possible that a 
proposal: 
- I 
- - ------------- l 
A 
a. Will ·have no rate of return 
b. Will have one rate of return 
c. Will have more than one rate of return. 
All conventiona~ investments (negative cash outflow followed by a 
string of positive cash inflows) will have one and only one rate of re-
'o turn. But, a non-conventional investment; (an investment which has one 
or more periods of outlays (income) interspersed with periods of positive 
( ) ) 
" " "b " 
negative cash flows , may fit into either of the above, a, , or 
"c" class. 
An example of a non-conventional investment with no yield would be 
an investment having cash income of $200 and $300 in periods 1 and 3, 
respectively, and cash output of $400 in period 2. Mat-hematically, we 
can express this as the equivalent of: 
300 x2 - 400 X + 200 = 0 
where X represents the discount factor. Of course, _t_~is equation has no· 
solution in the domain of real numbers. "However, a project for which 
,; there is no real value of the internal rate of return is not necessarily 
a bad one." (44, p. 21) 
The problem of multiple rates was first examined by James Lorie and 
Leonard Savage in 1955 in an article titled, "Three Problems in Rationing 
Capital", (66) • According to these investigators, the types of invest~ 
ments yielding more than one rate of return " are rare, but they do occur, 
. - -----------------:----: 
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" { ) especially in the extractive industries ,66, · p • 63 • But, Prof. 
Richard Bernhard disagrees and claims, "it is not difficult to find 
examples in practical settings for which R (the terminal cash flow) is n 
. -
not positive and hence for which the internal rate of return is not 
unique.1 For example, the terminal cost of demolishing a building or 
k R " of disposing of radioactive waste might. be such as to ma e --ii negative , 
C 44 , .· p • 21 > • 
Also, J. Hirshleifer (62), has presented several patterns of net 
incremental returns which do not lead to a unique value of r. M. Klein 
--~ 
... 
:-. -
. . -~- -· ----..:-- ,,W'"\ 
does the same in his article (64, p. 69). 
... ,. 
An example, due to Ezra Solomon, ·will serve as an illustration of 
d multiple internal rates of return. 
' 
Assume that the proposal being considered is the installation of a 
larger oil pump that would get a fixed quantity of oil out of the grcund 
more rapidly than the pump that· is already in use. . Also, assume that by 
operating the existing pump the investor can expect $10,000 a year hence 
and $10,000 two years hence; and that by installing the larger pump at a 
net cost of $1,600 now, he can expect $20,000 a year hence and nothing the· 
,. 
second year. The installation of the larg~r pump can be viewed as a 
project having the following cash flow characteristics: 
1 C. S. Soper in (79, p. 175), has shown that sufficient conditions for 
r, the internal rate of return, to be unique are: 
a. The final net return, E , in the life of the project must be positive j! n .. 
s=k Es b. - Eo> I: r)S k = 1, 2, n-1 (1 + ... ' ~ s=l / 
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Time Period 
- .. 
. . 
...: 
Incremental Cash 
Flow Due to Investment 
-- ~-- .._ 
• --=- ._ ... 
. ..... 
---~------------· -
-
~· 
- 1,600 
+10,000 
_ -10,000 
"'···· ,. 
Application of the standard procedures to find the internal rates 
which make the algebraic sum of the discounted cash outflows and in-
flows equal to zero, yields two answers, 25% and 400%. Which of these 
. 
two rates is correct? "Neither of these rates is a measure of invest-
ment worth, neither has relevance to the profitability of the project 
under consideration, and neither, therefore, is correct. The fault. 
lies in the incorrect application of the 'usual prescription' ·for 
finding the rate of return", (30, p. 130). To find the correct answer, 
we must merely answer the question, "What is it worth to the investor 
to receive $10,000 one year earlier than he would have otherwise re-
ceived it?" If the investor spends ,1, 600 at time t 0 for a larger pump, 
he will have at time t 2 ($10,000)(X%) where X% represents the rate of 
yield applied to the $10,000. Equating the outlay of $1,600 and the 
gain of $10,000 (X%) to zero over the three time p~riods gives the 
• appropriate rate of return. "Using this approach, a unique and meaning-
ful rate of return can always-~e found for any set of cash inflows and 
outflows", (~O, p. 131) . 
There are two different ways to analyze multiple returns, graphical 
--and mathema_tical. Each shall now be briefly examined: 
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1 Mathematical Analysis of Multiple Rates 
. I 
.-
Actually, the proof shall be concerned with conditions necessary 
for a unique r~te of return. By not satisfying these singular con-
-altions, it is possible to have multiple returns. 
The present value of the income flow can ·be defined as: 
T 
V, = J E(t)e-stdt 
0 
where T represents the life of the project ands is the instantaneous 
rate of intere~t. 
Similarly, the present value of the outflow of investing can be 
defined as: 
W = J C(t)e-stdt 
0 
where C(t) represents the capital investment flChedule or rate at which 
capital is being invested at time t. To calculate an internal rate of 
return, we set: 
JT T E(t)e-stdt l -st - C(t)e~ dt 0 " 
In general, it is not possible to solve this equation directly for a 
value of s. However, numerical methods can be devised with the aid of 
which the equation can be ~olved. In order to investigate the charac-
teristics of this equation further, it is necessary to -define a function 
U(t, s) as: 
1 The approach which the author uses is similar to the Lefkovits', Konn$r's, and Harbottle's presentation at the 1959 Fifth World Petroleum Congress (65). 
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(;J:: :t ·r= U(t, s) = J. ·C(x)e -sxdx - J_ 
0 0 
E(x)e-sxdx 
--==---whcich~s the present value at the ra:te s, of the unpaid capital at time 
-------'·-·-- -t-. Now, if T denotes the life of the project, thens<!! O, is an internal 
rate of return-if 
U(T,s) = 0 
Now, consider a net cash flow: 
' } \ ,.... 
,.. 
" 
,· .. 
----------------1 
F(t) = E(t) 
- C(t) . 
where 
. \ 
{ F(t)e -stdt = 0 
0 ! 
~efines a rate of return for s <!! O. 
Because Tis the termination date, F(T) = 0 fort> T; the~efore, 
we can restate the former equation as: 
cc J F(t)e-stdt = O 
0 
This integral represents the Laplace1 transforms of the function F(t) 
.. 
which can be represented by f(s). Hence, a rate of return of a project 
is a non-negative root of the equation: 
C • 
.. . 
f(s) = O 
Now, it is possible to state the conditions for a project to have only 
I 
one rate of Peturn: 
Condition 1: 
I 
, 
1 
By analogy to electrical engineering, one can think of the input 
as the cash outflows, the black box as the financial manipulation 
of the project involving rates of return, and the output as the 
cash inflows". 
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55. ' 
. -·~ \ ----' - \ a. f(o) 2 o, 
-b. F(t) have only one sign change. In words, this means 
-
-· 
- -- -- -
........ - that the total undiscounted income from a project is 
J 
------------~· _not smaller than the capital investment into the -p:roject r 
and also the net cash flow does not become negative 
.,. 
\ 
again after it has become positive. 
Condition 2: 
) 
a. U(t,s) ~-o for ~11 t ~ T 
-c'f.f.' l (It is easier to "see" this relationship if we redefine 
U(t,s) based upon the definltion of F(t): 
U(~,s) f F(x)e-sx dx 
.,, 
-~ 
- -
where F(t) is the net cash flow rate of the project, 
ands is the rate of return of the project) . 
l 
This condition states that in order for a project to have a 
. unique rate of return, it. is sufficient that the unpaid capital· 
·., 
function remain non-negative at all times when a previously determined 
rate of return is used for discounting. Stated in another way, a 
.. 
project has more than one rate of return if the function U(t,s) 
changes sign as a function oft. Whenever U(t,s) is positive, it 
<d 
represents the unpaid capital, on which it is assumed that the 
interest rate, s, is being pai.fl/ As U(t,s) decreases toward zero, 
\ 
and.\then becomes negative, U(t,s) represents a surplus which is being \ 
accumulated out of the income, but being used up later in the project. 
-___ -:..:...-__::-:.:.:..·-~·-:.== .. =.=--~~ ..... --~_·::··0is: . ':.:-~~------
;. 
----,--
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It is assumed that this surplus is also accumulating interest at the 
same rate as is being applied to the unpaid capital. 
1 
It should be noted that if a project satisfies either one of these 
-
- -----·two conditions listed above, it will always have a unique rate of return;·~-, 
otherwise, it may have multiple returns. 
Proof: 
' 1 • a,. 
Condition. 1 c'an be derived as a special case of Condition 2, since 
if a project has only one investment period, then the unpaid capital 
will always be positive. Accordingly, Condition 2's proof will be given . 
The approach is to show that if U(T2s1 ) = 0 and U(t2s1) > O, t < T, then 
U(T2s) = 0 has only one solutions= s 1 . 
Assume that there exists a solution s2 to U(T2s) = 0 and s 2 > s1 • 
Then let: 
T J [ -s X ~ = F(x) e 1 -0 
But since s is a solution of U(T2s) = O, 6 = O. Rewrite:. 2 
This integrates by parts to: 
6. = [1 - e<8 1 8 2>x] rF(y)e-slydy 
0 
l'1' (s Jo 1 
X = T 
X = 0 
The first term vanishes at both limits and the second term is negative 
since U(T2s1) = O and s1 < s 2 _. · Theref_ore, fl < 0 and so s 2 cannot be a 
0 
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solution of U(T2s) = O. The identical procedure is used to show that· if s 2 < s1 , s2 is not a solution of _U{T2s) = 0. 
-----~ 
_-_-,..-.::~=---... ..,,~ -.-· -B. Graphical Method for Analyzing Multiple Rates of Return 
For conventional investments, the present value is a steadily de-
creasing function of the cost of capital. 1 This can be illustrated by 
means of the fallowing graph: 
Net Present Value vs. Rates of Return for Conventional Investments Net 
Present 
Value 
Rates of Return 
I 
FIGURE 2 
The curve I - I represents the net present value of an investment 
at various rates of interest. O A indicates th_e particular internal 
rate of return on the given investment, since the yield or return of a 
cash flow is defined as the rate of interest that makes the net present value zero. Accordingly, the return is the point at which the net 1 It . easy to visualize this by employing the formula fox- continuous 
1S 
discount~ng: 
I = JT E(t)e-(jt) 
t 
0 
I j I As increases, I decreases. 
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-present value line crosses the horizontal _;axis. 
The basic question which has to be answered is: Under what con-
ditions can the net present value of an investment be something other 
--·-·than this steadily decreasing function of the cost of capital? In 
other words, why do some net present v;1_lue curves intersect the x axis 
in more than one place? 
-· ·----- --
To analyze this situation, let's look at a proposal that intersects 
the " " X axis in two places. The example given on page51 is such a pos-
sibility. 
Net 
Present 
Value 
C I 
0 
I 
' ' 
--
·:-,-· 
I 
Figure 3 · f 
Return 
When A Proposal Yields More .rhan One Rate of Return 
.~· 1: 
In Figure 3, A and B represent the two yields, C is the cost of 
' 
·capital, C' is the net present value of the investment at the firm's <.:, 
cost of capital. 
/ - -· 
•
1 
· It is noted from Figure 3 that: 
.·,-
... 
- --
r 
.. ... -
' 
.. 
\ 
\ 
I •• 
...• - ., 
,o:: 
II 
h 
' 
• I 
_ a. As: the cost of capital approaches zero, the net present 
value tends to be negative if this net value is negative. 
b. As the cost of capital increases, the present value cf 
the final net cash outflows dfminishes in importance in · ______ 
1
_;· _______ ·_ • -~-
relation to earlier flows and this lessening effect causes 
. __ l 
the net present value of the proposal to become positive. 
This seems to imply that more than one outflow is involved 
as in a non-conventional type of investment. 
c. As the cost of capital continues to increase, all future 
cash flows continue to diminish in their importance, causing 
the present value of the proposal to approach the initial I 
outlay as a limit. 
d.· The first part of the graph is typical of that of a loan, 
#' 
while the second part- has the downward slope typical of an 
ordinary investment. Figure 4 will serve to illustrate 
this: 
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Figure 4 
·L 
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M 
,. 
Same Investment As Seen By Lender and Borrower 
Curve L: Investment as seen by the l9nder 
Curve M: Same investment as seen by the borrower 
Hence, this series of cash flows as shown in Figure 3 would be 
Rate of 
Return 
t • 
1 worthwhile at rates of discount between A% and B% only. The reasoning 
for this lies in the fact that for the loan type of cash flows, the 
yield represents the lowest rate-of discount at which the net present 
value would be positive and the borrowing desirable; and for con-
ventional investments, the yield represents the highest rate of discount 
at which the net present value W<Xlld be positive and the investment 
1s1nce A and B represent the two yields • 
. -f.,_ __ • 
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.., 
I. . ·•· .•• ,. 
desirable. If the cash flows represen~ing the curve in Figure 3 were 
inverted, i .e-., income bec·~mes outlays and vice versa, the resulting 
·•· 
· -... ~:·---cash flows would be desirable only at interest rates that were less ____ _ 
__ : __ ---·than A% or greater than 13%. 
-- ·-·- - -.- -
-~· 3. 3 Rate of Return .,. 
l 
'.I 
3.33 Discounted Cash Flow vs. Present Value / 
In an article, Arithmetic of Capital Budgeting Decisions, (78), 
Ezra Solomon presents the following problem: 
Assume that two mutually exclusive projects, X and Y, are to be 
dee ided upon • Project X requires an outlay of $100 now, at time t
0 and 
promises to return $120 exactly 1 year hence at time t 1 . ·Project Y also 
requires an outlay of $100 now and promises ··to return $174.90 exactly· 
4 years·hence at' time t 4 . Both projects have the same degree of 
certainty. Assuming that the investor's present cost of capital is 10$, 
which project is more favorable? 
Calculations give the following results: 
Rate of Return Method 
Project Rate 
X '· 20% 
y 15% 
Rank 
1 
2 
Project 
X 
y 
.. 
Present Value Method 
P .v. Amount 
109.09 
119~46 
Rank 
2 
1 
This example has been introduced to show that both methods do not 
always give equivalent results. By equivalent results, is meant that 
either technique would: 
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r 
1' 
) 
. 
a. Give the same decision in an accept/reject _criterion· 
of an independent proposal. 
· b. Rank order a given number of proposals ·1n the same -
preference sequence. 
When dealing with independent, conventional investments, the 
• I 
" " " h 
internal rate of return will give the same accept or reject de-
,1. 
J 
......... -
cisions as the present-value method using the cost of capital as the 
discount rate . "This is so because the net present worth of a project 
is greater than, equal to, or less than zero if, as, and when the rate 
of -return is greater than, equal to, or less than k (the company's cost 
of capital)", (30, p. 132). 
" As a general rule, since most independent 
investments have cash flow patterns that meet the specifications de-
~cribed above, (i.e., cash flow consisting of one or more periods of 
cash outlays followed only by periods of cash proceeds), it is fair to 
say that in practice the yield and present-value methods, would give 
the same recommendations for independent investments." (4, p. 35) . 
The problem of correct ranking becomes important when considering 
mutually e~clusive projects. This type of investment is fairly common; 
e.g., which one of several locations will be best suited for building ··1. 
a new plant. Thus, if a decision maker is considering two mutually 
exclusive investment projects, P1 and P2 , it is possible to generate 
cases such that at a given market rate of interest r, Net Present Worth· 
P 1 > Net Present Worth P 2 while Internal Rate of Return P1 < Internal 
.,J,> 
Rate of Return -~~-· ·- S~~~~~ically, if for_ P1 , the net incremental 
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. \ . [) 
' returns of B - -1, E ·= l and E - 4, and for P2 , the net incremental· -0 1 2 
returns1 of E' - 1, E' = 2 and E' - 2, the internal rate ·of return for 0 - -1 2 
. / P1 = 1.562 while that for P2 - 1.732. I~_thus appears that P is better 2 I 
than P • But, if the market rate of interest for P and P is r = 0.50, 1 1 2 
then the present worth of P1 = 1.444, while the present worth of P2 = 
1.222. Thus, the present worth method indicates that P is superior to 
1 
A plot of the present worth of P and P at various interest rates, 1 2 
··r, appears as follows in Figure 5. 
FIGURE 5 
Present 
Worth 
Effect of Rate of Interest on Proposal Rank1!1fJ 
pl 
1.5 
1.0 
0.5 
o.o 
r 
For all possible rates, r·, below 1.0, P1 has a higher present W(?rth 
than· that for P2 , but the internal rates of return give an opposite 
ranking of P1 a~d P 2 • Such discrepancies, first analyzed 'by Lorie 
l These values are similar to those prQPOsed by Prof. Richard Bernhard (44). 
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' and Savage (66) arr based upon certain assumptions for each method: / 
- - -
a. The Int:rnal rate of return method assumes that the 
~ 
rate of interest appiied to the investment is also the 
rate that is to be applied to the reinvested income 
streams-.-
b. The net present value method assumes reinvestment at the 
minimum rate of interest which is the company's present 
cost of capital. 
Thus, "the apparent conflict between the two approaches (methods) 
results only from differing assumptions that each makes about the 
,# 
future'', (78, p. 76). In the example just given, the internal rate 
of return assumption implies that the net incremental return, E1 or Ei, 
at the end of period 1 would be reinvested during period 2 at the same 
rate of return which the project itself is earning; i.e., 1.562 for P 
1 
and-- 1. 732 for P2 • The present value method implies that, since the 
cost of interest wa~, r = 0.50, the reinvestment would occur at this 
(./ 
rate. The "logic" of this has generated many different arguments and 
counter-arguments. Ezra Solomon has suggested that the difficulty in· 
using the usual internal rates of return as a ranking device may be 
overcome by making explicit and consistent assumptions as to the 
-
interest rates at which intermediate receipts from projects may be 
reinvested either in other projects or in the outside market: 
"a. The ultimate criterion is the total wealth that the investor can expect from each alternative by the terminal date of the longer lived project. 
"b. If the rate of return is to be used as an index of relative profitability, then the relevant rate is the per 
l 
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annum yield promised by each alternative course of action 
-from inception to a common terminal date in the future (usually the terminal date of the longer-lived project). 
It c. If the present value is to be used as an index of---relative profitability, the expected reinvestment rat·e or set of rates should be used as the discounting factor. These rates will be equal to the company's present cost 
... 
of capital only by coincidence. When comparing two projects requiring different outlays, it is necessary to compare -present value per dollar of outlay rather than the absolute present value of the projects." (78, p. 77) 
_____ Thus, "-if a common assumption is adopted, both approaches will 
always rank projects ident 1ically". (78, · p. 76) Prof. Ed Renshaw, 
reviewj.ng Ezra Solomon's conmlents, claims, "Solomon's over-all rate of 
return should be interpreted as an average rate of return on funds 
investment to the common terminal date. The idea of discounting by 
reinvestment rates is appealing since in committing investment funds, 
one cannot afford to ignore reinvestment opportunities. The problem ( 
of \_~ccepting one philosophy of discounting as opposed to the other, of 
course, exists pnly if the firm has some grounds for distinguishing 
between the current cost of capital and future reinvestment rates". 
(73, p. 81) 
.. 
Grant and Ireson claim that the average rate of return method is 
"a misuse of an auxiliary interest in computing prospective rates of 
,, " 
. " 1 
return as well as a misleading analysis of two investment proposals., 
' (13, p. 505). However, it is easy to show ~athematically, that two 
mutually exclusive proposals requiring the same initial investment, 
1 
· Another famous a.rgument involving different interpretations about internal rates centers about Keynes' Marginal Efficiency of Capital and Fisher's Rate of Return, with Keynes and Robinson on one side and Fish~r and Alchian on the other (15), (40), (76). 
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-B0 , and lasting for the same number of n periods, will .be ranked, in 
the same fashion by Solomon's average rate of return or the present 
value method: 
The present value formula is: 
Hence: 
- * n 
=-E (l+r) 0 
where r* is the average rate of return 
Therefore: 
Let 
-
Then 
£_ I = C - E0 (l+r*)D 
Eo -~----· ------~-
•, I ~I 
.. 
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i '·. 
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If we have two projects P1 with present value= 11 and P2 with present 
value = 12 and rt = average rate of return for P 1 and r; = average rate 
. '• 
I 
of return for P2 , and both projects have the same initial outlay and 
same time periods: 
--__ ·--·_----·-- . I 
.·~ 
-·. 
' 
C 
- I = C lo 2 
Therefore, if 1
1 
> 1
2 
But since E is negative: 
0 
* * l+r1 > l+r2 
* r * Q.E.D. or rl > 2 
\ 
·.-: 
Although Ezra Solomon warns the decision maker about employing the 
present value method on projects requiring different outlays, he did not 
' include such a warning when the internal rate of return method is used. 
The following example will serve tq demonstrate that it. is important to 
consider the size of mutually exclusive investments when using the 
internal rate of return method: 
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Rate,, of Return 
.. - -- - • __,__ .1-""-w --
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lOj 
Judging by the internal rate of return, the decision maker would say 
that P1 was more desirable. But, this is not a correct decision. As 
, ' 
Profs. Bierman ar~ Smidt word it, "A yield of 1,000 % on an investment 
--- ·- -:L,. 
C . • 
r 
of a dime is a poor substitute for a yield of 15% on $1, ooo", (4, p .. 37) . 
· Actually the important difference between P1 and P2 is the incremental 
i? benefits derived from t~ additional expenditure of P2 ; i.e., the 
. 
additional $5,000 outlay for P2 returns at $5,700. This is actually 
a return rate of 14% which is certainly more desirable than any yield 
possible at the market cost of 10%.. The above, ~ccording to many writers, 
_, ''-
,--.... \ 
is a strong disa·dvantage in. the use of the internal return· rate method, 
because "it is necessary to compute the yiel"Cl on the incremental cash 
'--._/ proceeds ijin order to determine which of a pair of mutually exclusive 
investments is preferable", (4, p. 40). If more than two mutually 
exclusive alternatives are being considered, it means that the return 
on the incremental cash flow of the first two alternatives must be 
calculated and then the better of this pair. decided. The "winner" of 
the first round is then paired with the third .alternative and its 
incremental benefit return is calculated; etc. 
... 
,· 
Because of the discussion in this section and the possibility of 
multiple return rates when the discounted cash flow method is employed, 
many writers prefer the-- present value method to that of the discounted 
cash flow technique. M. Klein states, "The net present worth method is 
' 
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t 
a better measuring and selecting tool than the rate method although 
the latter is usually preferred by managers and engineers", (64, p. 64). 
Prof. Bernhard writes, "We have earlier concluded that the present 
worth method is-superior to· the internal rate .of return method for 
'' ( ) 
ranking productive investments proposals, 44, p. 26 . Profs. Bierman 
and Smidt claim, "When the two methods lead to different dec_isions, the 
present value method tends to give better decisions. • •. For most of 
. fl 
us, the present value method is simpler, safer, easier and more direct , 
(4, pp. 34, 46). Some writers see little or no difference between both 
methods. For instance, Joel Dean and Winfield Smith write, "These net. 
\ cash flows are then d.iscounted to yield e·ither a measure of rate of re-
turn or of present value, which then becomes the criterion for accepting 
or rejecting the proposal and for comparing it with other proposals", 
(48). Even Grant and Ireson claim that, " Once a particular minimum 
attractive rate of return is selected as the criterion for comparing 
alternativ~s, a correct analysis of rates of return will invariably lead 
to the same conclusion that will be obtained from a correct annual cost 
comparison or a correct present worth comparison", (13, p. 121). 
Some writers avoid bringing the present value method into con-
sideration and merely deal with the discounted cash flow technique. 
These writers generally act as if they have found the answer to the 
investor's dream with this one method. Examples of this approach are 
Joel Dean's (47), John G. McLean's (69),} Edward A. Ravericroff's (72), 
1 This article is the one -1.ncluded in the finance section of Bu.rsk' s and Chapman's, New Decision Tools for Managers, Harvard University Press ,-1963 .: 
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~ 
Ray I. Reul's (74) articles. 
Of course, many investigators1 a~e d~ssatisfied with either method,_ 
because they lack a proper modification for uncertainty, but for an 
op~rational, day-to-day technique, these two methods appear practical. 
Actually, "if a corporation knows its cost of capital (at least approxi-
mately) and can either obtain additional funds from the market at that 
cclst of capital, if--- desirable internal investments are available, or can 
invest any excess funds externally at the cost of capital, then either 
of the two discounted cash flow procedures can be used to make correct 
investment decisions", (4, p. 43). 
3.4 Subjective Method 
3.41 General 
) 
Strangely enough, in articles or textbooks dealing with capital 
investment decision making, it is rare to find the subjective method 
included in any list of operational investment decision procedures or 
·,P!easures. Yet, this method is widely used by businessmen of big and 
I 
small firms. Prof. Istvan verified this when he surveyed the investment 
"habits" of 48 major companies in the United States. 2 He found that 
four firms employed subjective judgement for all proposals, and that 
all of the remaining 44 firms employed this technique in various 
1 For example, R. M. Adelson' s comment, "Al though the present worth 
method appears to be gradually gaining acceptance, the present worth 
appr~ach and the way in which it is generally applied still leave 
- " some rather growing doubts, (39, p. 21). 
2 Ref er to (14) • 
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degrees.1 
r The subjective judgement criterion. operates in the following typea-~--
-·-of environment: 
a. In situations when no other-measure is-really applicable. - - --- ~--- ---- -
• 
~-
An example of such an occasion might be a proposal to 
expand the company's cafeteria facilities for the comfort 
of employees during the lunch hour. In this case, no 
operating advantages can be determined, and only subjec-
tive judgement can decide the acceptability of the expendi-
ture. 
" 
But, Prof. Istvan warns, that where the operating 
advantage can be determined at all, subjective judgement 
should not be the sole measure of acceptability", 
(14, p. 94). .. .,._ ._ 
b. In specific cases of necessity when the proposal in ques-
tion is known to have an inferior return capability. Such 
a situation could involve relatively poor investments 
/ 
made for the sake of maintaining a competitive position 
by the firm. Actually, this class of subjective judgement 
criterion is equivalent to the necessity_/postponability " 
\ 
criterion described in 3.53. In view of this, it can be 
stated that, when projects of necessity are being studied 
and evaluated, all firms use subjective judgement • 
c. In investment cases where objective data is replaced in 
part or in full by subjective judgement. Such circumstances 
1 
'' All of these :companies are among the ten largest in their res-pective industries and more than two-thirds are among the six largest." (14, Pre~ace). 
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. --usually arise when, due to ·the urgency of a proposed 
expenditure, there is little or no time for data col-
' 
.,. 
.... - -----·- ·-- - ~ lection and evaluation. Opinions, hunche~, experience, __ ~-------
-
- ---- - -~---------. d 
! 
. ;..·,r··. 
• 
'· 
-.I,· 
• . 
-and rules of thumb, come strongly into play to decide 
the fate of such a proposal . ____ In these cases, " subjective 
judgement is a poor measure of acceptability. It does 
not measure anything concretely. It does not account 
for time-pattern effects. It does not provide for 
objective comparison of proposals no~ does it set a 
~I 
predetermined minimum'', (14, p. 94). This is especially _ _. 
true for those companies which use the subjective judge-
me~t criterion for evaluating all proposals. But, why 
are they still successful? For example, one of the 
leading airline companies that makes upwards of $20 
million of expenditures annually uses subjective judge-
ment exclusively. Its vice-president of finance stated 
that once it is determined how many plans will be needed 
(based on a market forecast of passenger miles), there is 
no need for evaluation of further expendttures because r_ 
-, 
all expenditures are based on providing facilities to 
. 1 service repair, and maintain the aircraft. 
3.4 S~bjective Method 
3.42 Angell's Hypothesis 
1 Refer to (14, p. 95). It should be noted that the major com-petitor of this airline company measures all expenditures by an average simple rate of return, after complete analysis. 
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' 
- -· - -· -- ' - -- -- - . Economics Prof~ James W. Angell of Columbia University has investi~ ,_-
: gated and hypothesized on the way the successful decision maker sub-
" . 
- ~ - -----~...---- .. -.. ·---jectively manipulated his "data" and judgements to arrive at a "sound" 
\_(_ 
·decision-in the face of uncertainty. Prof. Angell has developed his 
hypothesis as an alternative to the probability approach and to Shackle's· 
Proposal. He has attempted to put into a fornn.ila what he believes 
expresses the decision maker's "thinking": 
Let y = Most likely gross gain outcome which includes both 
recovery of sum originally invested and any net profit, expressed as a per cent of the current 
market price, of the investment. y ~. 1%. 
·;:a. 
. ,._. 
~ 
Then he 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
l( = Coeff icierit ··of maximum likelihood of receiving at least y. 0 ~ x ~ 1 • 
t =.T~me period required to receive the gain in full. 
a = Coefficient (perhaps exponential) embodying the 
appropriate allowance for the time factor t. 
t - Measure of gross satisfaction expressed as -
s-atisf.action per do~)llar to be invested since y is expressed as a per cent of the cost of invest-ment. 
. ll, 
y' - Most likely loss, expressed as a per cent of the -
cost ofr· the investment. 
x' Coefficient of maximum likelihood of y'. 
t' ~ Measure of pain or dissatisfaction, per dollar invested. 
t Net satisfactory per dollar invested • 
hypothesizes that: 
t - ~ (!l) 
-
{, .. at 
t' - t' (~' y') -
- t - I' = v <it - x'y') -
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The maximum-likelihood value of the most likely loss, x'y', cannot r. 
be discounted to present-value equivalents, nor can the time factor be, 
introduced into_it in any normal manner. The reasoning for-this rests 
upon the assumption that there is no way of estimating when the loss, 
'if there is one, will be realized •. This has the effect of weighing a 
loss heavier than an equivalent gain. 
'If the value of ,Jr is positive, the investor then compares this 
.... , 
value with the desirability to him of continuing to hold part or all 
' .. 
of his money. Then, if: 
UM= desirability of retaining all the initial invested money M. 
I= amount of money which would be spent for the project. 
and~~ dUM the decision maker will adopt the proposal. Although, di dl J 
neither the net satisfaction nor desirability of holding onto unin-
" ' vested money can be expressed by the investor in consciously quanti-
tative terms, it is clear that comparisons are made in the actual world 
and that decisions are reached in terms of 'greater or less' if not in 
terms of cardinal magnitudes", (41, p. 20) . 
"The decision-making process through which investors go, if the 
foregoing hypothesis is ,at all correct, is thus a complex affair. The 
major elements in this process are largely subjective; they can usually 
be express~d in quantitative terms only rather loosely and inaccurately_, 
if at all. The relations among them are not stable over time, and the 
investor's own appraisals of them change frequently. Hence, prediction 
of any one investor's decisions is probably impossible." (41, p. 27) 
' 
Thus, Prof. Angell' s hypothesis has been one ·Jattempt to forinalize 
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what may be the thinking of the successful businessman. To date, 
encouragement for his hypothesis has come from the composite results of 
1----
-~ groups of ?ecision makers rather than from individual decision makers. 
Realistically, Prof. Istvan believes that the businessman who uses _sub-
jective judgement merely employs some self-developed payback or rate-
o{-return yardstick. 
• 
--- - -
_J-
3,.4 Subjective Method 
3.43 Shackle's Proposal -- It has been included for two reasons: 
a. It is widely known in Europe and less familiar in 
the United States. 
b. It attempts an approach different from the calculus 
of probability in its attack upon uncertainty. 
Prof. Shackle's original work entitled, "Expectations in Economics", 
was published in 1949. His most forceful argument against the use of 
probability coefficients as indices for investment outcomes rests on the 
fact that probability calculus uses a form of .knowledge which is derived 
from the outcome of a long series of identical past trials. As such, 
prediction of the outcome of any one future trial cannot be made "but 
only of the average outcomes of a long series of future trials, all 
" { ) 
identical to those conducted in the past, 41, p. 4. InveE;tment acts 
" " are one shot, unique affairs which Prof. Shackle argues, do not meet 
1 We may be entering the realm of descriptive analysis which rightfuliy belongs to the psychologists. Much has been written on this process. A recent (1965) article, entitled, Human Decision Making Under Uncertainty and Risk: Computer. Based Experiments and a Heuristic Simulation Program, shows how the computer may be used to assist the psychologist in this endeavor (52). 
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any of the prerequisites demanded by the rules of probability •1 
Prof. Shackle's hypothesis introduces the concepts of potentiar-
_,:;:' 
. 
surprise and degrees of ,enjoyment. Potential --~~prise2 is the a100unt 
of surprise the investor would expect to feel if a particular outcome 
were actually realized. This surprise is generally the inverse of the 
investor's estimate of the likelihood of that outcome's occurrence. In 
general, "the intensity of enjoyment of a given hypothetical outcome by 
. . • . imagining it in advance l.S no doubt a function of several variables but 
·" two of these are likely to be dominant; this intensity will plainly be 
..... _,,. \l,-
. ,,_ 
an increasing function of the desirability of the outcome in question, 
and a decreasing function of the degree of potential surprise associated 
with it", (28, p. 18). This statement is expressed as an equation called 
the stimulation function 3 : ~ = cp [x, y(x) ], where x is the anticipated 
value and y(x) is the associated potential surprise. The two values of 
x which maximize I are given special names, "primary focus gain" and 
1 Prof. Shackle lists these prerequisi ~es_ in Chapter---I, --p.--6 of his -- ( book and uses Chapter VII to argue against the use of probability 
calculus in investment decision making (28). 
2 Prof. Shackle speaks about potential surprise as follows: "Thus we 
shall say that a person can compare his own respective degrees of 
belief in two different outcomes of some course of action or two dif-ferent answers to a question by taking each of these outcomes or an-
swers in turn and asking himself what intensity of shock or surprise he would feel if w~thout there having been meantime any change in 
3 
the kno,vledge available to him on which he based his belief in· it, he were to learn that this belief is mistaken. The measure so ob-
tained is what we may call the potential surprise associated, by a particular person at·a particular date, with the falsity of the answer 
or the non-occurrence of the outcome", (28, p. 11) . 
It can also ~ndicate "distress by anticipation" "if the outcome in question, instead of b~ing desirable, is pos'itively hurtful or dis-
advantageous", (28, p. 18) • 
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-L· 
"primary focus loss"; they are related to the "greatest degree of 
-------
_ enjoyment" and the "greatest. degree of hurtfulness" to the investor. I -
-- ·-------------------- - -t- : In making a decision, the investor selects that investment or I 
---- ---·-- ------=---
I 
. , . 
,.r· 
r 
I 
group of investments which offers to him the optimum combination of 
gains, possible losses, and the associated degrees _9f potential 
. " f " " 1 surprise, based upon his own gambler-pre erence map. This "map'' is 
defined as follows: " For any specific focus-loss there will be some 
specific focus-gain such that if he is faced with this pair of focus-
outcomes his situation seems to him neither more nor less desirable 
than if he had. th~ assurance of experiencing neither gain nor loss. 
We shall say that this focus gain compensates the focus-loss. The 
ratio of focus-loss to its compensating focus-gain will in general be 
\. di£ferent when the focus-loss is different. The set of _all such ratios 
obtained by varying the focus-loss, other circumstances remaining un-
changed, is what we mean by the schedule of gambler preference of the 
given individual in these circumstances." (28, p. 33) These focus 
---------
09tcomes are in effect simply differ-ent- values of x, s1:nce Prof . ........ 
., 
Shackle states, "Before any further step (i.e., after primary focus 
gain and loss are ·determined), can be taken in comparing the merits 
of two rival ventures, for each of which the primary focus outcome 
have been determined, these primary focus-outcomes must all be replaced 
by equivalents carrying nil surprise. Each of these equivalents will 
be a value of x, say x such that if the primary focus outcome is s 
---1 In addition to this "map", -Prof. Shackle develops the ~oncepts of gambler's indifference map, and gambler's oppor~unity curve. _., 
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Prof. Angell of Columbia University, reviewing Shackle's Proposal 
. .,-·-t.:---
, 
:,· 
,•I) ·--
thus far, believes that_these propositions, taken on their face, seem 
entirely reasonable, but other notions, which Shackle also advances, 
seem to him more debatable. These·other notions are: 
a. An investor may attach the quality of zero potential 
surprise both to a particular gain outcome or range of 
gain outcomes of a particular investment and to a par-
ticular loss outcome or range of outcomes. This concept 
b II to Prof . Angell seems unreasona le becaus~~..:. If a par-
ticular gain outcome from a particular investment would 
convey zero surprise, were it to be realized, sure'iy no 
·' 
one loss outcome from that investment would also convey 
zero surprise (unless, perhaps, when both outcomes are 
close to zero). The investor is unlikely to regard both 
a particular gain and a particular loss as outcomes of 
zero surprisingness, (or of maximum unsurprisingness!)" 
(41, p. 5) 
b. The use of "focus" gain and loss, ·i.e., the prospective 
gain and loss outcomes, for comparing investUEnt. In 
effect, Prof. ·Shackle tries to describe the philosophy 
of decision-making by the investor. The investor 
P.rimarily decides, from among the various possible gain 
outcomes, which one, if realized would usually entail 
some degree of potential surprise, but which also offers 
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., 
a somewhat larger prospect of gain than do those gain 
., 
outcomes for which the attached potential surprise is 
less or zero, thus insuring the greatest enjoyment. 
Actually, the investor is trading off more prospective 
gain for less potential surprise.until he reaches a 
prospective gain outcome offering a combina~ion of 
prospective gain and attached potential surprise from 
I which he believes he would .. ·anticipate more enjoyment 
than from any other combination. This holds conversely 
for his calculations of possible losses. These then 
become the prospective gain and loss outcomes; i.e., 
his focus gain and loss,· which he uses in making com-
parisons with other investments. Prof. Angell believes 
that an investor does not act in this fashion, but, rather, 
employs a most likely gain outcome and the most likely 
loss outcome. He then "decides whether the corresponding 
prospective gains -and losses, when viewed in the light 
of the associated likelihoods (in effect, gain or loss 
f 
times its likelihood), meet the requirements of his own 
I 
preference system. l I Once his estimates of th'e most 
likely gain and loss outcomes are made, all other 
possible outcomes cease to interest him." (41, p. 6) 
c. The question of zero potential surprise. Actually, the 
poteJ?.tial surprise associated even with the most likely 
· o t · t th "It takes an t di u come 1.s grea er an zero. ex raor nary 
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smug investor to expect no surprise at all if- his guess 
. ' turns out to be right, even if it is his very best guess!" 
(41, p. 6) 
:, d. The continuity of the stimulation·-·function, t, which 
Prof. Shackle merely assumes. If what Prof. Angell states 
is the more correct mode of decision making, it may be 
that few of the possible values are really .. ever con-
sciously present in the investor's mind.l 
e. The lack of a direct method for detailing how the investor 
weighs a prospective focus gain and its associated potential-· 
surprise against the related prospective focus loss and its 
surprise, in order to arrive at an estimate of the net 
enjoyment or distress he could anticipate were he to make 
the investment. 
Perhaps, it would be best to summarize this section with the fol-
lowing quote from Prof. Shackle's book: 
"But my system is no whit more indeterminate than theirs (i.e., those who favor the use of the probability calculus). aoth they and ~{·reduce the enterpriser's conception of the gain and loss possibilities of a venture to a pair of numbers, precise numerical magnitudes, one of which represents and summarizes the favorable and the other the unfavorable po-tentialities of the ventures, as judged by the enterpriser. The difference between the characters of the two resulting expressions is, first, that their figures for "yield" and 
"risk" are more mathematical abstraction, the answers to a particular kind of sum, while mine are c.laimed to represent psychological realities, the levels of hypothetical outcome which generate the highest intensities of feeling; and secondly, that their figures and mine are, of course, 
1 An excellent discussion of tl?:;ls---t·op:i.c is found in Symposium on Uncertainty and Business Decision (eds. C. F. Carter, G. P. Meredith, G. L. S-. Shackle) , Liverpool, 1954, pp • 40, 50. 
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" --- ·-·-- -----~determined in two entirely different ways • (28, p. 134) 
3.5 Other Techniques 
For the sake of completeness, the f0Trow1ng investment decision 
techniques are included. No complete review and analysis of any method . 
will be undertaken. Instead, each method will be listed together with 
a brief 
\.-.... 
'' 
. '' write-up • 
1 3 .51 M A P I Formula 
... 
The MAPI formula was developed as a means of facilitating the 
expenditure evaluation calculations when hundreds or even thousands of 
replacement proposals are reviewed annually by a firm. " It was con-
ceived and presented as a replacement formula (the term replac~ment 
being broadly construed to include mixed replacement-improvement-
expansion situations), its main purpose being to indicate the proper 
timing of re-equipment decisions." (33, p. 14) The end result of the 
MAPI formula is a figure called the " 
" 
next year rate-of-return. It is 
the rate of return that will be obtained by making the concerned in-
vestment immediately rather than putting it off for another year. It 
is derived as follows: 
a. Operating Advantage (of proposed new facility for next 
year, before taxes and capital consumption). Plus 
b. Avoided capital expenditures by making replacement (fQr 
next year only). 
Less rf·. 
c. Income taxes (on sum of (a) and (b)) 
1 MAP! (Machinery and Allied Products Institute) formula was de-veloped by George Terborgh, Research Director, Machinery and Allied . Products Institute. The basic r.eference to MAP! is (33). 
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d. Capital consumption costs (derived from cnart). 
Divided by 
e. Net investment to be made in new-facility (after salvage 
and the next year avoided capital expenditure). 
Equals 
f. Next-year rate of return on proposal. 
Business Week (September 27, 1958) describes the charts (step "d" 
above as follows: 
"The charts themselves are produced from an elaborate mixture 
' of: the rate at which the new project's earnings will de-
cline; the service life of the. new equipment., its final value 
for sale, trade-ineor scrap; the corporate tax rate, the 
company's depreciation system; thet ratio of the company's debt 
to its total investment, the interest rate it pays on borrowed 
capital, the after-tax return it gets on equity capital. 
"The MAP! charts have precomputed all these things. They have 
assumed that a 25% debt ratio, a 3% interest rate, and a 10% 
after tax return on capital are about the normal for most 
companies. There are three charts--because :MAP! offers the 
analyst three general patterns in \Vh-ich the earnings of a new 
machine will decline over the year~ of its service life. In 
some cases, the machines will produce half their earnings by 
the time they have worked half their service life; in others, 
they'll run off one-third of their earnings when their service 
life is half over; some will produce two-thirds of their 
earnings in half their estimated service life." 
According to Prof .. Istvan, "When the actual conditions in a firm 
conform to those assumed in the MAP! formula, it is an excellent measure 
of acceptability. It a~counts for all factors relevant to the problem 
including the time pattern.of capital consumption. Whether its 
assumptions are realistic, howeve+, remains a question .••• It is dif-
.. -... 
ficult to accept a 25% debt ratio, a 3% interest cost and a 10% return 
of---equity---There is no reason, however, why the ~ormula would not be 
adapted to reflect the capital mix and costs of the individual firm", Io 
~ I (14, p. 75). 
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Ray I. Reul worded his very strong sentiment against MAPI as 
follows:, "This approach (MAPI) is an interesting intellectual flight 
of the imagination.. Many of the assumptions necessary to make its---- -
application practical are completely unrealistic. The basic as-
sumption is that history will repeat itself endlessly and that our 
need for the facility for which replacement is being studied will go I A 
on forever. It assumes uniform, regular changes i.n variables that are 
'\ not at all realistic, either .•.. The answers are relative--the com-
parative values changing in an irregular fashion with changes in the 
interest rate assumed." (74, p. 131) 
Strangely enough, when MAP! was first introduced, many firms 
attempted to explore the feasibi.lity of a unified capital-controls 
program covering the firm's investment expenditures for all purposes 
based on the MAP! concept. Accordingly, there was a requirement for 
an investigation of the way in which the MAPI method measures the 
productivity of capital as compared with other methods. Joel Dean 
and Winfield Smith undertook the job1 to prove that MAPI cannot be 
used for such a unified method and that it compares very unfavorably 
with the rate of return and present worth methods in handling all _but 
replacement investment decision making. George Terborgh replied to _ ., 
r De d ( ) . ,, " an an Smith in 80 and literally tells them I told you so • 
According to Terborgh, "No knowledgeable person has ever claimed uni-
versality of application of the MAPI formula .... It was offered as an 
improvement over the primative rules of thumb so widely employed in -
1 Refer to the well written article (48). 
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American industries to make these (repTacepient) decisions. As such, it 
r 
. tr has proved very useful, as evidenced by the extent of its employment, 
(80, p. 307). But, the last part of this statement may be in doubt_~ 
today because: 
• 
a. Prof. Istvan's study in 1961 of 48 leading firms showed 
that only two companies employed the MAPI formula for 
measuring acce"ptability of their replacement expenditures; 
but, "neither employs it in the exact manner developed by 
Terborgh", (14, p. 75). These firms "built in financing 
assumptions of their -own, stating that the assumptions 
employed by Terborgh do not compare closely enough with 
the actual situation. One of the firms done away with the 
chart al together ... ", (14, p. 75) . Of the firms not c .. 
using MA.PI, executives<>f 16 companies stated that they 
had never heard of MA.PI and the executives of 26 companies 
stated that they were familiar with the MAP! formula, had 
considered it for use in their f ir~s, but had dec.ided 
against adopting it. 
b. Recent articles on equipment investment decision making 
do not even ·mention MAP!. 
,. 
Perhaps in fairness to MAP!, "it could probably be shown 
that this measure is more widely used in smaller firms, 
where the expenditure and evaluation environment are uni-
form throughout.the firm", (14, p. 77). 
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3.52 Accounting Methods 
Basically, any calculations used to generate a ratio relating 
earnings to investment which yields a simple rate of return has been 
designated as an accounting method. The big problem with this method 
is its many variations. Some businessmen use an initial investment 
concept while others employ an average investment concept or book 
values, and still others fail to account properly for salvage value. 
Also, some earnings are gross or n~t of depreciation, either before or 
' -· 
after taxes, and some are the average of several years or the first 
year only. Naturally, such a wide diversification gives different 
results. "This shortcoming can be minimized only by arbitrarily 
standardizing on one variant of the method and making all computations 
according to this standard. "1 (47, p. 128) 
The usual variations of the accounting method are: 
3.521 Initial Year Simple Rate of Return 
This rate of return is computed as follows: 
r = Initial-year net operating advantage x 100 
Initial Investment 
... 
"The net operating advantage should be determined after financing 
' 
costs, capital consumption allowance, and income taxes. Investment 
should be net of salvage on any replaced facility but before future 
_salvage on the proposed facili~y." (14, p. 78) Prof. Istvan in (14), 
1 John G. ·McLean describes in (69), his "struggle" to unify the dif-
ferent rate of return methods used by the various divisions of his 
company. 
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notes that many businessmen erroneously believe th·at it is not neces~ 
-~ 
sary to account for financing costs, capital consumption and income 
taxes because all proposals will be subject to these factors and hence 
it is possible to eliminate them without altering the percentage 
relationship between different proposals. 
~ 
It is important to note that the initial year net operating 
advantage will depend on the adopted method of tax depreciation, type 
and cost of funds used, and relative lives of the investment proposals. 
Under certain circumstances, this measure may be used as an index 
for the acceptance of a proposal, i.e., "when it is, for all proposals 
,·· ~ being considered, indicative of the average of tne yearly rates of 
return. If this condition is not met, misallocation of funds may result 
in addition to that misallocation resulting from neglect of the time 
dimension of future advantages", (14, p. 81). 
3.522 Average Simple Rate of Return 
s 
There are actually two different procedures to calculate this 
rate of return. One of these is: 
_ sum of the yearly simple rates of r~turn 
rl - f number of years of expected proposal 11 e 
' In calculating this return, the same factors used in calculating 
the initial year rate of return must be taken into account, except that 
financing costs, capital consumption and income taxes are considered for 
each particular year. f Also, the investment for each year is the invest-
ment of the preceding year minus the capital consumption of the preceding 
year. The last~--year' s investment figure should be net of salvage • 
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The second method, although it gives th·e same ·result as the first, 
em.ploys a different method of calculation: 
= average net operating advantage x 100 r2 average investment 
"The average simple rate of return can serve fairly well as a 
measure of acceptability. The percentage figure obtained from the calcu-
:~ lation is a fair indication of profitability." (14, p. 82) The reason 
why Prof. Istvan uses "fair" lies in the fact that it fails to take into 
·-- --~-----
account the time shape of the yearly net operating advantages and yearly 
investment figures. 
In this method, the type of tax depreciation pattern used, does not 
affect the average net operating advantage. The elimination of taxes 
from the calculation does not affect the ranking of proposals but it 
does affect the indications for profitability. 
3.523 Book Return on Book Investments 
.. ' 
The rate of return for this technique is usually defined as the 
average income after depreciation divided by the average book value of 
1 the investment times 100: 
.... 
r _ (average income-average depreciation) for life of proposal x 100 average book value of investment 
In applying this formula, the pattern of depreciation affects both 
1 Some businessmen use a ratio which has the same numerator but change the denominator to original cost of investment without consideration given to accum'Jl ated depreciation. According to Profs • Bierman and Smidt, "The use of undepreciated cost has certain advantages over the use of book value. These advant~ges are not so important in capital budgeting and are relatively unimportant compared to the failure to take into con$ideration the timing of the cash proceeds", (4, p. 22). 
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the numerator and the denominator, and usually gives different results. 
"The income on book value (may be) a common and useful measure of 
performance, but it is less useful as a device for ranking investments--:-0 
(4, p. 21). In fact, seldom does this method give the same ranking of 
investment proposals as does the discounted cash flow procedures. 
Rather than look at one figure for the entire life of the proposal, 
ft f' some decision makers employing this method, prefer to see the yearly 
pattern of returns for each proposal. The following examples due to 
Ray .I • Reul will be used to demonstrate how this method can lead to 
ridiculous results. Assume an investment of $1,000 is required. The 
net income before depreciation and income taxes is estimated at $400 
per ye~_for five years. Depreciation is to be taken at 20% per year 
by the straight line method. The income tax rate is 50%. In tabular 
form, the rate of return for each year can be derived as follows: 
TABLE III 
Straight Line Depreciation and the Book Return on Book Investment 
• 
Net Income Depreciation Profit After Book Rate ofl Year Before Tax (Straight-Line) Tax Value Return 
1 $ 400 $ 200 $100 $1,000 10.0% 2 400 200 100 800 12.5% 3 400 200 100 600 16.7% 4 400 200 100 400 25.0% 5 400 200 100 200 50.0% Total $2,000 $1,000 $500 
- -Average 400 200 100 600 22.8% 
1 Profit After Tax Rate of Return for each year = x 100 Book Value at Beginning of Year 
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If this project continued to produce an income in the sixth year, 
'l then, the rate of return would be infinity. 
To study the effect the pattern of depreciation used has on the 
rates of return, all data will remain the same, except that the sum of 
the digits .method will be used to evaluate yearly depreciation. 
TABLE IV 
Sum of Digits Depreciation and the Book Return on Book Investment 
(i Net Income Deprec.ia t ion Profit After Rate of1 Year Before Tax (Sum of Digits) Tax ·Value Return 
, ,,,.,, .... 
1 $ 400 $ 334 33 $1,000 3.3% 2 400 2_66 66 666 9.·9% 3 400 200 100 400 25.0% 4 400 133 134 200 67.0% 5 400 67 167 · =67 250 .0% Total $2,000 $1,000 $500 
-Average 400 200 100 666 71.1% 
Obviously, we have obtained a completely new set of figures for the 
rates of return. 
It is also possible to show that if investments, similar to the one 
just described, were made each year for seven years, the rates of return 
start to increase rapidly as soon as investments are stopped. 2 These 
.f 
rates are: i 
1 Rate of return for each year = ____ P_r_o_f_i_t_Af_t_e_r_T_,;,,.;;a..;;.;;x ___ --=- x 100 Book Value at Beginning of Year 
2 In financial circles this is called ''milking the franchise", i.e., the amount of profit goes down but the rate of return goes up. 
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Year Rate of Return 
1 10.0% ·----·-----
. .,. ... -··- 2 11.1% . . 
12 .5% 3 
4 14.3"/o 
... 5 16.7"/o 
6 16.7% 
.r.- 16.7% 
20.0% 
No 25.0% 
Invest 33.3% 
ments 50.0"/o 
" 
Because of such examples, Ray I. Reul believes, the ratio of 
annual profit to book value is a vague and meaningless figure. Since 
·· "" this ratio is not even consistent with itself, of what use would be a 
method that produced comparable inconsistent evaluations"? (74, p. 119) • 
As an overall evaluation of accounting methods, Prof. Istvan states, 
"It provides a percentage result that is indicative of the profitability 
of the proposal and that lends itself to com~~~J.son with the percentage 
results of other proposals or with a minimum level of acceptability. 
It can, therefore, be used in the allocation of funds'', (14, p. 77). 
Prof. Istvan seems to underplay the tirrie pattern effects on the net 
operating advantage and investment when he made the above statement. To / 
Joel Dean this is the prirae factor to disqualify the accounting method 
for even consideration as a good yardstick: " more serious drawback to 
the use of the accounting method is that it is insensitive to variations 
in the time pattern of investment outlays and earnings. By taking _an 
average of earnings over the life of the project, this method ignores 
the earning trend, which may be quite important .•.• Only a company whose 
investment projects are roughl~ similar in time shape and in economic 
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f " ( 2) tt li tr-can ignore this featu~e, 47, p. 1 8. Ray I. Reul states, It,· 
(the accounting method), will be in serious error whenever the time - --
pattern of cash flows varies appreciably in the alternatives being 
compared", (74, p. 131). • I ft Ezra Solomon agrees and claims, Without 
~l.these conditio~s, (i.e., when outlays occur at a single point of time, 
when expected benefi-ts- flow evenly over the life of the project, and 
where economic life corresponds to the life assumed for bookkeeping 
purposes), the results derived from this approach (i.e., accounting 
method, especially book return on book investment) are subject to 
d " ( ) fairly wi e errors, 30, p. 125 . 
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3.5 other Techniques 
3.53 Necessity/Postponability \ 
_.:, .. :·-- ... ,; ·- -·- -
1 Necessity and postponability, widely used standards for selecting., 
investments, are opposite faces of the same coin. 
Postponability operates on the principle that a firm should under-
take first those projects that must be undertaken now, if ever. Those 
· that are postponable can be put off to a later date. This is es-
pecially true in situations where there is an excess of budget pro-
posals over available funds. 
Some writers, 2 fail to acknowledge tQe fact that t"here i~~ace 
in the capital budgeting machinery for the necessity/postponability 
1 Necessity or degree of necessity is the degree of urgency of a proposal; i.e., the extent to which it cannot be postponed. 
2 Joel Dean in (9) gives the impression that there is almost no justifi-cation for postponability, but in (47), he definitely claims that there is a logical place for the necessity/postponability criteria. 
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criterion. Investment proposals which must be made·to meet certain 
government and legal requirements have a high degree of necessity and 
cannot be postponed. The replacement proposal of a very important 
piece of equipme~t; e.g., replacement of the telepnone company's micro-
. . 
wave relay tower destroyed by lightning, could fall into this high 
degree of necessity classification. 
Such projects acquire their high priority from the inherent im-
mense productivity and/or immense company profits which are imbedded in 
the proposal • '' '' But, as a general rule, must do projects of this nature 
"seldom bulk large in the company's over-all capital expenditure pro-: 
" ( ) gram , 47, p • 123 • 
The basic problem with the necessity/postponability criterion lies 
in the fact that "it is not logical and is not likely to lead to allo-
, .. 
cation of investment that pro·duces maximum profit. A large proportion 
of investments that would yield big savings and high profits could be 
put off almost indefinitely", (9, p. 20). Many examples can be cited 
to validate this belief.1 Accordingly, there does not seem to be any-
inherent.relationship between postponability and profitability . 
.. Another problem with this criterion is the fact that degrees of 
urgency cannot be measured according to a standard. There is seldom 
any general agreement as to the priority ranking of urgent or non-
J" 
postponable projects. This usually generates a contest of 
1 One of the examples used by Joel Dean refers to a plant modernization 
project which may be highly postponable; but which, if it can pro-
. . 
' .., duce annual savings which will yield 30% on the added capital tied 
up, is to be preferred to a less postponable but less profitable 
~roject, (47, p. 123). 
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personalities. The victor being the more eloquent and/or persistent 
division head., 
Thus, by its very nature, postponability can "forestall expansion· 
investment and technological advancett, (9, p. 28) . It is for these 
reasons that some writers claim this criterion fosters a stagnant.modus 
operandi. 
3 .5 Other Techniques 
-3 .54 Decision Trees 
. Since "the investment ·problem is not posed in terms of an isolated 
decision, (because today's decision depends on the one we shall make 
tomorrow), nor yet in terms of a sequence of decisions, (bebause under 
~ 
uncertainty, decisions taken in the future will be influenced by what 
we have learned in the meanwhile)", 1 (18, p. 250) the most recent 
investigations in the field of capital investments have dealt with 
decision trees and risk analysis. 2 These tools are needed by the de-
• 
I 
l 
t 
! 
' i ~ 
., cision maker who cannot analyze a project as if it existed in vacuo-·- -·-- ----------- · ~----
without giving ample consideration to any other problems which he faces 
at present or he may have to face in the future. 
Decision tree analysis, a form of dynamic programming, is a con-
venient method for representing and analyzing a series of investment 
1 Peter F. Drucker expresses the relationship between pres~nt planning and future events as: "Long range planning does not deal with future decisions. It deals with the futurity of present decisions", (49, p. 239) .. 
2 For examples refer to a 1962 textbook, (18, chapt. 6); three 1964 articles (68), (67), (57); a 1965 article (58); and the 1965 te,rt-book, (22, chap ts. 1-6) • 
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decisions to be made over time. The essential characteristics of all 
decision tree analysis involves the following: 
..... 
1. A choice or in some cases a sequence of choices must 
be made among various possible courses of action. 
2. Thi:s choice or sequence of .. choices will ultimately 
lead to some consequence, but the decision maker cannot 
be sure in advance what this consequence will be because 
it depends not only on his choice or sequence of choices 
but on an unpredictable eventor sequence of events. 
3. There exists, either by statistical research techniques 
or personal judgement or any_ combination of· these,- a 
probabilistic quantification to designate how good the 
chances of achieving each consequence are believed to be. 
4. There also exists a quantif~cation of preference by the 
decision maker to describe how good the chances or odds 
of obtaining any one consequence (C1) would have to be 
to make him willing to gamble on either of any other two 
consequences (c2 or c3 ) rather than to take c1 for 
certain • 
. 
. - -
Operational investment writings which appear in periodicals employ 
the first three factors only, 1 while recent textbooks2 on statistical 
decision making, use all four factors for a complete theoretical analy-
sis. The fourth factor involves the concepts of utility, lotteries, 
1 Refer to (58), (68), (67). 
2 Refer to (26), and (22). 
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and conditional probabilities, which are covered, in part, in Chapter 
V of this thesis . 
Al though these periodical articles do no·t _include the fourth 
-
factor, the fact that the decision maker(s) probably do consciously or 
subconsciously employ some mental manipulations which involve utili-
ties to arrive at a final decision can be implied. 
The following example1 will serve to illustrate the above factors: 
A firm is faced with the decision of introducing a new product 
regionally or nationally with the related capital investment problems. 
All the pertinent decision points, chance event nodes and probabilities 
involved can be diagramed as follows: 
I 
.,, -~' 
:.k 
1 Related to problem employed by Hespos_ and Strassman (58) . 
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Introduce 
Regionally 
1 
Introduce 
Nationally 
~... \. 
.,; ... 
•• 
) 
.. 
Limited Demand 
P = 0.3 
Large Demand Nationally 
~-------------------· P = • 71 
Limited National Demand 
P = .29 
2 
Large Demand Nationally 
P = • 71 
Limited National Demand 
P = .29 
Large National Demand P - .5 
Large Regional Demand, Limited National Demand P = .2 
' 
Limited Demand P = .3 
·Figure 6 
·-Examp 1 e of Standard Decision Tree Method 
NPV = Net Present Value (accounts for time differences). 
c::J = Decision Point 0 = Chance Event Nod~ 
P = Probability (All probabilities from any branch must 
sum to 1 .O). 
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An analysis of this diagram to determine an optimal sequence of 
decisions involves starting at the final consequences and "rolling 
backward". At each chance event node, the expected net present value 
is calculated for all of its outgoing branches. At each decision 
--------~--"--:----,-- --; _______ poiilt, the expected net present value is calculated fo:r a_ll of its __011t .... 
going branches. At each decision point, the expected net present value 
is calculated for each of its emanating branches and the highest is 
- ·-. - - ---~ ------· ---
-.- ....... 7 ,;:- - - •. 
selected. In either case, the expected net present value of that node or 
decision point is carried back to the next chance event node or decision 
point by multiplying it by the probabilities associated with the branches 
- that it travelsover. Thus, referring to Figure 6, the expected net 
' 
.. 
present value of all branches~emanating from chance event node C is 
$3.05 million ($4.5 x .71 + (- $0.5) x .29). In like fashion, the ex-
pected net present value at node Dis $2.36 million. Rolling back to 
decision point 2, the alternative with the highest net present value; 
i~e., "distr·ibute nationally", with NPV of $3.05 million, is selected by 
.F 
• 
~·· ··~ 
.... 
the decision maker. Continuing the roll back technique, it is seen that 
the branches emanating from chance event node A has an overall expected 
net present value of $2.44 million ($1 x 0.3 + $3.05 x 0.7). Si-
milarly, the expected present value at node Bis $2.75 million. Hence, 
the alternative that maximizes expected net present value of the entire 
decision present value of the entire decision tree is "introduce nation-
" ally at decision point 1. The procedures and thinking engaged in, to 
- . 
• II II arrive at an optimum path is closely related to the selection of an 
optimum strategy by a player in the theory of game.I 
1 Refer to Appendix 3, Game Theory - A Brief Review 
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As can be verified by the above example, the use ~f decision trees 
is based on three assumptions: 
a. All the states of the world; i._e!_, alternatives._-ana· 
chance events, that could occur in the future can be 
----enumerated and defined in advance. 
b. It is possible for the decision maker (or an associated 
group), to assign probabilities and costs to each state 
that may occur in the future. 
c. The optimum for any course of action is obtained by 
maximizing or minimizing mathematical expectations; i.e., 
. 
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maximization of profits or the minimization of~costs for 
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- equivalent services • 
To validate these assumptions as much as possible, it is necessary 
to obtain "accurate" cost estimates, business forecasts, probabilities, 
etc. To~his end, John F. Magee believes, "Marketing analysis, 
operations research, engineering analysis, and financial analysis have 
vital roles in investment analysis .... Those engaged in the analysis 
should be encouraged to express doubts, and uncertainties and to express 
estimates of costs, technical feasibility, or forecasts of market con-
ditions in terms of ranges or probabilities", (67, p. 80). But, how 
does one incorporate such factors of uncertainty and doubt into decision 
trees analysis? ( At prese.nt, there appears to be two approaches: 
a. John F. Magee's1 recommendation for the use of three 
- --·- --- . --
1 Prof. J. Morley English reviews J. F. Ma.gee's decision tree tech-
nique in Engineering Economist, Vol. 10, No. 1, Fall, 1964. 
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> 
estimate~; i.e., the optimistic estimate, most likely 
estimate, and pessimistic estimate for each doubtful 
factor; e.g., demand forecast. Incorporate these 
estimates as separate branches emanating from a chance 
node. All other procedures and criteria remain the 
same. 
b. R. F. Hespos' and P. A. Strassman' s method of stochastic 
decision trees. This most recent of methods is similar 
to the conventional decision tree approach, except that 
it also includes the following features: 
·., 
1. All quantities and factors, including chance events, 
~ 
are represented by continuous, empirical probability 
distributions. In effect, this replacesthe single 
best estimate of the standard method. 
2. The information about the results from any or all 
possible combinations of decisions made at sequential 
points'' in time can be obtained in a probability form. 
3, The probability distribution of possible results from 
any particular combination of decision can be analy~ed 
using the concepts of utility and risk. 
~-
The stochastic decision tree analysis involves computer simu-
lations, and according to the orginators, seems ideally suited to the 
computer language known as General Purpose Systems Simulator (GPSS). On 
each iteration in the simulation, a value of each factor is randomly 
selected from the appropriate frequency distribution and used in the 
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computati6n.- It is now also possible, by use of the computer, to evalu-
ate by complete enumeration all of the possible paths through the trees, 
regardless of the number. (By the standard method, simplification of a t· ---- -------- -~--
·,, 
'} 
j 
!: 
1 
very large number of .paths can be accomplished on the basis of dominance 
and the setting of an arbitrary standard which cannot be exceeded if the 
path is to be considered.) 
A simplified diagram of the same example used earlier, employing 
stochastic decision trees would appear as: 
Limited Regtonal Demand 
>' 
Figure 7 
Simplified Stochastic Decision Tree 
' This stochastic method has an inherent investment risk analysis 
built into it. This is so, since risk ~nalysis consists of estimating 
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_.1" • 
the probability. distribution1 of each factor affecting an investment 
decision; e.g., market size, investment request, operating costs, 
fixed cost, sel_ling price, etc., and then simulating the possible combi-
nations 0£ the values of each factor to determine the range of possible 
outcomes and the probability associated with each possible outcome. 
Risk analysis can also be used for sensitivity testing of investme1lt 
factors. In (59), Quigley and Hess illustrate how they have employed 
risk analysis on chemical industry investment problems by using the 
Monte Carlo method. " It now appears that, risk analysis is rapidly 
becoming an established technique in American industry. Several large 
.. 
corporations are now using varioµs forms of the technique as a regular 
part of their Jnvestment ijJlalysis procedure'', (58, p .· 6). ~is impres-
sion is reinforced by David Hertz in (57), a well written article on 
) 
risk analysis in capital investments. 
3.6 Summary 
,·, 
Each method examined in this chapter has some advantages and some 
disadvantages. However, of all the methods propos.ed for the measurement 
of the profitability of capital investments proposals, the two most 
_generally accepted are the present value and internal rate of return 
methods .. This author prefers the present value method; especially since 
the rate of return technique can sometimes lead to ambiguous and/or 
indecisive results. But, another method, payback, has many sponsors 
and this popularity tends to raise it to the level of acceptance of the 
1 Hertz in (57), and Hess and Quigley in (59), give recommendations for the techniques to be used to generate these distributions·--
- -- -·-· -
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., 
.-Other two. Probably~ the use of payback as an index of liquidity and 
" " f . i risk accounts or its popular ty. For investments made in very 
unstable foreign countries, this is no doubt the best method of evalu-
ating investments. But, for many domestic investments, most decision 
· makers, this author believes, have the wrong impression·of the charac-
teristics of tlle risk incorporated in the payback method. Payback 
measures only the risk associated with time since it assumes that a 
project continues uniformly with unchanged profits for a certain 
period of time and then suddenly ceases to be and ceases to have any 
value. It·does not measure the risks associated-wi~h normal business 
'I 
dynamics; e.g., sales will decrease, costs increase, taxes increase, 
inflation increase, etc. Even if payback is used for time risk, it is 
still imperfect since it does not make allowances for the time costs of 
money nor the amount of the initial capital investment recovered. For 
example, if 95% of initial investment is recovered in the first one and 
one-half years and the remaining 5% in another year, it is obvioos that 
most of the risk has been resolved in the first one and one-half years 
and it is incorrect to describe this project as one with a two and one-
.. 
half years capital recovery period. ~()the~ problem y,i th p~yl;>ack is the __ 
_ decision as to when to measure the beginning of the period of capital 
recovery. In some projects, long development phases are involved with 
small early expenditures. If.one uses the commonly accepted starting 
point: the beginning of operations, then the pre-production period is 
ignored. Thus, two projects which have the same payback periods measured 
from the start of operations could have very different development and 
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pl-anning period such that the capital is .. at risk for much longer time 
-. 
in one case than in the other. Probably, the most significant period 
of risk is from the time of expenditure, not from the beginning of 
- :--~ , ___ . 
.... 
-----operations . 
The present value method always gives the proper ranking of 
mutually exclusive proposals and the correct accept/reject decision 
for independent investments. Its big.failing lies in the assumption of 
no risk or equal risks for all proposals. Yet, its very format makes 
it the ideal method for incorporating a factor for ris~ due to inflation. 
Since World War II, this factor has been of chief concern to management. 
This author recommends that the risk involved in inflation be treated as 
follows: 
Let: 
r = cost of equity capital in absence of inflation 
s = cumulative rate at which the general level of 
prices is expected to increase 
Then, without the effects of inflation, the present value of an amount 
A due inn years is: 
A 
P = {l+r)n 
However, if inflation is operative, then money values are not constant, 
and P does not truly indicate the present dollar equivalent of A due in 
n years. If s~is known, then to translate A into present money worth, 
A must be reduced by the factor, (l+s)n. Accordingly, 
• 
• 
. ' 
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- - - --- -----. . ... _ -p = ___ A ___ _ 
(l+r)D(l+s)D 
;. A 
= -------
--
' [(l+r)(l+s)]D 
Or, to generalize, the equity cost of capital in terms of r1 under 
inflation at rate,s is: 
• 
r 1 = (l+r)(l+s)-1 
At this point the following should be noted: 
--a. The rate of inflation is multiplied by the equity cost 
of capital, and it is this product which is used to 
discount future payments. If both rates are low, i.e., 
less than 5%, their sum would be accurate enough for 
calculations . 
b. If the general price level is expected to decrease 
rather than increase by the rate s'per year, then:~ 
A(l+s)n \ .. p 
- (l+r)n -
1 
The stochastic tree method, because it inherently incorpor)ltes . 
the risk dimension in the form of a probability distribution and the 
time discounting factor by use of the present value method, has 
accomplished a much desired marriage of risk and present value. If all 
the assumptions of the tree method, as based on page 98 assumptions, 
are met, then it can be the best available operational method. Because 
of its very recent development and the requirement of a computer, little 
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application studies have been conducted. The future may show this 
method to be superior. 
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CHAPTER IV COST OF CAPITA!, 
-.. 
4 .1 Cost of Funds 
- '--~---...-cc-- ... -.~--........-------~ 
A-very important f actor1. affecting -investment decision making is ------ -· 
the cost of capita~ to a firm. This cost depends upon its source. 
Although there are many ways to finance an investment; e.g., borrowing 
from banks, selling marketable securities, issuing bonds and/or stocks, , 
using funds generated by operations, selling other assets or parts of 
its business, it is convenient to employ four general categories of 
. 
fund sources: depreciation, retained earnings, debt, and equity 
' financing. The first two sources of funds a~e internally generated 
while the last two are externally acquired. 2 
In most corporate enterprises, "capital expenditures are usually 
'/ derived from internal sources. . .. Consequently,_ the projection of the 
amount that can be expected from accumulated depreciation and retained 
earnings is usually the most important part of capital expenditure 
budgeting", (9, p. 38) . A more detailed description of each fund 
follows: 
A. Depreciation Fund 
As a general rule, depreciation funds are always available and do 
not represent much of a problem so far as costs are concerned. Any 
1 
2 
Another important factor affecting investment decision making is the interaction of depreciation, taxes and profitability. "It has fre-q~ently been noted that the choice of depreciation method will affect the profitability of the investment."- (4, p. 108). Two good references t.o show the importance of this interaction are (4, Chapt. 8) and (51). 
Some sources, such as preferred stock, can be considered hyb,rid, since it has some of the characteristics of debt and equity securities. 
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f 
fi will have the opportunity to reinvest these £unds profitably. In 
"'\ fact, t~e cost of not reinvesting these funds and of not keeping the , \ 
\ 
\ 
'\\ 
·· -£irm' s cap'i,:f:al investment intact can be prohibitive. 
Many firms treat the depreciation fund as if it were in reality 
another equity fund. Merrett and Sykes (20, Chapt. 4), believe that 
such a concept is totally erroneous, and that the depreciation fund 
should be partitioned'into 9ebt and equity portions. The debt portion 
should consist of th~ money used for re-investment, since it obviates 
the need to repay a debt . Also, "when the opportunity cost of using 
part of the depreciation provision is effectively the repayment of 
debt, that part of the depreciatio~ provision can meaningfully be re-
garded as attributable t.o debt and should be so regarded. Accordingly, 
it need only be invested at a rate of return sufficient to service debt 
capital", (20, p. 142). In other words, th,e cost of depreciation 
capital is to be considered as made up of the· cost of the uses to 
which it could be put; e.g., to repay debts or distribute as dividends. 
\ Prof . Eli Schwartz claims that where depreciat.~on funds are the 
sole source of capital, the decision makers, "simply a.llocate the 
available volume of funds from depreciation to the highe'et yielding 
uses", (27, p. 246). For the growing firm which employs other than 
\ 
\ 
depreciation.funds, "the cutoff point for new investments proposals 
will be determined, on the supply sid~, by the cost of the other\forms 
o:f equity capital that are used to finance the expansion of assets':, 
(27 1 p_. 246) • 
It is generally agreed that depreciation funds should not be "--
'···· 
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_ .. ~ 
...,__ ____ allocated acdording to where they originated._ ~nstead, depreciation 
funds should be assigned to a general-.-pool along with other capital 
funds. Any individual department of a company would then have to bid 
for use of these funds on its comp·etitive merits. 
B. Debt Fund 
-" differentiate between short-term funds (trade credit, bank borrowing,· · 
bills of exchange, deferred tax payments), medium and long-term loans. 
· However, for the purpose of financial analysis, the debt fund is usually 
associated with long-term debt, which are obligations the firm does not 
have to pay for a least a year.1 Items that may be so classed are 
bonds, debentures, term loans, or in -small firms mortg:,ges on buildings. 
The use of debt financing involves risks and imposes restrictions 
upon the freedom of management. Financing by means of debt implies an 
obligation to repay a firm's creditors at a fixed rate of interest in 
fixed periodic payments. Equity financing does not have these re-
strictions. Thus, according to the demands it creates, some companies 
try to avoid the use of debt. 2 
The cost of borrowed funds is-the current effective interest rate. 
This effective interest rate may be different than the indicated or 
nominal interest rate of an outstanding debt security. For example, a 
1 They are also called funded debt or fixed liabilities. The portion 
of the long-term debt due within the current year is carried in the 
current liability section of the firm's balance sheet. \~ 
------........... 2 The·effects of leverage, i.e., that amount of debt the firm uses in proportion to their own.contributions in financing total assets, 
must also be considered. 
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bond issued at a discount or at a premium will have an effective 
interest rate different than its coupon rate.l 
C. Equity Funds 
Although equity or ownership of a corporation is legally tied to 
its common and preferred stock, for cost analysis purposes, preferred 
stock is defined as a form of debt and common stock as the equity fund. 
(The cost of using funds provided by an ordinary non-convertible pre-
ferred issue is simply the current dividend yield on such shares 
divided by the forecasted corporation profits tax rate. Earnings do 
not enter the calculations. Fo~ example, if the going dividend yield 
i c.,• is 5% and the tax rate is 50%, the pre-tax cost 
financing is 10%. "The cost of preferred stock 
high compared to debt-. On the other hand, as a 
of preferred 
financing is 
subordinated 
stock 
relatively 
form of . 
. financing - bearing some of the risks of equity - it helps to support 
the debt structure." (27, p. 141).) 
According to Ezra Solomon, "the cost of capital derived from the 
issue of new common stock is a difficult concept and one about which 
little agreement exists in·practice", (77, p. 242). Presently, there 
are at least four possible criteria in use for ~easuring the cost of 
these funds. These criteria are as follows: 
Criterion 1: If these funds can be invested in projects whose 
rate of return is greater than that currently being earned on the 
1 
The effective rate of interest :for an outstanding issue can be determined by comparing the current market price for the security with the remaining payment obligations; e.g., for a bond, the ef-fective interest rate is the rate of interest which equates the market price and the present value of the amount due at maturity pl:us tlle present values of the series of interest payments. 
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"' existing capital, then their benefits are greater than their costs~ 
This will raise the company's average rate of return on its total in-
vestment. One of the fallacies with this reasoning is that the low 
profitability pr-ojects are given equal weight with the higher pro-
fitability undertakings in determining the firm's future investments. 
,, 
Criterion 2: This criterion compares the anticipated rate of 
' 
·· return of a new investment proposal with the present ratio of dividend 
payments to the market price of existing shares, i.e., to the dividend 
rate that the company expects to pay on new equity funds. The pro-
ponents of this method argue that any rate of return per share that is 
' -
higher than the dividend rate per share will provi~e a net return to 
the firm. 
Criterion 3: According to this criterion, the cost of equity funds 
is measured by the ratio of the current earnings per share to the 
current market price per share; i.e., the E/P ratio. 
Criterion 4: This criterion is actually a refinement of the previ-
ous one. Instead of the current earnings per share (E), the numerator 
should measure the best estimate of the average of the future expected 
earnings per share if the proposed capital expenditures were not made. 
This measure shall be· designated as E~ The correct index of equity 
costs is then E'/P. This measure, in the opinion~ of Ezra Solomon, is 
~ 1 the only valid criterion for the cost of new equity capital. 
The following example of a co~pany capitalized entirely by-equity 
funds will be employed to defend this opinion: 
1 Refer to (77, p. 243). 
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1. Total book value per share 
2. Total capitalization 
3. Current earnings per share (E/S) 
4. Current dividends·per share· 
5. Current market price per share (P) 
6. Best estimate of future annual earnings 
without new investments, e.g., an 
expansion project 
7. Best estimate of future annual earnings 
with the investment 
8. Salvage value of the project1 
9 .. Present outlay required for the investment 
' 10. Underwriting and flotation expense2 
.. 
$ 30.00 
-'\ 
1 million shares 
3.00 
2.00 
20.00 
3,300,000.00 
4,200,000.00 
6,000,000.00 
6,000,000.00 
0 
The proposed project, according to items 6 and 7, promises a re-
turn of $900,000 per year for an outlay of $6,000,000. The average 
rate of return is thus 15%. But, if the cost of capital were calcu-
t'-' lated in accordance with each of the four criterion, the following 
results are obtained: 
Criterion 1: 10%~· 
Criterion 2: 10% 
Criterion 3: 15% 
Criterion 4: 16 .5% 
Accordingly, the prop~sed project would be acceptable to Criteria 1 and 
2, rejected by Criterion 4, and would be marginal according to Criterion 
3. Which is correct? To finance the $6,000,000 project, 300,000 shares 
1 The unrealistic salvage value simplifies but does not affect the validity of the solution. 
2 In a "real" case, these items, including any underpricing necessary to insure success of the issue, must be taken ~into account in computing the cost of new equity capital. 
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of stock must be issued at the current market price of $20 per share . 
The new earnings, with a capitalization of 1,300,000 shares will be--
about $4,200,000 or $3.23 per share. Without this investment, and 
without any new financing, the earnings per share would be $3.30. 
(items 2 and 6). Criterion 4 is the only one which correctly !ndicates 
that this investment would be unprofitable. 1 If P' indicates the 
amount of money the corporation actually receives for each share, then 
the correct measure of the cost of equity capital is E'/P'. 
It must be realized that this cost model is restrictive because 
it implies: 
"A. Investment proposals within the company are homogeneous with respect to the quantity of yield offered. 
b. The company is financed entirely by equity funds. 
c. True earnings are equal to book earnings; l.e., the amount of depreciation deducted from the cash flow generated by operations is exactly enough to maintain ~earnings at the anticipat~d level. 
d. This level of earnings contains no upward or down trend", (30, p. 51) . 
Profs. Myron J. Gordon and Eli Shapiro in (56) have proposed a dif-
ferent method of evaluating the cost of equity. This approach described 
2 b~low, seems to have gained many followers: 
. 
They (Gordon and Shapiro) have noted that both the dividend yield 
(Criterion 2) and the earnings yield (Criterion 3) fail to recognize 
---------------· 
1 Criterion 3 gave marginal results only because of ·this particular example. It tends to give erroneous results, especially if small E/P ratios are involved·. 
2 / 
For example-, Profs. Bierman and Schmidt base two chapters of their book on this method for-determining the cost of equity. I 
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.. that a share's payments can be expected to grow and in addition, that 
.,, 
Criterion 3 fails to recognize that the corporation's ea·rnings per 
_ share are not the payments made to the stockholder. "The practical 
significance of these failures is evidenced by the qualifications with 
which these.two rate of profit measures are used by investment analysis", 
(56, p. 143) . 
' To account for the propsective growth in a share's revenue, Profs. 
Gordon and Shapiro reasoned as follows: 
' 
Let, 
·~--
P0 - a share's price to t=o 
Dt = dividend expected at time t 
k - rate of profit or criterion 
, 
Then, the rate of profit on a share of stock is the value of k that 
' 
(1) p = ~ Dt 
0 t=l (l+k)t 
But, it is mathematically convenient to assume that the dividen:I is 
paid and discounted continuously at the annual rates D and k giving: 
t 
(2) 
To solve for Dt' two assumptions are made: 
1. A corporation is expected to retain a fraction "b" of 
.its income after taxes. 
2. A corporation is expected to earn a return of " " r on 
the book value of its common equ·ity . 
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Therefore, if Y equals a corporation's income per share of common 
4 t 
after taxes at time t, the expected dividend at time tis: 
(3) Dt = (1 - b) Yt 
.. The income per share at time t is the income at (t-1) plus r per 
1 cent of the income at {t-1) retained: 
or, if Y grows continuously at the rate g = b-r,--we have: t 
(5) yt = Yoegt 
., Hence, from equations 3 and 5: 
( 
4 If this expression is substituted for D in equation 2 and inte-t grated, it yields: 
·..ii:; 
\. 
J(X) -t (k-g) = D0 e dt 
0 
If k > g, a condition easily satisfied, for otherwise P would be 
0 infinite or negative: 
D (8) k = _Q, +g 
Po 
In words, this means that the rate of profit or the cost of equity 
at which a share of -conmion·s-tock is selling is equal to the current 
dividend divided by the current price (Criterion 2) plus the rate at 
t~ 
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which the dividend is expected to grow. 
For example, if the current dividend is $6.00 per share~ the "__J" • 
current market price is $150 .oo per share, and -tne-clividend per shari 
1 is expected to increase at about 2% per year, the formula gives: 
k = 0.04 + 0.02 = 6% 
D. Retained Earnings 
The dividend policy of a firm has an important effect on the 
amount of retained earnings of that firm. For example, the firm may 
try to retain all funds that can be used profitably, i.e., their rate 
of return exceeds their costs. In this case, retained earnings would 
be a fluctuating residual left over from earnings. Or, the firm may 
try ~o retain a certain percentage of earnings for contingencies and 
growth. In this case, the dividends would be the residual, and their 
magnitude would vary with earnings . 
• 
In order to arrive at a correct measure of the cost of retained 
earnings, Ezra Solomon in ,(77, p. 245), proposes that these earnings 
must be thought of as analogous to new equity funds. It is then 
assumed that the company paid out these funds as dividends and that the 
stockholders then reinvested the funds in the company. On this basis, 
the correct measure of the cost of retained earnings would be the same 
as that for equity funds: E'/P. The Prather than P' is used because 
no floatation costs, etc., would be involved in obtaining these funds. 
Stoc~<?lders' personal income taxes may be an important factor in .. 
determining whether to retain earnings or ~t. If the rate of return 
1 Adjustments must be made for expected stock splits and stock dividends. 
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that can be earned on these funds is less than their cost, then they 
_sh9uld be paid to the stockholders. If there were no income tax on 
dividends, then E'/P would be the correct measure of their cost. With: 
E1 -taxes,';',however, this ratio must be adjusted to P(l-m) where m is the 
common tax rate. Thus, it might be more profitable from the stock-
holders' viewpoint for the company to reinvest the funds at a lower 
rate than that at which the stockholders could reinvest them .. Although 
.. 
the stockholders might reinvest these funds at a higher rate than the ~:. 
corporation, they would have a smaller amount to invest after taxes.I 
To illustrate the above, let's assume that a company has $1,000 
either to reinvest or to distribute to stockholders as dividends. The 
company can reinvest these funds at 10%. The stockholders can reinvest 
. ? 
the funds in the market at 20% (E'/P), but they are subject to a 50% 
tax. The company can earn $100 for their stockholders. The stock-
holders would also earn a net amount of $100. In this case, the stock-
holders would be just as well off if the company retained the money. 
For any rate higher than 10%, the company could earn more for its stock-
holders than the stockholders couldfearn by investing for themselves • 
If the stockholders were all subject to the same tax rate, the 
E' correc~ measure of the cost of retained earnings would be p(l-m). In 
reality, the personal tax on the company's shareholders is not uniform; 
e.g., tax-free institution and top income groups in society may be 
shareholders. There is no way to adjust for this multiplicity of tax 
1---,·, 
. The fact that stockholders are not all in the same marginal tax 
.• 
bracket' creates a d~fficult problem, and one for which there· is no 
solution at either the conceptual or the operating level." (77, p. 246). 
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rates . The ref ore, either the tax rate must be ignored or some kind of 
average tax must be assumed. 
-------.----····- - -- .. - -· . 
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4.2 Effect of- Corporate Income Tax on the Cost of Capital 
Corporate income tax is an important consideration in determin~.pg 
which typ~ of financing is to be used. This tax has the effect of 
lowering the cost of debt relative to equity financing. The reason for 
this is that interest payments are tax deductible while dividend payments 
are treated differently. 1 Part of the debt cost, therefore, is not 
really a cost, since it would have been lost through taxes. To illustrate 
this: · Assume that a corporation will acquire $10,000 by either debt or 
equity financing, that the corporate tax rate is 50%, and that for sim-
plicity sake, the current yield demanded by the market is 5% for both 
debt and equity funds. If the firm .decides upon debt financing, it must 
be able to earn at least $500 a year to avoid default. This would re-
quire an earning rate of 5% on the $10,000. l.f equity financing is 
chosen, this rate of return would be inadequate. The corporate tax 
would reduce the $500 earnings to $250. The resultant E/P yield would 
be only 2.5%. To justify financing on equity the company would have to 
earn at least $1,000 before taxes. This would be equivalent to a return 
of 10% on the original $10;000. With a corporate income tax of 50%, ".a 
therefore, a company must earn about twice as much with equity funds as 
with debt funds . 
Obviously, then, if the cost rate of debt and equity funds are to 
---------- -- . - - - . 
' 
~ .. • 
1 The corporation is taxed on its earnings. The 
taxed. on that proportion of a company earnings 
dends. · 
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, -be compared, they must be put on the same basis.(, When ·the corporate· 
.-
-· 
l 
-w 
tax is considered, the cost of debt funds (r') is as follows: 
-----~~-~------ -
Effective Interest Rate r' = ------------1 - Corporate Tax 
-- ------
This calculation then helps to resolve the problem of measuring and 
comparing the cost of individual sources of funds, but it does not clarify 
what should be done when the total cost of capital is a composite of more' 
than one type of fund. 
4.3 Composite Financing 
The question of how to treat the---cost of capital when more than one 
type of fund is used for financial budgeting has been and remains one of 
paramount importance to economists, financiers, and decision makers. Al-
though the solution has been formulated in several ways, as yet no clear-
cut, generally accepted solution exists. " This gap represents the 
weakest link in the theory of capital budgeting, and, until it is filled, 
capital budgeting theory will remain, at best, only a partial guide to 
decision making in this important area of business activity." (77, p. 241) 
.,~-;-
Six of the proposed solutions will be described, in order to demon-
strate the current theoretical thinking about this problem. Most of 
these methods ignore depreciation funding, because a successful firm is 
supposed to have little real choice about reinvesting such funds. 1 
Merrett and Sykes, in what is probably one of thr most respected books 
on finance and capital budgeting in Great Britain, (20, Chapt. 3), refuse 
1 Typ°:i~cal examples are (4), in which the authors discuss the cost of 
c,apital in two chapters but never mention depreciation funding; also 
Joel Dean's discussion in (9, Chapt. 3), and (70), (56), (50), and 
(75). 
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< to recognize such an eliminat-ion of depreciation funding. To them, - I 0 
I . 
.... 
depreciation funds should be divided into its debt and equity com-
ponents for proper calculations of its cost. In this fashion, it 
takes its place together with debt, equity,· and retained earnings in 
----------
.any composite cost calculations. However, most authors believe that 
omitting depreciation funds, even if it has inherent opportunity costs, 
is not._a serious flaw. Thex, claim that the practical advantages of 
ignoring the cost of depreciation funds far outweigh the relatively 
insignificant theoretical loss. Thus, when depreciation is ignored, 
·the problem resolves itself into one of finding the combined costs of 
debt and equity with the latter being composed of retained earnings 
and new equity funds. 
Proposed Solution 1: 
This method employs what is probably the most obvious technique: 
. the use of a weighted average of the costs of the debt and equity funds. 
The weights to be used are the proportion of each type of fund in the 
company's capital structure. 1 This method can be illustrated by the 
foll9wing tabulation: 
Debt 
Equity 
Total Cost 
of Capital 
Proportion 
of Capital 
Structure 
40% 
60% 
---
l 
Cost of 
Each Type 
5% 
10% 
-----
Weighed Cost 
of Each Type 
2% 
6% 
_ _._. 
1Thi"s method is employed by some state commissions in the reguiation of ~- •,,_ .... ..,. public utilities. 
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One criticism of this approach is that the existing capital. 
stn~cture represents the past financing~\of the company. Perhaps, the 
proportions of debt and equity in the anticipated future financing 
______ ~hC>uld be the weight appl-ied. But, here again, we are entering into 
areas of uncertainty. The overall simplicity of this technique is 
..., 
most appealing . 
Proposed Solution 2: 
· This solution is closely related to Proposed.Solu-ti-on~l-.-------ln--t-his 
-method, the cost of capital is also defined as a weighted average of 
. the cost of each type of capital. But, the weight for each type of 
capital is the ratio of the market value of the securities representing 
that source of capital to the market value of all securities issued by 
~ the company. The term security includea common and preferred stocks 
and all interest-bearing liabilities including notes payable. For 
example, suppose the market value of a firm's common stock is estimated 
at $45 million. The market value of its interest bearint debt is esti-
mated at $30 million, and the average before tax yield on the.se liabili-
ties is 6% per year, which is equivalent to an after tax basis of 2.88% 
per year (6 x .48, assuming a 52% tax rate). Assume the company is 
currently paying a dividend of $8.00 ~er year and its stock is selling / 
at $100 • The rate of growth of th~1 dividend is projected to be 2% per 
year. 
,_ 
Hence, the average 
k = $S + 0 .02 $100 
. I 
/ 
cost~ the common stock equity 
. // 
I 
= 10% 
,/ 
I 
/ 
is:· 
Therefore, the average co~-~ of cap-ital -for the company as a whole 
,-
-,_ 
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is computed as follows: 
.. 
Capital Source 
Proportion of 
Total Capital 
Weighed~~~~--~ 
---Co&t------------- Co st 
Equity 45/75 - .60 .10 0.06 
Debt, interest bearing 30/75 = .40 • 0288 0.012 
Average Cost of Capital 7 .2$ 
Proposed Solution 3: 
This technique assumes that all funds, regardless of their source, 
have the same cost as debt funds. The fact that the cost of debt funds 
is fairly"easy to obtain seems to be a point in favor of this method • 
.. " But, because it ignores the cost of equity funds, this approach pro-
vides a wrong criterion for judging the acceptability.of investment 
proposals~ •.. Whenever the net cost of equity funds is higher than 
the net cost of debt funds, (and this is the usual case), the use of 
this approach will lead to the acceptance of proposals that should 
properly be rejected", (77, p. 248) . The following example will serve 
to reinforce this opinion: 
A company has $300 as the maximum equity funds available from re-
tained earning. Assume that for each dollar retained it can borrow a 
dollar at the net interest cost of 2% .. Thus, the company has a maximum 
borrowing capacity of $300. Also, -assume that the current earnings 
yield in the market at which a stockholder could-reinvest any dividends 
is 10%. The- company is considering three alternative investment 
projects: 
1 • $200 at a rate of re±_urn of 1-4i 
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2. $200 at a rate of return of 7'1o . 
---=-- - ·- ----- - .. -· . ... . 
\I 
3. $200 at a rate of return· of 3% 
----~-·· The cost of capital (2%) is less than the rate of return o~ any one 
of these proposals. Accordingly, the company, by this proposal, should- ------------. .. -
borrow the required $300 and invest in all three projects; i.e., $300 
is retained and $300 is borrowed. But, if this were done, the total 
yearly earnings for the stockholders would be $48~ i.e., ($28 + $14- + 
$6). After paying interest on the borrowed funds, $42 would remain. 
This, actually, is not in the best interests for the stockholders. To 
demonstrate this, only the first two proposals will be accepted and 
$400 would be invested; $200 from retained c·earnings and $200 from bor-
rowing would finance this investment, and $100 would be paid out as 
dividends. This action is based on the fact that only the first pro-
posal justifies retaining the earnings within the company; while the 
second proposal exceeds the cost of borrowed funds. The t_~ird project 
also exceeds the borrowing cost of funds, but the company has already 
reached its borrowing limit. The net results of this operation would 
be as follows: 
$200 at 14%------------------$28 
$200 at· 7%------------------ 14 
Gross Earnings---------$42 
Less Interest Costs 4 
Net Earnings $38 
Plus earnings from 
Dividend Reinvested 
at 10%---------------------~$10 
Total Earnings $48 
.. 
_,.. 
This investment activity yields the stockholders $6 more than the 
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previous plan . This method is then inadequate. 
---------------
\Proposed Solution 4: 
; 
This approach identifies the cost of equity funds as the relevant 
cost of all funds regardless of their source. - - " " The logic behind this proposed solution is as follows: In addition to their monetary costs, debt -funds also have -~- 11on-mone_tary cost; e.g., constraints placed on 
- - ··-·· -- --· . --
·tne borrower by the terms of the loan, and the risk of default together 
with its consequences. "Companies will finance by debt so long as the total real cost of the increment of borrowing is below the cost of financing by new equity funds." (77, p. 249). But, as the firm con-tinues to borrow, the real cost of debt funds increases, because the lender will set higher nominal costs and also because the risk in-
. curred by the borrower will rise as the proportion of debt to equity 
rises. At the time, when borrowing costs have reached equity costs, 
the company will turn from debt financing to equity financing. Thus, it can be assumed that there will be a continual adjustment of a firm's 
capital struq,ture so that the cost<of its debt and equity funds are 
always in balance. Since it is usually impossible to give quantitative 
• values to the non-monetary costs of debt, the cost measurement is ~de 
on the equity fun~s. 
The major problem with this approach is the fact that it does not ... provide a guide as to how a firm can achieve a balanced capital 
structure. Without such guidance, this ioothod must be viewed as having little practical value, although it does attempt to take borrower's risk into account • 
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Proposed Solution 5:· 
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This method,_ which is strongly endorsed by Ezra Solomon, considers~-
debt funds as a form of quasi-equity funds. It is easier to understand"'·· 
this concept if we view the equity capital supply versus the cost of 
0 
capital, initially without borrowing. Figure 8 is a supply schedule of -
equity funds. 
FIGURE 8 
Supply Curve of Equity Capital 
Cost of Capital 
(per cent) 
EI I/PI 
E // /P 
A E'/P-------------~ 
Millions of Dollars 
Amount of Equity Capital 
In the·· above representation, "A" is assumed· to be the depreciation 
funds, but no attempt is made to measure their cost explicitly. Part 
., 
"B" of the t t · d · curve represen s re a1ne earnings. The initial cost of 
these funds is E' /P as wasi previously explained. As more and more 
dollars are reinvested, the earnings are assumed to rise faster pro-
portionately than does the price. The slope . of this part of the supply 
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curve, the ref ore, is upward. The cost of the last unit of available 
·retained earnings is E"/P where E" is equal to the expected earnings 
per share, including the earnings expected from projects to be 
financed from depreciated allowances and all of retained earnings. 
: i 
- --·----- - - -
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Part ''c" of the t . t f d curve represen s new equi y un s. The abrupt rise 
between "B" and "c" is caused by the fact that E"/P changes to E"/P' . 
The P' amount is less than P (actual market price) by the amount qf 
underwriting fees, floatation expenses, etc, Accordingly, the value 
of the total cost ratio ris·e-s sharply. Part "D" shows what would 
happen if the company reduced dividends below past levels. "such 
action is likely to bring about a rapid r-ise in the cost of funds 
because it will generally reduce the --market price of stock", (77, p. 
247), and cause the slope of the ret~ined earnings curve to increase 
noticeably. Actually, Part "D" then, represents the new equity fi-
• at this higher level of stock . nancing prices. 
At this point, how 
'· 
can this curve be moddied so that it can be 
applicable to a company that uses debt .funds. It is possj.ble to 
._,, consider the use of debt funds only because of the equity capital al-
., j 
1 ready invested in the company's assets. When a company borrows money 
it frees some of its equity funds that had previously been tied up in 
its asset structure. " In other words, the supply of usable equity funds 
can be derived not only from cuirent earnings and new stock floatations 
" ( but also from borrowing on the strength of these real assets, 77, 
_f'-. p. 251) • These newly freed equity funds are then added'·-to the supply 
schedule described above. If the borrowing has no influence on the 
1 
'' 
Ezra Solomon refers to this as the general borrowing power of 
equity", (77, p. 251) , 
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price of the company's stock, the net effect is to stretch out the 
--~·---·-·· ·--- . 
_§Jlpply curve to the right • 
' 
In effect, the debt funds have become 
quasi-equity funds. 
In using these methods, each new proposal is given a Qorrowing 
quota ... ---This quota is based on the minimum amount of earnings expected 
from the proposal 1 so as to prevent the possibility of default on the 
loan. When this is done for all proposals, the amount of total 
. . 
borrowed funds is known. The amount of new equity financing required 
~ . 
is simply the difference between the total cost of the investment and 
the total borrowed funds. This technique allows the decision maker to 
formulate a schedule that shows, for each proposal, the amount of equity 
funds it needs and the net rate of yield it promises to return if these 
funds are granted for it. Thus, in addition to the borrowing power the 
company possesses due to its existing assets, it will add new potential. 
borrowing power for each new proposal tha~ is accepted. 
Proposed Solution 6: 
l 
This method has been sponsored by Profs. Modigliani and Miller in 
(70). 
Let 
C = cost of capital 
X = corporate profits before interest payments 
D = total market value of the company's debt,, securities 
S = total market value of the company's equity securities 
V = S + D = total market t'\ral ue of company 
Then, if it is agreed that "the market value of any firm is inde-
. pendent Qf its capital structure and is given by capitalizing its 
- • ' I 
. 
---· 
,.. -
- .-_. ~---... -.. -_-... -...... - ... - - -- - -- -- ... -
-- - .· - . --- - . -- . --- .---- ·- -· "."' . --- ..__,...,...,,.,,_.........,.,.._ -~""""-~-• .............. _.,_....,.,~~~-.- ~-;;;::::r.:..:..~::..;...c·->!-"'--"~-~.;z.,:...>.J---"__;_~-.:_-:;;:-:~::::.:-::::._~:~~-- ;zs• - I •. )&&.,· 
' ./ -
/ 
--
- -~. -; . - - - -- . 
__ .... _________________ ::.c..:· -=----..cA~; --~-
I 
=i1 
-r 
' I 
-a· 
. i 
.. , 
;. -
.... •· 
·· .. 
-~ 
. •" 
.......... 127 . 
expected return- at a rate appropriate to its class", (70, p. 158), we 
can let: 
' - -~-~--:-:::.. ------ --- -
-
• t 
" ,. 
The value the market places on the firm's securities is supposed to 
reflect the total capital value of the firm at any particular time. 
return for this capital contribution, the security holders have re-
ceived claims to the total value of the company's earnings (X). ~· The 
. 
In 
ratio of what the corporation has given up (X), to what it has received 
in retu,rn (D + S) is, therefore, the correct measure of the cost of 
capital. Prof. David Durand criticized this proposal in detail in (50). 
The above methods should give some idea of the complexity of·this 
... problem of composJ te financing. Perhaps this can be best appreciated 
by the following comments by Profs. Bierman and Smidt, (4, p. 140): "A 
person who desires neat solutions with one correct answer should avoid 
the computation of a corporation's cost of capital. Usually such an 
answer is impossible. If ten experts independently computed the cost 
of capital of the IBM Corporation, .there would be ten answers. Although 
• 
an exact answer to a corporation's cost of capital is elusive, it is 
possible to establish a range which, with a high degree of probability, 
r includes the cost of capital." 
~. 
4.4 Effect of Capital Structure on the Cost of Capital 
It is possible to view the effects of capital structure on.a firm's 
<i 
cost of capital from two entirely different approaches: 
a • The Traditional Approach 
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, This point of view, mos~ commonly accepted, holds that the moder-
at·e use of debt lowers the total cost of cap·1 tal . The basis for this ~-----------· . 
r 
'· 
premise is the "belief" that debt is much cheaper than equity capital. 
This can be illustrated by a comparison between a firm's interest yield • 
on bonds and the earning yield on stock. Stock yields are usually 
several times larger than bong yields. 
The cost of debt funds, however, is not a constant. As the debt 
ratio increased, the company would have to offer higher interest rates 
to compensate bondholders for their increased risk. In addition, the 
greater proportion of debt in the capital structure would decrease the 
·'-:,,,. . value of the common stock. This means that the cost of equity funds 
also increases with increasing debt ratios. The use of debt fina~cing·, 
however, tends\_to reduce the total cost of capital up to a point. 
Evidently, there must then exist an optimum combination of debt and 
" equity capital. This can be illustrated in Table V, where the combined 
cost of capital is calculated by weighing the cost of each type of fund 
by their respective proportions in the company's c·api tal structure. 
This table indicates that for the year under consideration (1937), the 
-~-
ideal utility capitalization consisted of approximately 30% bonds~. and 
70% common stock . 
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TABLE V 
Effect of Capital Structure on the Total Cost of Capital -
An Example From--utility Companies1 
Percentage of 
Debt in Capital 
Structure 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
Cost of 
Debt (%) 
0 
3.15 
3.21 
3.35 
3.70 
4.60 
Percentage of 
Equity _in Capital 
Structure 
100 
90 
80 
70 
60 
50 
Cost of 
Equity 
Combined 
Cost (%) ___ _ 
6.56 6.56 
6.84 6.12 
7.19 5.76 
7.59 5.50 
8.17 5.51 
9.37 6.17 
Graphically, the relationship between debt funds and combined 
funds can be represented by Figure 9 . 
% 
Combined 
Cost of 
Debt and 
Equity 
. -, 
Cost of Debt 
• ... ,,n ........ ~.°' 
-~ 
'I 
\. 
Cost of Debt vs. Combined Cost of Debt and Equity 
,-
FIGURE 9. 
-~-
-1 Source is (8, p. 232) - This table is based on a survey of telephone, 
electric and gas utility companies for the year 1937. 
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. Table V and Figure 9 demonstrate that an optimum capital structure 
does exist; i.e., the structure at whfch the combined costs are a 
minimum. "It is impossible to give any simple rules for determining in 
advance the optimum capital structure for a particular firm. Theo-
''\!.-. 
retically, the optimum structure is reached when an additional debt 
issue, in substitute for stock equity, will result in a decrease in the 
price per share of the common stock." (4, p. 159) • 
b. Modigliani and Miller Approach 
'-
Profs. Modigliani and Miller, in 1956, in a paper delivered at 
the annual meeting of the Econometric Society, presented their three 
propositions which contradicted the traditional approach. The theory 
/ put forth by Profs. Modigliani and Mille-r, however, has not been eagerly 
endorsed by many theorists. In fact, Prof. David Durand has vigorously 
attached the Modigliani and Miller (henceforth referred to as Mand M 
approach) in (50). More recently, Alexander Barges won the 1962 Ford 
Foundation Doctoral Dissertation Award for his unfavorable analysis, 
(mostly statistical), of the M and M philosophy (2) . And in 1963, Ezra 
Solomon attempted to disprove the Mand M approach through logic and 
theoretical analysis in (30, Cbapts. 8,9). Mand M take as a starting 
h 
' 
point a world of perfect markets in which all investors act rationally 
and in which all types of investors are not handicapped in their actions. 
I ' Given this, Mand M assume that firms can be divided into homogeneous 
\. 
classes in accordance with business risk or the certainty of their 
anticipated income stream. In other words, the income generated by the 
assets of any one firm in a class is subject to the same degree of 
.'!. 
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uncertainty as the income generated by the assets of the other firms in 
that class. Having'thus assumed perfect markets and clas~es of homo} 
_geneous firms, Mand M then present their propositions. / 
Proposition 1: The average cost of capital to any firm is com-
pletely independent of its capital structure and is equal to the 
capitalization rate of a pure equity stream of its class • . 
'-
To express this proposition in equation form, let: . .,,. 
Xj = the expected future profits of company j in class k before 
deduction of interest. 
sj - the market value of the common shares of company j. -
Dj the market value of the debts of company • - J . -
vj - the total market value of company j. 
Pk = the expe_cted rate of return on the common stock of 
...-:-: 
an unlevered company in class k . 
-Xj/Vj = average cost of capital of company j. 
Then, if 
vj_ -. :(sJ + Dj> 
for any firm j in class k, 
X ·-,~ 
(S + D) - V = pk 
. j j j 
-
) 
This relationship indicates that the firm's cost of capital is dependent 
on its total market value (Vj), but is independent of the composition of 
' 
that market value. Thus, a company that has the same earnings (X.) and 
J . 
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' the same total market value (V ) , is supposed to have the 'same cost of j 
capital whether it be 10%, 40%, or 80% financed by debt. 
Proposition 2: The expected yield of a share of stock is equal to 
the appropriate capitalization rate Pk for a pure equity stream in the 
class, plus a premium related to financial risk equal to the debt-to~ 
equity ratio times the spread between P and r (the interest rate). k 
• .. r· ·.~·. Mand M define the expected yiei~ of a share of stock as the 
expected earnings yield, and not dividend yield. Also, Mand M define 
J 
debt to include all securities senior to the common stoek. 
Proposition 3: The cut-off point for investment in the firm wili 
in all·cases b~ Pk, and will be completely unaffected by the type of 
security used to finance the investment. 
Mathematically, this proposition can be formulated as follows.: 
where: i j =- expected rate of return on th~ couunon stock of company j .. 
r = the rate of interest. 
The mathematical proofs given by Mand M have been challenged by 
Alexander Barges who has demonstrated that, " with respect to the 
empirical methods employed by Mand M it was found that under very 
'\ 
frequently encountered conditions, their methods will result in tests 
which are biased against the traditional views", (2, p. 101). 
Mand M's basic premise of a perfect market is suspect since a 
. perfect market is defined as one in which two identical commodities can 
not sell at two d~ren~ prices. Further, their assumption about the 
' 
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C 
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__... 
-possibility of separa~ing firms into e4uivalent return classes seems 
unrealistic. Also, the development of the Mand M approach relies 
heavily on an arbitrage process which ignores the'differences between 
"Corporate debt and personal debt. In other words, 'it assumes that 
I: 
,II 
I 
I. l 1, 
I 
- ~ . 
I 
-t . 
. - '~ .. , 
· personal and corporate leverage can be regarded as equivalent; because 
for certain conditions a stockholder in~a levered firm will presumably 
transfer the company's leverage to himself by selling the stock, taking 
out a personal loan, and investing the total preceeds in the stock of 
an unlevered firm. The fact that the stockholder is liable for the 
-----r 
full amount of his personal loan when he levers himself, compared to 
his limited liability when he held stock in a levered corporation, is 
completely ignored. These and other assumptions, (the effects of l 
" 
! 
• 
taxation are ignored, and the yield curve is supposedly the same for all 
borrowers), .probably accounts for the general unacceptability of the M 
and M approach . 
4.5 Summary 
The basic overall capital investment and/or budgeting proble~ is 
one of supply and demand. The demand that a proposal can exert for 
funds is subject to its own (the proposal's) profitability. The supply 
of funds depends on their cost. If these curves are plotted (Capital 
Funds vs. Cost of Capital), their intersection should result in a 
unique, theoretically correct solution to this capital budgeting problem. 
·,~ If the two main methods of evaluating the capital investment 
problem are viewed in the light of the above statement, a difference 
appears. The present value method has within its ·mechanics both supply 
- I 
-
·-., . 
" . 
. ' 
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and demand factors. It can, however, be argued that the supply factors 
are. imperfect, since more than one value for the cost of capital usually 
exists. In fact, it generally varies with the amount and type of funds 
used. The rate of return method is claimed by many to be evaluated in 
~ 1 --i .....,,r::....:::ela.t_ive isolation from the cost of capital. This claim, is believed by 
. •°'. 
.! 
,. 
this author, to be unrealistic and has been expanded upon earlier in 
this thesis. However, operationally, most decision makers treat the 
choice proposals based on rates of return as follows: 
• 
(a) Evaluate all proposals for their anticipated rate of 
return . 
. Ql) List the proposals in order of magnitude of their rate 
... 
of return . 
(c) Generally, a cutoff rate is selected'·; e .~., 15%, ·and 
any investment whose prospective rate of return is below 
this is "inadmissable''. 
(d) Develop a cumulative demand table which includes each 
proposal based on the above oraering. 
(e) Act on all proposals which are included in this cumu-
\.. ! · .. 
lative amount which in turn is equal to the amount 
available or to be made available. 
The decisi.&n maker believes that by evaluating proposals with the 
above techniques he does not concern himself with a cost of capital. At 
any rate it is considered in a separate evaluation similar to the -
schedule developed for the fund demand, when the time comes to raise 
·capital. 
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. In r_~viewing the supply and demand of capital investments,_ it 
should be noted that the cost of capital determination is the second 
weakest link in the whole chain of capital budgeting. (The first 
weakest link is the uncertainty of the future.) There is no general 
agreement as to how the cost of capital should be determined. None 
of the methods previously described are completely acceptable. But, 
to function, every firm must determine the proposals which are to be 
considered, acted upon, and the amounts and canposition of the neces-
sary capital funds and their respective costs. If all such information 
were available to the firm, its capital budgeting problem can be easily 
solved by simply plotting the supply vs. the demand, and extrapolating 
the Roint of intersection horizontally and vertically, to identify the 
total amount of capital funds and the potential earning rate, (since rate 
of return and cost of capital would both represent the same axis): 
Rate of 
Return 
or 
Cost of 
Capital 
(%) 
jl 
/ 
- ~-
Depreciatio 
apital Funds($) 
Supply and Demand Schedule for Capital Funds 
FIGURE 10 
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But, by its imperfection, such -a model only _approximates the real_ 
world. Until the perfect model is developed, the decision maker will 
fill in the gaps with his rules of thumb, experience and intuition. 
The closer to ideal and model becomes, the less he will use these very 
"-
personal aids. 
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CHAPl'ER V UTILITY AND ITS RCLE IN CAPITAL -INVESTMENT 
I ' --
.,. ft For problems arising under risk conditions, our analysis will 
reveal that an optimal decision can be defined as one which maximizes 
the mathematical expectation of value or utility", (1, p. 32). Ac-
cordingly, a review of the role of utility theory in investments is 
pertinent. 
"Relying on Jacques Bernoulli's famous Law of Large Numbers, 
theorists have for nearly two and one-half centuries (Ars Conjectandi 
was published in 1713) attempted to justify expected ret~.rn maximization 
in virtually any setting through the purely formal argument that, in the 
long run, 'the expected' becomes 'the. certain' . " (11, p. 8) But, to be 
theoretically valid, expected return maximizing must meet the following 
criteria: 
1. " . " Experiments involved must be repetitious in nature. 
• s.:.-
2. Successive observations are independent of their prede-
cessors. 
3. Possible outcome are not extre·me . 
. "':'l 
.. 
However, these three factors do not describe any capital investment 
environment. It is fairly obvious why the first two are f_.oreign to 
such an environment and no discussion is warranted.. The third criterion 
is usually difficult to adhere to in investment decision making. A 
· rational investor's concept about extreme values can best be demonstrated 
1 by the St. Petersburg Paradox. 
1 An excellent mathematical treatment of this s~bject i-s-~given by Prof. Paul A. Samuelson, in "The St. Petersburg Paradox as a Divergent Double Limit", International Economic Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, Jan·., 1960 . 
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I 
Thi~ _paradox can be described as follows:· 
A person buys a chance to.flip a coin unt1i heads appears. Should 
- i.t ·appear on the first throw, he receives $1. Should it appear on the 
second, third, fourth, ... , n-th throw, he receives $2, $4, $8, ... , 
,, 
• j 
· n-1 $2 , respectively. How much should he reasonably pay for a chance to 
play the game? 
The expected value of this game, assuming a fair coin, can be 
computed as follows: 
co 
I: n-1 1 : .CO 
n=l 
'. 
Accordingly, a person should be willing to pay an infinitely large sum 
of money to play the game. But, this does not seem to be in accordance 
with the rational behavior o'f reasonable people. Most of these persons 
would reason that the bank itself does not have infinite resources. 
Any throw beyond the consecutive toss that could break the bank is then 
meaningless. Also, very long runs of heads or tails are very improbable. 1 
. (.'I The decision maker does not usually treat extreme values in the same 
linear relationship re~ative to ri~\and uncertainty as he does an 
average value. A loss of $100,000 is'not 10 times as bad to a firm as a 
loss of $10,000 especially if any loss over $10,000 would mean bank-
ruptcy. 
Thus, because most investments are one shot affairs, dependent, 
1 F P = (1)20 = or example, .20 2 -·· heads .95(10-3~) 
r. 
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and usually involve large sums of money, profit maximization, 1 cannot 
be regarded as an overall investment model under uncertainty. 
1' 
"There are a \vealth of arguments to the point that a simple theory of profit maximization will not in fact predict the choices made by managers. \\Thi le profit can be made operational, it represents one with difficulties in the process. One of the most troublesome of these is the allocation of overhead, which requires judgment on the part of the calculator of profit. Many other such judgments are required to produce an operational definition, giving it a rather arbitrary character. One 1D1St couple with assertions of the profit motive the answers to 
several difficult questions: 
a. How far in the future are profits to be calculated in a gi~en decision~ How are future profits to be related to present profits? 
b. What is the relation between profit and risk or uncertainty? How is one to combine profits and prob~bilities in making 
a choice? 
c. What explanation is to be given for the three following instances of management decision-making behavior?: 
1. Managers do not select the profit maximizing alter-
native and engage in policies apparently antithetical to the maximization of profits. 
2. It is possible to show a manager ways of making more profit which he will decline. 
"Recent dissatisfaction with the profit maximization assumption has 
. -- .. ··-.·- -·---. 
been one of two types. Either it is claimed that maximization is a~ non-operational concept and hence a different analytical framework is required or the exclusive attention to the profit goal is dis-puted." (37, p. 6). Prof. \Villiamson then attempts to demonstrate the importance of managerial motivation; i.e., salary security, 
"dominance 11 , professional excellence, and discretion in developing a model of the business firm's behavior in seeking profit maximi-zation. J.M. Clark sums up his opinions in (7, p. 91): "The assumption that a firm pursues maximum profits is an extreme simplification. Indeed,· it is a simplification to assume that any unified objective governs all the operations of a firm, especially a large one. This covers up a multitude of divergencies. Theory has a tendency to dispose of these as being either differences of view on . 
.. what kind of action will maximize profits on a given case, or dif-ferences between longer or shorter time perspectives in which profits may be viewed." 
.,, 
.·· .-
-- --··--.·-.-·- ._-._._-..... ~...,_- .. · -., -.. __ ··~- ~-;;~ ~-""'."·~-,z,', .-,-·'"~-·.·· -- - - P .. SW -.~ -
"/ 
:j 
I 
ij 
. ~-,, ., .. ,- ---·---· =----,------- - .... --- - ....... -- ... 
,_.,-...~ ;~_--. 
,. 
... 
I. 
;: 
• 
• 
\ 
. 140. 
,. 
3. Managers explicitly use other goals than profit i".l their work. For example, they are concerned with ~uch measures as sales volume, rate of growth, share of market, and industry position-~-and food corporat~ image, satisfactory labor relations, job security, 
---~- -and satisfaction and public service.'' (21, pp. 159, --160) . 2 
Concerning the use of money as a valid guide to action, Prof. ~-
Schlaifer claims: "Expected monetary value should be used as the 
decision criterion in any real decision problem, however complex, if 
the person responsible for the decision would use it as his criterion 
,, 
in choosin~ between (1) an act which is certain to result in receipt or 
payment of a definite amount of cash, and (2) an act which will result 
in either the best or the worst of all the possible consequences of 
the real decision problem." (26, p. 29) . . " " Prof. Schlaifer proves 
this rule by showing that decision makers who do not follow the rule 
will make choices which are logically inconsistent. 
However, he agrees that this rule generally becomes inoperative 
when the amounts involved are quite large. 
As an alternative to expected profit maximization, most theorists 
have adopted the principle of maximizing expected value. Prof. Ackoff 
justifies this. principle by its ''apparent reasonableness" . 3 To them, 
.i:- •• : 
1 For example, an investment in recreational f~~ilities, building and swimming pool for employees. 
2 Prof. Morris also lists, in detail, five arguments usually given for the use of the profit maximization premise. 
3 (1, p. 38). 
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it just seems obvious that x-ationall decision makers ought to function 
within the framework of such a principle. 
The original proposal for a principle 0£ maximizing expected 
ut-1-lity was developed by Daniel Bernoulli, as a result of his investi-
gation of the St. Petersburg Paradox. He assumed that utility followed 
• 
a function that more than a century later was proposed by Fechner for 
subjective magnitudes in gener_al and is now called Fechner' s Law • 
Bernoulli claimed that an individual's marginal utility of money will~ 
always be inversely proportional to the total amount of his wealth. In 
effect, he expressed the total utility of money as a logri thmic ''function: 
If weal th increases from x l, to x + y, there is an increase in utility which ) 
is 
(a) "' Proportional to the· increase y -
(b) Inversely proportional to the initial wealth X-. 
This means that: 
or 
Letting 
KY= µ(x + y) - µ,(x) _ 
X 
K µ(x + y) - ~(x) x- y 
:y _. o, o.ne obtains 
1 µ, '(x) = K x ., 
• 
1 A whole chapter, Chapter 8, is given to this topic of rational be-
havior in C. West Churchman's book (6). The author defines rational 
behavior in terms of a set of axioms. A psychologist states: "In 
more complicated choices the measured utilities can be used to cal-
culate what response the person should make to maximize his expected 
_J utility. This response is the rational choice." (24, p·. 61). 
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or 
µ(x) = K log X + C 
Tbus,-if a firm has an initial wealth of s, it should prefer· the 
prospect which maximizes the sum: 
------------
-, 
/ 
./ 
,t 
'' '' 
Bernoulli called this sum moral expectation, ~s distinct from mathe-
matical expectation: 
I 
The principle of maximization of expected utility, however, was 
adopted by the theorists, only after the concept of constant utility 
or indifference mapping, 1 which incorporated expected value preference 
and risk aversion, 2 had failed to adequately explain real life situ-
ations. Because economists are still working with this indifference 
concept, it is interesting to investigate3 it: 
Let 
v = f(µ,cr) where 
V = investment's certainty4 equivalent 
1 An excellent discussion of Indifference Curve Theory is given by Prof. Milton Friedman in (12). 
2 Risk aversion; i.e., that the utility of money must be represented by a concave function, was originally proposed by Alfred Marshall. Prior to his theory, Adam Smith had reasoned that most people had 
a risk preference; i.e., that their "attitude to risk" had to be 
represented by a convex utility function (increasing marginal 
utility of money). Refer to: Marshall, A., Principles of Econo-
mics, London, 1890. 
3 Another reason to investigate this concept is due to the fact that H. Markowitz used it as his base for generating a model for stock portfolio selection. Refer to (17). 
4 The certainty equivalent is the amount which involves no risk or 
uncertainty. It can also be derived through lottery techniques. 
An excellent reference on this technique is (26, Chapt. 2). 
t 
" li 
l 
i.:. 
\ 
• 
\, 
. . 
• 
. . 
r· 
143. 
J -µ. = the mean of alternatives 
.J 
a= the standard deviation of these alternatives 
- --------~-~-,~--Then define a function: 
. which can be equated to an indifference curve which is defined by the 
locus of µ, a points whose values are deemed to be equal to a certain 
return of v; i.e., the same .utility. 0 
Each alternative can be similarly defi~~d; 
. ·-
vi = f (µi' cri) 
Now, it is a generally accepted fact that most investors will desire 
an increase inµ and would tend to disapprove of alternatives with 
increasing 0 • This expressed on a given constant utility curve is: 
and 
.av o av o 
- > , - < oµ ~ 
clcr 
--
-dµ, 
-
- ~ > 0 av . 
-
00" 
Also, if risk-disappears: 
V = f ( µ,, 0) = µ, 
--- _-_.- ·~·-. -- -··-·. _· .. 
. \: 
The choice of the proper alternative involves selecting from the 
graph, Figure 11, an investment whose expected value and risk are 
equivalent (M) to the investor, to a certain receipt of v0 dollar,. 
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Investment Indifference Curves 
FIGURE 11 
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In fact, "this solution i·s, in most respect, identical to the classical 
equilibrium of consumer choice---It envisions the maximization of an 
objective functiot subject to the constraint of available investment ,,.__ 
opportunities. Geometrically, it consists of the usual tangency be-
" 1 tween an indifference curve and the border, of the investment field. 
t..I -··-'). Little development of the theory has been done beyond this point. 
,, f For example, only few economists have hereto ore attempted to specify 
even the form 
~- .... 
' . -~1-
V = f ( µ,, cr) 
which a certainty equivalence relationship is assumed to take, and none 
. ,_ has attempted to go so far as to evaluate the parameters that define 
l (11, p • 14) . 
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p. 15) . 
~ - - -Incorporation of-risk and uncertainty into a workable utility theory 
., 
=,, 
has been mostly the work. of Von Neumann and Morgenstern (34) ,--Friedman 
and Savage, 1 and Markowitz. 2 
Von Neumann and Morgenstern implied that individUal utility can be 
measured. 
. a. 
They made the following assumptions: 
An individual can give a preference order for all 
alternatives; i.e., an order scale can be established, 
b. An individual can also express preferences for combi-
nations of alternativ~s and stated probabilities; i.e., 
an interval scale can be incorporated in which it is 
possible to order probability.combinations of states. 
!; 
Many economists found· 1 ·1t difficult to accept part " " b , perhaps 
because the proof of the theorem was so difficult and because the pre-
ceding generation of economists had waged a fierce battle over the 
measurability of utility. 
To examine these implications that risky propositions can be 
-ordered in desirability, that expected utility is behaviorally meaning-
ful, and that choices among risky alternatives can be made in such a 
way that they maximize expected utility, it is necessary to investigate 
the concept of lotteries . 
. • . 
1 Refer to their article, the Utility Analysis of Choices Inv~lving Risk~ Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 56, 1948. 
2 Refer to his article, the Utility of Wealth, ~ournal of Political , Economy, Vol. 6P,.1952. 
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If a firm prefers alternative· A to alternative Band alternative 
B to alternative C, then, there exists for the firm a lottery in which 
-- - --,----------- ---- -· ---- -···· A and C is preferred to the certainty of getting B. If, for example, 
the chance of A occurring is 0.95 in this lottery and the chance of C 
occurring is 0.05, it appears logical to assume that the firm would 
choose the lottery rather than the certainty B. But, if the proba-
bilities for A and C were reversed, then the firm would choose the 
certainty of B. Thus, there must exist some probability in between 
...... these extremes where the firm will be indifferent to B, for certain, 
... .. .. •' ,.. 
or the lot~ery of A and C in which the probability of A would be p 
and that of C, 1-p. Asp for A increases from Oto 1 the preference 
for the certainty option gives way to the preference .for the lottery 
option . 
,, The axioms which underline the -0tility theory usage above are: 
a. The decision maker can arrange a complete and transitive 
ranking of the alternatives; i.e., outcomes. 
b. Any prospect of gamble involving equally desirable out-
comes is just as desirable as either outcome by itself. 
c. If outcomes A, B, Care ranked so that A is preferred to 
B, Bis preferred to C, and Ai~ preferred to C, then 
there exists a gamble involving A and C which is· just as 
desirable as B. 
d. ' If A and B are equally desirable, then the gamble pA + , 
(1-p)C is just as desirable as the gamble pB + (1-p)C. 
•· .. 
One can prove that a value scale does indeed exist if these axioms 
l 
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hold. Btit, can--we be sure that the axioms do hold in the firm and 
that the decision maker can properly reply to such question a$ might 
be posed. "There is not yet sufficient evid~nce to argue conclusively 
one way or the other on these questions." (21, p. 157). Actually, 
the six axioms listed in Appendix 1 are the foundation upon which 
~ modern utility theory has been built. These axioms, although slightly 
modified to reflect an investment flavor, are similar to those de-
veloped by Von Neumann and Morgenstern (34). Detailed interpretations 
of these axioms can be found in Luce's and Raiffa's book (16, Chapt. ';, 
·'I . 
2) or in Prof. Ackoff's book (1, Chapt. 3). 
'' Many examples of behavior can be generated which violate the 
axioms of Von Neumann - Morgenstern, 1 especially if the amounts of. 
money involved are very large, or when, the probabilities involved are 
extremely small. But, on a general evaluation basis, it may be correct 
" 
" 2 
to state that their theory has considerable predictive power . This 
was confirmed by the famous contfolled experiments made in 1950 by 
Mosteller and Nogee (71) . They studie'd a group of Harvard under-
graduates and some members of-the Massachusetts National Guard and 
attempted to: 
a. Construct a utility curve for each subject from the 
behavior of ~game of dice. 
~--
1 For example, refer to Strotz, R.H., Cardinal Utility, American Economics Review Supplement, Vol. 43, 1953, pp. 384-405. 2 Expression used by Prof. Karl Borch in discussing Von Neumann-Morgenstern's theory, in Economics of Uncertainty, Working Paper 79, Un. of Calif., 1965, Chapter VI, p. 11. 
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- -
b·. Make predictions from the utility curves aboot future 
individual behavior toward other more comp1icated risks, 
and to test these predictions. • 
--- --- ------------
- ----~----------------~------~-It turned out that the Harvard undergraduates had a curve of 
diminishing marginal utilities, 1 while the National Guardsmen had 
increasing marginal utilities. In addition, these curves were fairly 
--accurate in predicting future behavior toward riskier situations. 
' Friedman and Savage,and Markowitz have been primarily concerned 
with the effects any change in wealth or income would have on a firm's 
or individual's current income utility curve. Friedman and Savage's 
utility curve for money is shown in Figure 12. 
_) . 
"• I , 
;;r-
1 Marginal utility is the rate of change in total utility per unit 
change in quantity and is not the utility of a marginal unit.-
--
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I= Current Income or Wealth 
r' 
OA = Decreasing Marginal Utility (consistent with avoidance ..
of risks) 
AB= Increasing Marginal Utility (favors risk undertaking) 
FIGURE 12 
Hypothetical Utility Curve for Money, Proposed by Friedman and Savage 
~ 
,, 
Actually they developed their curve to explain why the same person will 
\ 
buy insurance and will gamble . Friedman's and Savage's curve is 
_,, 
dependent upon levels of income rather than upon changes in income and 
it is presumed that individuals choose as if they were moving along 
.... 
that curve. In other words, the utility curve stays put and the indi-
.'\ 
vidual moves up and down as wealth or income changes. 
--~---~ 
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Markowtiz suggested that the origin of a person's or firm's 
•l ~ ut_ili't:Y curve for money be taken as his customary financial status and 
that on both sides of the origin the curve be assumed first concave 
and then convex .. If a firm's customary state of wealth changes, then 
the shape of his utility curve will thus remain generally the same 
with respect to where he now is, and so his risk taking behavior will [;.l 
\.. 
-
remain about the same instead of changing with every change of wealth 
as in the Friedman-Savage proposal. 
It is possible to derive demand curves from utility functions. 
This may be important to the decision-maker when considering his own 
dem~nns or from the viewvoint of considering his customer's utility/ 
demand interactions. To illustrate how such a demand curve may be 
derived, consider the following utility function: 
u - log X + log y. Assume that P p and I are given where: - x' y' 
X - number of units of commodity x 1,2,3, .•. X -
-
y - number of units of commodity y y - 1,2,3, ... -
-
p 
- a ~et price for commodity _x -X 
p 
- a set price for commodity y -y 
I = money income or wealth 
.. 
It is easy to show l that the condition for maximization is 
1 
Differentiate the following with respect to X, Y, A: 
U(X,Y) + A(XPx+YPx-I) 
t·o get 
ux + Apx - 0 -
u + AP - 0 
-y y ,,. 
XPx+ yp - I - 0 
-y 
---~-: .... 
.... ..:..· 
-- ·- .x-:. ~- - . '' ----=---------------,-------....------------~~= 
·.:·, 
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where Ux .. = p~_tial derivative of U with ·respect to_ x. 
U = partial derivative of U with respect toy. y 
-~---, 
This in· effect means that the "marginal utility per pen~y's worth of 
'' ( ) commodity x must equal that of commodity y, 12, p. 40. 
Because: 
Ux = 1/x 
... 
Then 
.. , 
Therefore, 
But, the money constraint is: 
xPx + yPY = I 
thus, 
I 
x = 2Px 
and this is the demand curve. 
.!'-. 
l 
~rof. M. Friedman in (12) presents a remarkable conclusion by 
examining the following three different utility functions: 
., . 
·:······ 
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,. :"';-.. TABLE.VI 
~-
Utility Function and Derived Demand Functions 
-~--- -~-
------
--:mi,,. 
... - . -------- ----
=-=-o Util-ity Demand 
Function --------- ----
·- ......... . 
• 
-:-
Function 
U=log x +logy 
u = xy 
2 2 U = X y 
X = _1_ 
2Px 
X = 
X = 
I 
2P 
X 
I 
2P. 
X 
•. --- ------
Characteristics 
Marginal Utility of x and y are inde-
pendent . Demand curve is equilateral 
hyperbola. 
Marginal Utility is constant and there 
is dependence. Marginal Utility of 
I 
x=y;i.e., (Ux=Y) and that of y=x;. 
i.e.,(Uy=x) 
Marginal Utility for both x and y are 
increasing and there is dependence. 
Marginal Utility of y=2~ and · 
Marginal Utility of x = 2xy2 
This unexpected conc·lusion lies in the fact that "in each case we end 
up with the same demand function. This seeming paradox can be stated 
in another manner. We notice that people spend one half of their 
income on commodity x, which is the case when the demand function is 
x = 2~ . Yet there are three different utility fu
nctions which 
X 
rationalize this observed phenomenon", (12, p. 42) . 
• 
In summary, w.henever a decision-maker assigns utilities to events 
or proposals, "he is really saying that in his judgment his long-run 
expected profit is increased by playing it safe until he has built up 
greater financial ·strength and therefore he will choose an act whose 
iuunediate expected profit is less than that of some other, riskier 
act", (26, p. 48). 
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· CHAPl'ER VI GAME THEORY AND CAPITAL INVESTMBNT 
Game theory1 may b·e- v:iewed as a mathematical method for analyzing 
problems that arise out of conflict. Since most investment decision 
problems can be regarded as a conflict (between objectives), we may 
/)inquire whether management is making use of this tool in evaluating 
alternatives. 
Consider the following example due to Edward G. Bennion (43): 
Suppose we know that: 
a. The most probable forecast is for a recession. 
-----~----
• 
.:.-,-- . 
-~ , 1 ., '! •o • •• ,L. - ·-
·.• 
._ .... 
b. 
c. 
In recession, investment· in plant will yield 1% as 
compared with a 4% yield for securities. 
In prosperity, plant will yield 17% while s·ecuri ties 
will yield 5%. 
Now if we form a 2 X 2 game matrix we have: 
Management 
Investment 
Alternatives 
Securities 
Plant 
Cycle-Phase Alternatives (Nature's) 
Recession Prosperity 
-
.,. 4% 5% 
' 
1% 17% 
In or~~ to know how probable the "most probable" forecast is, we 
need, usually from the economists or statisticians, a probability coef-
ficient, i .~., a foreca_st probability, for each cycle phase. Let us 
V 
1 The pioneering work in game theory was written by John Von Neumann and 
· Oskar Morgenstern in 1944 (34) . Appendix 3, "Game Theory - A Brief Review", surveys the basic theory. It should be noted that the game theory formulation which deals with decision making under certainty is in reality linear programming and as such is not treated in this thesis. 
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suppose that the forecasters think the chances of recessiQn are 6 out of 
· 10. (Thus, the recession probability coefficient = .6 and the prosperity.· 
~ . , __ 
_--_· __ p_rQp~'t>ility coefficient = .4 .) At this point, we must also calculate 
~-
-
-
the indifference probabilities which are a unique set of probabilit_ies_ ____ ~ _____ _ 
describing the situation which exists when eacn course of action is 
equally attractive. The calculations involved are as follows: 
./' Let R = recession probability coefficieht 
P = prosperity probability coefficient 
Then, from the matrix it is known that: 
(a) 4R + 5P = return on securities 
(b) lR + 17P = return on plant 
y. ', 
,., 
Accordingly, it is seen that the return on securities will be the same 
as the return on plant if: 
(c) 4R + 5P = lR + 17P 
Solving the last equation for R in terms of P gives: 17 
(d) R = 4P 
But, since the sum of all probabilities CR+ P) must equal 1.0, we obtain 
(e) 1 - P = 4P 
or, the indifference probabilities are 
"' 
(f) P = 0 .2 
R = 0 .8 
To sum up in· matrix form: 
- . --- ·-
- _ _:___·~.:_ __ 
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----------·-
I 
£,cle-Phase Alternatives (Nature's) 
' 
Management 
Investment 
Alternatives 
Securities 
Plant 
Indifference Probabilities 
Forecasted Probabilities 
Re·cession 
4% 
-· 
~
-
--·· 
lJ 
R = 0.8 
A 
R = 0.6 
Prosperity 
5j 
17,,, 
P :: 0 .2 '' 
,. 
P = 0.4 
By comparing the forecasted probabilities1 with the ·indifference f, 
probabilities, the best alternative is noted; i.e., if the ind-ifference 
probability for a given alter:native is greater than its forecasted 
probability, the decision maker would not select this alternative. 
rationale for such action lies in the fact that it requires a proba-
bility greater than the forecasted one to make this alternative's 
The 
attractiveness equal to the other possible choices. Returning to the 
example, if the probabilities of a recession and prosperity are 0.8 and 
0.2 respectively, then the chances are the firm wil~be just as well off 
investing in securities as in plant and vice versa. Accordingly, the 
decision maker knows, based on these probabilities, "that he is not 
making an avoidable mistake by playing for high stakes and building a 
plant", ( 43) . 
-. What has this decision !)laker gained by the use of the game matrix? 
a. He has become aware that the best paying investment 
.. -~-
1 These probabilities can be vi~wed as the opposition's or nature's probabilities and represent the probabilities of nature to hold the firm's gains down to a minimum. (: 
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' 
j alternative in the most probable situation is not necea-_ 
sarily the one that should be selected. 
·b. Using indifference probabilities, he, can compute the . ---- - - .. 
margin of error which may result in an erroneous decision. --
. 
- . 
-
- --
This technique--for a zero-sum game can easily.be extended to a 3 X 3 · 
or larger matrix. 1 
--- -----------
: ...... · 
- T 
. . - -
- •,7.~· ~·.,-.,,,,~ 
The capital budget decision maker attempts to maximize or minimize 
some given index as a preliminary to choosing the proper alternative. 
The choice of this index is crucial. Usually in capital budgeting, the 
dollars of profit or loss, or the per cent of return on investment, etc., 
is the appropriate index. " The essence of the problem is: how should the 
subject select an index function so that his choice reduces to finding 
the alternative with the maximum index." (16, p. 15). ~' ... Manipulation of 
these indices must be in accordance with several assumptions or axioms 
2 of modern utility theory. 
) 
It is not always possible for a firm to make a model of its 
preferences in any given capital situation or to be able to establish 
a set of utility assignments to the various capital budgeting outcomes. 
These factors can offer limitations to the employment of game theory. 
Because different firms at different times have different indices, 3 no 
1 I. Edward G. Bennion includes in his articles an actual case of an inte-grated petroleum company using a 3 X 3 matrix (43, p. 118). This case is interestingly presented and shows how game theory alters the con-' • ff ,, ventional decision makers selection of the proper alternative . 
2 Appendix 1, Utility Theory Axioms From the Viewpoint of Capital Budgeting, lists these axioms. 
3 For example, if a firm DDJ..st select the alternative to match a competi- .-tor's move to advanced technology, anticipated profit from the capital budget may be a secondary consideration. 
--.-~ --~---
- .~-
-- i, 
" . 
" ... '~ . 
- . 
i' 
. ;!) 
• -I ,1 
- - . _>: -
I 
. L 
.J. 
. -· -l 
--- ... 
~ ---· ~. ---·---- ~ 
... ·-· 
' . 
.-.,:.-:,:.·,;.:,,··.-..-.-u.to;._................_ 
-~· 
.--'- .. 
-
157,. 
• 
" 
canmon utility index can be established in ·a general treatment of game 
. theory to capital budgeting. This has handicapped the development of 
the game theory approach. ·Limitations, other than this, which have 
·" 
arrested the application of game theory are: 
a. The lack of experience which the decision makers have 
with game theory. 
b. Little has been written on the subject of game theory and---. 
investments. Recent books on decision making make no 
mention of game theory. These books seem to compromise by 
1 including tree techniques and lottery methods. 
c. The definition of rational behavior on part of the 
decision maker has been "an incessant cause of contro-
versy between the followers and disbelievers of the 
theory. As is so often the case, a good part of the 
" 
dispute has been terminological rather than substantive . 
(81, p. 371) . 
d. When we enter n-person games, a "new realm of issues"I 
appear. "In spite of the obvious importance of n-person 
games, relatively little research has been done in this 
area, and application·s are few and far between." (81, 
/ 
p. 385). In fact, when Luce and Raffia deal with n-
person games, they devote one fourth of their book to 
. _,,. ••-••., T'•-•·•-.,.-.. ... ~f••~ .,, -•• ' 
the subject; however, they "lack a persuasive theory 
1 For example, (a) The textbook which has only been introduced pro-
visionally in 1965--Pratt, John W., Howard Raiffa, Robert Schlaifer, 
Introduction to Statistical Decision Theory, McGraw-Hill, Inc., (22)., (b) Schlaifer, Robert, Probability and Statistics forBusiness 
Decisions, McGraw-Hill, 1959, (26). 
2 (81, p. 384). 
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- " for n-person games, (81, p. 384). 
"_-~e· .---~c--In--additi-on, there are some game theorists who disagre~ · 
. .. 
I 
on what an_ optimal strategy and rational action are in the 
non-zero game. 
I 
· f. ··. A review of Appendices 2 and 3 would reveal that: 
1) ,Mixed strategies may fail because of a technical t 
problem -- it is impossible to achieve complete 
randomness. This bias which then must exist can 
be taken advantage of by an intelligent opponent. 
2) Minimax criterion may fail because complete 
ignorance .. of a competitor's relative probabilities 
of act.ion is impossible. If the opponent's 
alternative can be defined, then the player must· 
know something about them. 
·Because of such objections to game theory, Lawrence Friedman in 
(54), attempts to develop a gaming model which: 
1. Has one and only one optimal course of action. 
2. Has one and only one objective function: the maximi-
zation of expected utility. 
But on the other side of the coin, what may the decision maker hope 
to gain by employing game theory: 
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conventional approach to selecting an alternative, ~-the 
decision maker may only select the most likely forecast. 
The other forecasts may not really concern him. In game r 
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• 
theory, all the forecasts'are· employed to assist the 
, •• I decision maker. This apparently makes for more 
-
. . -
. . 
- - ~-· 
-
-··. (' accurate output. 
- . - ---
- ------·· 
-~~;- Margins of errors can be calculated by thause of 
--- ~--~· 
' 
-
- -- -- - - ---·- -------
indifference probabilities. 
c. His evaluation of rating alternatives can be assisted 
. ..... ------ -... by this scientific technique. By the use of game theory, 
he is forced to think seriously of his utility pref-
erences, and this may cause him to be more encompassing 
whe~eviewing pertinent factors. 
' 
d. Once game theory is employed consistently, more uses.can 
be developed for the theory. For example: 
1) The use of game theory to generate priority ratings 
for alternatives. This proposal has been of·fered by 
Edward G. Bennion (43, p. 207). 
2) An analysis of problem areas such as input, by working 
backwards, may be possible. Because game theory is 
assumed correct, and if the results are wrong, the 
r' inputs must be at fault. A backward search a._ould·point 
out where the input was in error, and it could also 
point out how much the probabilities assigned to the 
forecasts were off . 
In summary, it can be stated that game theory does have some 
potential in investment application; but, little has been done to 
exploit and develop this potential. Several theoretical limitations 
-. have been.responsible, in part, for this lack of gener~l I 
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Although game theory has been treated as the proverbial stepchild 
in relation to investments, it _has enjoyed a better treatment and 
\.r -- -· 
--¥:·::::; 
J 
• 
2 development in the general field of economics. 
- -- -----~~----Economic appi~cations 
considers: 
a. The possibilities of communication between opponents. 
b. The degree to which each player trusts the other. 
' c. The magnitude of payoffs. 
d. The number of times the game will be playe-d. 
e. The application of Nash's criteria for a unique solution 
to the two person bargaining problem. 
Classical examples which can be used to illustrate these above 
points are "The Prisoner's Dilemma~", (16, p. 9,4), or "The Battle of 
the Sexes", (16, p. 90). 
,! 
/ 
.,. . ,. 
At this point, Prof. Wagner's conments about the future of game 
theory are pertinent: 
" Although Luce and Raiffa do not devote a particular section to 
the likely new developments and future influence of game theory on the 
social sciences, certain indications seem clear. The Bernoulli 
1 An interesting but simple example of the use of game theory by management to help resolve problems other than investment is given by the authors of (5) in Chapter 8. They attempt to show how a union/company dispute may be resolved by game theory and utility theory. 2 An excellent reference is Prof. Karl Borch's Working Paper #83, Chapter X, University of California, 
" f 
. " 
The Economics o Uncer~ainty, June 1965. 
~ .... .; 
--- - .. 
--·--·- ·--
- ~---~; .. ~. 
- .._ ____ . ---- --- .... 
L 
·-· 
I 
:i 
' 
~ 
"1 I· 
:i. 
" . 
i: 
:f 
I 
~ 
I 
i 
r 
I 
j 
I 
l 
i 
l 
\ 
... _ 
.. 
... . 
: ...... 
- .. _ ... - -~~-- _ _.. -----=-- -
:.., .. 
:r 
.:. 
161. 
utility -functionl will continue to provide the mainstay for the 
--~analysis of decision problems in stochastic situations. Although the 
minimax strategy may not be offered as the 'optimal' rule for the 
selection of a strategy in the face of uncertainty, 2 it will remain 
a procedure worthy of serious consideration in such circumstances. 
Development inn-person theory are likely to be of a dynamic and behavior-
istic nature, perhaps embodying Marchak's notion of a 'theory of teams'. 
Consequently, there will be a tendancy to drop the normal form ab-
__ , straction of a game." (81; pp. 386-7) . 
• 
' 
·-· 
1 A .. Bernoul.li utility. funct i-0n for uncertainty is defined as follows: 
Given the utilities for a set of nonrandom events, the utility for a 
lottery with these outcomes, each occurring according to a given proba-
bility distribution, is numerically equal to the expected value of the 
utilities for the certain events. Therefore, Bernoulli utility 
implies a linearly additive function of the component utilities for 
each possible lottery prize. 
2 Refer to Appendix 2, "Six Rules Necessary for the Employment of the 
" Minimax Strategy . 
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CBA.PrER VII SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
.. -...-
-~ ..-. 
In the_ last few decades, numerous investigators have--attemp~e-cr-to-
develop a conceptual (and/or operational) framework which could be of 
assistance in capital investment decision making. This investigation 
has in turn attempted to present these contributions in light of their 
. strength, weaknesses, inconsistencies, and areas of conflict. 
' . 
. f_: 
-. ~,.-..., -----=--
Accordingly, in the preceding pages it was shown that: 
1.0 
-
Capital investment decision making occupies a central 
roll 
(i) 
(ii) 
in business. This is so because: 
Huge sums of money are involved. 
Both the- short and long range company profitability, 
compe·titive position, and perhaps its very survival, 
are affected by these decisions. 
(iii) Capital expenditures, from an aggregate and cyclical 
point of view, have a great deal to do with the 
character of the economy as a whole. Reflectively, 
the company itself is then affected. 
(iv) 
·cv) 
Investment decisions usually have long lasting effects • 
Mistakes in investment decisions cannot be worked off 
in ~a short period of time. If,, necessary, the dollar 
.. penalty fqr reversing a decision can be.very high. 
These decisions are management's tools of strategy; 
i.e., the means by which the " . " direction of a firm 
are controlled. 
-' 
(vi) All levels of the firm's personnel from stock holder 
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'· to laborer are effected by the fruits 9r losses .of 
capital investments-. 
2.0 ~The major difficulties faced by the decision maker are: 
-- . (i) The risk and uncertainty of the future together 
t with the concomitant assumptions which must be 
generated. 
=•: 
Because capital investments deal with the 
~uture, risk and uncertainty are imbedded in each 
of the following.:.--., .. the forecasts of expected costs, 
revenues, profitability, utility, and environ-
mental conditions; e.g., per cent of market. Short-
,, 
range forecasts are usually reasonably accurate 
because there is a carry-over of present knowledge 
into the immedt'ate future. At least the reliability 
of the data is greater, the closer into the future· 
we do our planning. But, for long-range planning, 
the decision maker is not so fortunate. The present 
inability to forecast accurately is due to many 
factors; chief among these is a basic lack of under-
standing the casual relationships that exist among 
the variables involved. This state of affairs is 
then aggravated by the rapid changes in technology 
and science. It appears then that the decision 
maker is almost cast in the role of Sisyphus, because, 
even ~she begins to understand the relationships that 
\ 
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. 
exist among the variables, technological advances 
change··these relationships. By the time the 
decision maker begins to comprehend what is 
. . happening and why, the casual relationships have 
changed. It then comes to p~ss that he under-
stands a problem that is no longer. Thus, al-
though, the decision maker will never operate in 
a future under conditions of certainty, he re-
quires more reliable data, better estimates and 
forecast in order that he may, among other things, 
push the immediate future time period within which 
he is fairly confident, a little further out. 
(ii) Questionable reliability of the estimates and fore-
casts used in decision making 
Emphasis has 6nly recently been placed on this 
important need. As a result, error analysis tech-
niques, risk assessment methods such as W. L. Gore's 
procedure, sensitivity analysis, sampling from sub-
jective probability distributions of concerned 
• 
variables, and the use of confidence limits have come 
into fl'eing. 
" n At present, these are the better ways 
of securing more reliable estimates and forecasts . 
.. But, more research is still needed in this area. 
(iii) Goals which are not or cannot be clearly defined. 
Good planning requires: 
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(a) All goals, especially long-term goals, 
be def ined~1-as clearly and precisely as 
possible. Because the achievement of &-
goal involves the interaction and 
dependence of many factors, its reali-
. 
--~-- ·---~--·--------------
-
... 
zation 'exists in a conditional environ-
ment. Accordingly, a good definition of a 
goal should involve the probability distri-
bution of the pertinent factors, such as 
anticipated demand, expected sales, expected 
size of market, anticipated size of capital 
expenditures, expected growth of the 
industry, el.Cl)ected volume of new military 
business, etc. Then, various convolutions of 
these factor distributions should be made to 
show the probability or odds of actually 
reaching the goal, the influence each factor 
exerts through its sensitivity or leverage 
effect and its relative degree of uncertainty, 
and the limits for each factor within which 
.r 
the goal can be realized. Purely verbal 
descriptions are the poorest method for de-
fining a capital investment goal. 
'· (b) Avoidance of unrealistic plans. Actually, 
this usually follows directly from 
-x:..: 
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because, if goals are not clear, it is 
possible to generate impossible or un-
realistic goals .. 
~-A differentiation between the means of 
achieving a goal and the goal itself. 
If goals are poorly defined, it . 1S 
possible to mistake the method and means 
to achieve them, which are usually given 
in detail, as the goals themselves. This 
is placing the emphasis on how to do 
something rather than on what to do. 
·3 .O The major stumbling b,locks in evaluating a capital investment 
I 
L-
J 
I ~ 
I 
I 
proposal are: 
(i) The lack of widely accepted criteria. This is true 
whether the decision maker is concerned only with the 
methods of measuring the profitability of a proposal, 
the cost of the various types of funds, or the effects 
of capital structure on the cost of capital. 
(ii) The difficulty in accumulating experimental data of a 
" 
comparable nature; i.e., almost all investment projects 
are unique. This prevents an objective statistical 
approach such as the use of the Central Limit Theorem . 
(iii) The lack of a discipline which specifically may serve 
the decision maker. By contrast, the physician has 
his allied field of medicine and the lawyer his study 
of law. 
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. ·. ·, ·-.-~ .... -
·- -.r.._..._ r··- .. :.-~---..... ....,,,..__,.. The more generally acc~pted methods for evaluating invest-
ment alternatives are: 
(i) PAYBACK 
(ii) PRESENT VAWE 
(iii) DISCOUNTED. CASH FLC1N 
(iv) SUBJ~TIVE 
MAP! 
(vi) ACCOUNTING 
(vii) NECESSITY/POSTPONABILITY 
(viii)DECISION TREE 
. ,--
-
•, 
·;, 
.......... ,' ' 
4.1 These methods vary in their Usefulness, mainly depending 
on the characteristics of the investment alternatives. 
This can be best summarized by considering: 
(a) A "sensitivity" scale. 
(b) 
(c) 
" . " A particular to general scale. 
" . " A degree of complexity scale. 
The sensitivity scale recommends a giYen technique or 
techniques if the decision maker is primarily concerned 
with one factor of the prqject, while all other factors 
remain unchanged. Table VIII is such a scale repre-
- sentation. 
- .. ,· 
The "particular to general" scale demonstrates the 
applicability of the various evaluation methods. Such 
a scale may be illustrated as follO'Ns: 
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TAB1.E VII 
Recommended Computational Techniques When The Factor That Is Of 
Chief Concern To The Investor Is Given 
.. 
-------- ---
------ . -
Factor 
Risk 
Liquidity 
Profit-
ability 
· Fast 
Screening 
Legal/ 
Necessity 
Interest 
Rate 
Timing 
Accept/ 
Reject 
Ranking 
Equipment 
Replacement 
Present 
Value 
** 
** 
* 
* 
* 
* 
-- TABLE 
Sub- Decision Acct. 
Internal Rate 
of Return Payback jective Trees Methods MAPI 
** * 
* 
*** * 
••• •• 
* 
• 
** 
** ** 
** 
* 
.,x Legend: * is preferred to **; ** is preferred to ***. 
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FIGURE 13 General 
* When used as the sole technique of evaluation, subjective evalu-ation belongs at the extreme left of the scale. However, subjective judgment and experience is used and should be used together with pther criteria in making a final decision. These criteria are only aids to the decision maker and as such should never be used alone to judge the worth of a proposal. 
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Complex 
* Necessity/Postponability and Subjec~ive Methods can be extremely 
difficult to apply if a full understanding of the variables involved 
and their effects are not understood or known. On the other hand, 
if the proposal is relatively simple with clear-cut objectives, etc., 
then these methods may be quite easy to apply. 
.•:-. 
4 .2 The three most widely accepted methods for measuring : 
the "profitability'' of capital investment proposals' are: 
(a) Discounted Cash Flow 
(b) 
(c) 
Present Value 
Payback 
.,; .• The fundamental properties of these three methods 
• 
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·-· can be summarized as follows: 
~a) Discounted Cash Flow Method 
'--------------- .Developed _ in 1951 by Dr. Joel Dean, this method 
was justly regarded as a great step forward. Par-
eticularly effective in evaluating independent projects, 
the internal yield method will not work properly where 
two or more projects are dependent • To apply this 
I 
\ 
procedure, the firm must compute the internal rate of 
return for each investment proposal and then rank these 
proposals in decreasing order. .-The marginal cost of 
capital determines the cut-off or minimum acceptable 
rate of return which can then be used for selecting 
projects. r" 
,./ 
An additional requirement i·s that an unlimited or 
unconstrained capital budget fund exist in all time 
p~riods. The average firm does not have these un-
--~ 
limited funds. Generally, .,there are more proposals than 
money available and it is not so simple a question as 
deciding which project's rate of return exceeds the 
minimum acceptable rate. The basic problem involves 
the selection of the best combination of proposals 
r 
within the constraints of budget funding. 
Even if it were correct to employ this method 
when fundi~ is limited, it wa.ild be difficult to use 
it since yields are not additive. 
------- ---------
It is possible to -. --
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add profits and present values, but one can not add 
internal yields in the same context, to determine an 
.. . 
----------
'' '' optimum combination of projects. 
Finally, this method seems to be applicable in 
evaluating conventional proposals; (i.e., streams of 
returns are not affected by alternations in sign) • 
If this condition of "conventionality" is not satisfied, 
it is possible to have no return or multiple returns. 
Such a state of being does not reflect the desirability 
' 
of a proposal. This problem, however, has been re-
solved by special sophisticated treatments by Lorie and 
Savage, Merrett and Sykes, and a few other investi-
gators. The average decision maker is usually ignorant· 
of this fact. 
When outlays take place over several periods, the 
discounted cash flow changes into an average annual 
rate of return which indicates the average rate of yield 
over the entire life of the project. For example, an 
outlay of $20 now, followed by a subsequent outl~y of 
$10 a year hence and a return of $35 two years hence, 
can be said to have an internal rate of return of lOJ. 
The correctness of this rate can be tested by assuming 
that one invests corresponding amounts in a bank at 
\ 
10%. But, the process of computing the internal rate 
of return is to discount the expected cash flows in 
- __ .., . -·-· 
I I 
I 
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order to find that rate at which net present value 
:i: is zero. Doing this seems to suggest that the outlay 
-~----
of $20 actually earns 10% between its investment date 
---------
-- ---- ----··--·--·--·-. -
--~ 
.. 
and one year later, whereas, in fact it yields ____ ~---~----
nothing during this period. 
Overall, this meth9d is based on accounting 
criteria rather than economic theory concepts. In 
particular the notion of btility is not and cannot be 
considered in conjunction with the internal rate of 
return. An application of utility involves the mean 
and variance of a variable. The present value method 
can supply a meaningful mean and variance; since one 
-
• ft tJ can interpret present value as the expected amount 
of a discounted cash flow process which the firm 
anticipates receiving. The variance of this present 
value can be related to the risk involved. But, it 
" " is meaningless to speak about the variance or sigma 
of an internal rate of return. 
To illustrate the above, assume that the utility 
function can be reasonably approximated by a quadratic: 
2 U = a+bx+cx where a,b,c are constants and xis the 
expected cash return. Then, 
E(U) = a+bE(x) + cE(x2). But, since E(x2) = 0 2(x) 
+ [E(x)]2, it ~s readily seen that it is only necessary 
to calculate the expected value and variance of the 
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.. 
payoffs. Actually, it is possible to view the 
variance as a measure of risk appropriate to a 
.. 
qiiadr-atic -,itlli ty function. 
In an environment ideal for the discounted 
-'------------
cash flow method, the ranking and accept/reject 
results obtained with this technique will always 
be similar to those of the present value method. 
Thus, it matters not which method is used. But, 
such assumptions are usually unrealistic because 
investment proposals usually interact and there 
is a limit to available funds. 
If one wants to employ the internal dis-
counted cash flow method on mutually exclusive 
proposals, it is necessary to compute the yield 
on the incremental cash inflow in order to de-
" termine which of a pair of such investments is 
preferable. If more than two mutually exclusive 
alternatives are being considered, it means that 
the return on the incremental cash flow of the 
first two alternatives must be calculated and 
then the-better of this pair decided. The " . " winner 
of the first round is then paired with the third 
alternative and its incremental benefit return is 
calculated, etc. Any ranking by this technique 
will usually differ from a comparable present-value 
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ranking. This is due to the different inlierent~-re- · -- -
investment rates of both methods. As a rule, the 
present value ranking is more reliable and accurate. 
Proposals on how to overcome these differences; e.g. 
use of average rates of return, have been examined 
in detail in this thesis. 
(b) Present Value Method 
Some of the advantages of this method are: 
1. Present values, unlike internal yieldsi are 
additive; and hence, can readily fit into a 
./ 
structure of selecting a composite of the "best" 
proposals within budget constraints. 
2. Present value can readily be incorporated into 
3. 
a utility theory concept. This has been de-
tailed in " ,, a above. 
Present value concept can be enlarged and built 
upon and offers a potential for future investi-
gators. Decision trees, standard and stochastic, 
incorporate present values in their mechanics. 
A marriage between the· present value method, risk 
evaluation, and utility into an operational 
mathematical model would be most welcome and 
useful. 
4. It gives reliable answers in the type of "environ-
ments" that the internal yield method may fail; 
-- -------- ------:---------·------ -. --·/ 
- /' 
.,-
,.-
-~ 
~ . 
J 
. - - -- ----·--------· 
. - --- . 
~--------- ~- --- -- - -- . 
- .~.L.-
.176. 
t .. 
- - ----------------
-- ~--------
-- ----- --~--- - -
..; -
e.g., dependent proposals and non-conventional 
--proposals . 
However, unless the ·decision m~ke_r~ ap-
preciate what is happening, the present value 
method can, under certain cases, appear illogical 
and not intuitively correct. For example, as 
the interest or discount rate increases, one 
would expect the present value to continuously 
decrease. In other words, as r increases, 
(l+r)-l becomes smaller. But, whenever multiple 
rates of return exist, the present value of the 
proposal may first decrease and then actually 
increase as the rate of return increases. 
Graphically, this can be represented as: 
\_../ 
•• 
Net Present Value 
• 
M 
·-·- .;. K 
r-
.. 
Rate of Return (r) 
,· r 
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As r.increases, present value decreases from 
K to A, and from A to B. Then,- as r continues 
!o increase, the present value continues to 
increase from B to C to M. This just seems to 
defy one's intuition. What is actually 
happening, is that the more distant outlays 
of the non-conventional proposal in comparison 
with present· outlays are playing a less 
influential role. 
--~, ..... 'o-.-•··1P:..?-i'· .•,· ... -~A·.· 
Negative net present values may be acceptable 
~',. 
to a decision maker. 
Because proposals generally interact and 
funds are limited, a negative net present value 
may be acceptable. For example, as·sume cash 
flows for a given project are as follows: 
t
0 : $ -10 
t1 : $+100 
t2-t4: 0 
t5: $-300 
The investor would be willing to accept the 
"losing" investment in order to obtain $100 in 
the near future against his immediate outlay of 
$10. This $100, (actually $90 which he did not 
have earlier), would enable the decision maker 
to reinvest in other proposals which are deemed 
profitable. Thus, to an investor, short of funds, 
a negative value proposal may-be accepted. 
The disadvantages of this method are: 
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1) Risks and uncertainty of all pr~osals are 
considered non-existant or equal. 
-
-2) The weighting_ factor, exponentially decreasing 
with time, which is almost invariably used for 
.,. l 
.:' discounting, is completely arbitrary. 
Money invested in a savings bank account will 
grow according to the exponential rule of Pert, 
(where r is the rate of interest, tis the time 
period involved, and Pis the sum invested at 
present) , because it has been so decreed . But, 
money invested in government savings bonds or 
industrial equities do not, in general, behave in 
accordance with this formula. Perhaps the faet 
that certain investments use a different growth 
formula is some evidence that the exponential one 
is not necessarily the best .. No doubt, this ~ 
exponential formula is being used, not because 
it is the best, but because it is the simplest • 
(c) Payback 
In an environment where there are no restrictions 
on budgeting, payback method usually serves no useful 
.purpose. The present value or internal rate of return 
would be more appropriate because no single proposal 
could "hurt" the firm and the involved risks are 
usually minimal . 
/ 
This method, however, becomes a very useful index 
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when funds are very limited, the future very uncertain, 
r 
and when the returns are .. ne.e9~_d _in. the relatively near 
-
£uture for reinvestment. 
Actually, in some sense, it is possible to view 
payback as a conservative method. It has as its 
,· 
'' 
) ,, 
objective function not the maximization of profit 
'· but the maximization of cash in the near future. 
It is important to realize that payback measures 
only the risk associated with time since it assumes 
that a project continues uniformly with unchanged 
profits for a certain period of time and then suddenly 
ceases to be and ceases to have any value. It does not 
measure the risks associated with normal business 
dynamics; e.g., sales may decrease, costs may increase, 
taxes and inflation may increase. Even if payback is 
used for time risk, it is still imperf ~ct, since it 
does not make allowances for the time costs of money 
nor the amount of the initial capital investment 
recovered. Its other shortcomings have been detailed 
in this thesis . 
4.3 A ~ailing of all the methods examined above is, the fact 
that the risks and uncertainties are ignored or are 
assumed equal • 
In an attempt to incorporate risk·into their 
planning, many decision makers have incorrectly 
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~. 
adjusted their cost of capital . •. or else have turned 
to the payback method . 
. ........ 
Much of the present day research has been 
concerned with incorporating risk into an operational 
model for measuring profitability. Accordingly, recent 
emphasis has been given to "decision tree" analysis . .i ... 
and "stochastic trees" in particular. 
Stochastic tree analysis has generated a welcomed 
union between present value and probability risk esti-
mates. If all of the assumptions inherent in this 
method are met, it may become the best available 
operational technique. 
5-.0 Perhaps, the most important factor ~ffeeting the choice of 
an investment is the cost of capital. 
Most differences of opinion, relative to the '' ,, costing 
of capital has centered about the cost of equity funds and 
composite funding. 
5.1 Of the four different criteria proposed for the evalu-
ation of equity fund costs, this writer recommends 
Profs. Myron J, Gordon's and Eli Shapiro's model: 
where 
In this model, 
p 
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-D~ = expected dividend at time, t = 0 
- "'l.----
k = rate of profit or cost 
g rate at which _the dividend is expected 
to grow per year 
In effect, this criterion has built upon.._,,, 
.. , .. 
. • I D Criterion 2 of Chapter IV; i.e., k ~ P°, and has 
0 
extended it by giving due consideration to the 
prospective growth of a share's revenue. The fact 
/ 
that a share's growth prospects influences the cost 
of equity funds has been overlooked in the formulation 
of Criteria 1,2,3,4 of Chapter IV. 
5.2 In addition to the above considerations, the E/P ~~tio 
criteria, (i.e., the cost of equity capital equals the 
ratio of current earnings per share to the current 
market price per share), fails to. recognize the fact 
that the earnings per share are not the payments made 
to the stock holders . I 
. 5._·3 An analysis of Prof. Ezra Solomon's criterion of 
E'/P (i.e., the cost ratio where E' measures the best 
estimate of the average of the future expected 
earnings per share if the proposed capital expendi-
tures are not made, and P represents the current market 
price per share), reveals the following shortcomings: 
If the investment· is not undertaken, the shares 
~--~ ...... 
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• 
182. 
' 
,J of the company can be expe.cted to sell at a price 
Pa, corresponding to earnings of Ea and not at a 
price P. In that case, the relevant capitalization 
rate is Ea/Pa and not Ea/P. This price P is the 
amount the firm receives for one new share, and it 
may differ from the market price of the shares in 
the near future if the investment does take place. 
In effect, it is necessary td estimate both 
- . 
the future earnings, E', and the future market prireP' 
if the investment were to be made, and Ea and Pa if 
thE; investment is not made. Then, the decision 
·- <i,.;/ 
(Pa, ntaker must decide which of the sets Ea/Pa) or 
(P', E'/P') offers the better prospects to the stock 
/ holder. 
-5--.4 If an analysis is extended to Prof. Ezra Solomon's 
proposal for determining the combined cost of debt 
and equity, several weak points or assumptions are 
noted: 
Making use of Prof: Solomon's notation, we have: 
Market Values 
Stock - S 
Bonds - B 
Total Value B+S=V 
Therefore: 
__, 
Overall capitalization rate: 
Interest on debt: k. = F/B 1 
Earning Flows 
E 
F 
0 E+F 
-----------------------: 
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. 
·Equity Capitalization Rate: 
,; 
Then, we have the identity: 
k = B/8 e 
.... 
~-
~~--~·--- -----
-s- · B 
• -· ~ ...-, 'c" .-
= (B+S) ke + (B+S) ~ 
Now, if 60 is the expected benefits from the 
investment, and C the cost of the investlll3nt, the 
acceptance criterion is~> k0 • However, it should 
be noted that in order to be in agreement with the 
previous formulation, this k must refer to the cost 
0 
of capital the company assumes for the future, in the 
absence of the new investment. 
Prof. Solomon argues that by allowing each new 
proposal a different proportion of debt financing; 
(i.e., vary w and w2), it is possible to adjust the 1 
. 
overall level of business plus financial uncertainty· 
contained in any given proposal so that the net yield 
... 
it offers can be compared against' the overall 
uncertainty reflected ink . This manipulation of the e 
values of w1 and w2 is somewhat contradictory with the 
fact that the capitarization structure of the firm is 
supposed to rema~n unchanged; (i.e., since leverage 
effects have been omitted). 
In addition, a change tn- the values of w1 and 
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) 
' 
. w2 presupposes that the decision maker has a 
definite, probably correct, idea about the cost ·• 
------------------
·.• 
I. 
~--- ---- ------··-· .. --- -· -- --
-------------·----- --- ---- -
--
of new borrowing . 
The-- restrictive character of the assumptions 
incorporated in this model, concerning taxes and 
equality of returns, can also be cited as a point 
in its disfavor. 
5.5 Closely related to the cost of composite financing is 
the effect of a firm's capital structure. 
The two opposing points of view on this subject 
are: 
(a) The traditional approach 
-
(b) The Modigliani - Miller Thesis 
•• 
A review of both methods follows: 
' (a) The traditional approach.· -~;:a-... -,..· 
This technique, endorsed by this author, can be 
stated as follows: Other things being equal, the 
I 
market value of a firm's securities will rise as the 
amount of leverage in its financial structure is 
.ii' increased from zero to some point determined by the 
capital market's evaluation of the level of business 
uncertainty involved. Beyond this point, changes in 
~ 
leverage have very little effect. Outside of this 
range of '' '' acceptable l,everage the total market value 
_of securities will decline with further increases in- -
. . . 
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. . 
leverage. In other words,- there is some specific 
degree of financial leverage at which the market 
value of the firm's securities will be higher than 
-
-- ---~--at -other degree of leverage. It is thus assume_d 
--~------~-
I 
that every firm has an optimal point of leverage. 
But, outside of the theoretical aspects of this 
concept, it is difficult to isolate this optimum . 
The reasons for this probably lie in the fact that 
examinations of leverage effects involve other~ 
elements in the financial structure; e.g., kinds 
of financial structure used by various industries, 
age of company, managerial reputation, conditions 
in the capital market, etc. 
A corollary of this concept is that a moderate 
use of debt lowers the total cost of capital. The 
reason for this is the fact that debt is usually 
cheaper than equity capital .. It is easy toil-
lustrate this by comparing a firm·• s interest yield .,.., 
on bonds to the earning yield on stock. Stock 
yields are usually several times larger than bond. 
yields .. As the firm's debt ratio increases,· however~ ' 
it would have to offer higher interest rates to 
compensate bond holders for their increased risk. 
(b) The Modigliani - Miller Thesis (The M-M Thesis). 
This proposal has as its basic proposition the 
following: 
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In a·world of perfect markets and rational 
investors, two identical companies; i.e., two 
--~-----~ --- sets oi assets offering net operating earnings 
of the same size and quality, must have the ~me 
total market value, regardless of differences in 
leverage. Thus, it is assumed that the market 
value of a firm, and henee··its cost of capital 
• 
,:-:-. 
are both independent of its financial structure • 
One can not find fault with the mathematics 
employed by Profs. Modigliani and Miller. The 
fault appears to lie. with their--assumptions: 
(1) rational investors 
(2) perfect markets 
(3) possibility of separating firms i·nto 
equivalent return classes 
(4) personal leverage which does not differ 
from corporate leverage 
The pitfalls iri the first three assumptions are 
rather obvious and do not require any amplification. 
A brief examination of the forth assumption reveals 
the following: 
The Mand M Thesis atfempts to demonstrate that 
the ability of investors to engage in personal 
leverage is enough to ensure that corporate leverage 
in itself cannot alter total market value, except for 
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., the tax effect factor. In ot~er words, ·it assumes 
t.hat personal and corporate leverage can be regarded 
' as equivalent; because for certain conditions, a.--· 
-··----· 
stock holder in a levered firm will presumably trans-
fer the company's leverage to himself by selling the 
•. stock, taking out a personal loan, and investing the 
total proceeds in the stock of the unlevered firm. 
The fact that the stock holder is liable for the full 
amount of his personal loan when he levers himself, 
compared to his limited liability when he held stock 
in a levered corporation is completely ignored. 
Perhaps, because profit maximization, as the sole guide to 
capital budgeting decision making, has recently been under 
fire, utility theory is becoming entrenched in this activity 
of capital budgeting . 
' An alt~tive to expected profit maximization, the' t-.· 
., principle of maximizing expected value is favored by many. 
6 .1 The utility function of a firm really is the utility 
function of its decision maker(s). 
Although many investigators speak of a firm's 
utility, there really is no sucb thing. Utility must 
. . 
~ be associated with a firm's decision maker(s). It 
is necessary to express his utility function as a key 
to a firm's action. For example, if a firm's conservative 
president retires, and is replaced by a younger and more 
aggresive executive, a. new decision maker's utility 
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function will come into being, which is then indicative 
of a "riskier" attitude on the part of the firm • 
. -6 ~ 2 Much research remains to be done before utility: theory 
can successfully be applied to a firm. 
The concept of question and answer to lottery 
quantities and probabilities is about the only way there 
is of generating a utility function today. The validity 
and stability of these functions must be proved . 
. ·~ 
Because utility theory will no doubt play a bigger role 
in the future investment decision world, such research 
is a must. It would probably be easier to formalize 
and verify a utility function for a long established 
organization with well defined goals and funds, such 
as a public utility company, rather than a very 
competitive, growing company. Perhaps, this is where 
such research should start. 
·7·.0 Game theory has been treated as the proverbial stepchild by 
both the theorists and the decision makers. 
Game theory has not prospered and it is unlikely that 
it will in the near future because of its restrictive 
assumptions. 
· ·The advantages, however, that a decision maker could 
derive from the usEr of game theory should not be overlooked; 
e.g., indifference probabilities . 
8.0 After all is said and done, it is possible to view the 
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overall capital investment process as a·-,basic problem in --\ . 
demand and supply. 
' -The demand a proposal exerts for funds' is -~~bjec~~t~o~------
\ 
·--the proposal's profitability, while supply of £unds depends 
on the cost of capital. 
' \ If perfect information is available, the capital 
\ bqdgeting problem of the firm could be easily solved by simply 
,,.,_ 
< 
using· the procedures described in section 4.5 of this thesis. 
But, because perfect information is almost never available, 
the capital investment problem explodes into an enormously 
complex conundrum. 
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possible areas of future research. 
8.1 Risk and Present Worth ' 
Most decision makers waild agree that on an overall basis, the present worth method gives the most valid answers. However, in using this method, risk is ignored or considered equal for all proposals. What is needed ia a mathematical model which would incorporate risk into a present worth technique. Such a marriage, which no doubt would involve utility theory, would be most welcome and useful. It must also be on a practic.al and operational level. 
8.2 Post Analysis 
t 
r Once a proposal or project has been adopted and allowed to grow, how does one evaluate the results of this project. This~s especially true of Research and Development projects. Ira Horowitz in (63) states, 
"It is difficult not to be impres~ed with our inability to evaluate the results of R-D. . . . Many of the possibly well intended attempts to bridge this· gap have been crude and have culminated in a series of hope-ful, if unjustified, inferences". 
\ It would _be necessary to isolate, id~ntify and put into a mathe-
matical relationship, the performance influencing variables of the project. The evaluation of these variables can then take place on dif-ferent levels: 
a. the broad levels of the ·economy or industry 
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level of the firm 
--r--· ::.....-.~:-..:_.-..,. level.of the individual project -~-----~-..._ .. .._ __ ~~ ~ .. ·--
8.3 Maximization of the Utility of Money 
.. ---
-
---
-
r· 
.. , .. __ 
Donald E. Farrar -(11) develop~d a mathematical model for optimum 
selection of a stock portfolio. 1 His basic procedure is to maximize a 
utility objective function subject to a set of restrictions. Pertinent 
to his model, his two assumptions are: 
It-· 
a. An investor's utility of money function is positively 
sloped and concave downwartt.·. 
b. An investor's strategy is the maximization of expected 
utility. ' ·, ~. . ·. 
. ' 
It is possible to develop a capital budget model along lines similar 
to Farrar's portfolio model. 
8.4 Stochastic Investment Problems 
More research is needed in the field of dynamic programming as it 
relates to capital investment. Most investment decisions are not 
isolated activities but extend in time. The acceptance or rejection of 
any project can affect other projects now or in the future; and in the 
same fashion, anticipated future projects can affect decisions today. 
The work done, to date, in this area has been meager. A good general, 
r1f 
operational dynamic model for capital budgeting is badly needed . 
1 Closely related to the capital budget problem are the stock and bond portfolio selection problems. This latter investigation has been carried on by men like Harry Markowitz, Donald. E. Farrar, Eugene F. Fama, William F. Sharpe, and Pao Lun Cheng. 
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8.5 Diversification and Capital Budgeting 
-~ What effect does centralization or diversification have_ on the 
capital budgeting problem? Where a large organization has several 
- -----~-
--- -------· 
,_ 
-locations at different ,geographical sites, and if the managers of these 
locations are fa~rly i~g~pendent, what is the best overall capital 
budgeting process? Should it be completely centralized, decentralized 
or should only certain expenditures be centralized? 
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APPENDIX 1 
Utility Theory Axioms 
From' the Viewpoint of Capital Budgeting 
AXIOM· I 
. Alternatives shall be comparable. The firm will prefer one or the 
ot.her of any two alternative outcomes or the firm will be -indifferent--·· 
between them . 
AXIOM II 
If a lottery1 option has as one·of its outcomes another lottery 
option, then this first option can be decomposed into the more basic 
outcomes through the use of ordinary probability calculus. 
AXIOM III 
If the firm prefers outcome A to outcome B, and outcome B to out-
come C, then there exists a lottery option involving outcome A and C 
which is indifferent, as far as the firm is concerned, to outcome B. 
AXIOM IV 
If the firm is indifferent between two lottery options, then they 
a,re interchangeable as alternatives in any compound lottery. 
AXIOM V 
A firm's preference and. indifference re·lations ·tor· 1ot·tery options 
are_ transitive. ,, 
1 
"A lottez:y ticket is a chance mechanism which yields the prizes A1 , A2 , ... ,A4 as outcomes with certain known probabilities. ---Opera-tionally, one can think of a lottery as the following experiment: circle having unit circumference is subdivided into arcs of length p1 , p 2 , ... , p 4 and a "four" pointer is spun which if it comes to 
--· rest in the arc of 1 ength- pi means that prize Ai is the outcome • " (16, p. 24). It should be noted that one and only one prize will be won in a lottery . 
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AXIOM VI 
If two lottery options ilivolve the same two alternatives, then the 
, 
option in which the more preferred alternative has the higher 
probability of occurring is itself preferred by the firm • 
• 
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APPENDIX 2 
-· .-
.:.: 
-----·----~ Six Rules Necessary For ___ the 
· Employment of the Minimax Strategy .. 
i-,. 
A violation of the minimax strategy occurs: 
1. If communication between the two players is allowed, then 
either one might very well attempt to influence the other by threaten-
ing, promising, or deceiving. 
2. If probabilistic uncertainty, either in the outcome or in the 
selection of strategies, is introduced, we need to extend our utility 
function to include rankings for risky events.-"--
) 
\. 3. If an individual does not have a complete and consistent (i.e., 
transitive) ordering represented by a utility function, the notion of-
an optimal solution which maximizes utility is ill-defined. 
4. If there is not a clear and definite conflict of interests in 
terms of utility· of the outcomes for each player, it cannot be demon-
- -
strated that player one, say, should ·use his saddle-point strategy, even 
though player two chooses his minimax strategy. 
5. If the game does not have a saddle point and player two, say, 
uses his minimax (pure) strategy, it is not generally advantageous for 
player one to use his minimax strategy. 
6. Finally, if player one, say; knows that player tv.o is not 
going to use his minimax ··strategy, it i-s usually not advantageous for 
\ 
player one to choose his own minimax strategy. 
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.j APPENDIX 3 
Game Tbeory--A Brief Review-~~ 
The first step to carry out in the game theory attack on a problem f 
I 
is to determine the number of players. If the game has only one player, 
a game of solitaire, there is no need for game theory. The player 
theoretically selects that alternative which yields the most. If there 
~ 
are elements of chance involved, the player selects that alternative 
which would bring the best results on the average. However, a one-
person game may have two players by considering nature a player. Nature 
is not a malevolent adversary. Her interests are not necessarily opposed 
•.. 
to those of the player. If nature is in accord with the player, there 
is no conflict. However, when a player is playing against the future 
(this would be the case in a capital budgeting application), nature is 
considered the opposing player. Any knowledge about nature that does 
not oppose the interests of the player can be accounted for, and strict 
game theory applied to the rest. 
More than two-player games are theoretically solvable via game 
theory. However, potential coalitions and qther ch.a_ng_ing_ ties __ of inter.-.._, ,:.. "'' - . . . . . . . 
. 
est greatly complicate the mathematics involved and therefore will not 
be included here. From a practical standpoint, this type of game may 
be -reduced to a two-player game b·y considering one player _versus all 
others, co).lectively. 
• 
Two-player games are representative of the common conflict situa-
tion. A player, again, is a distinct (and the~efore selfish) set of 
interests. 
.. 
--- ----~------------ - -- ____ ,.. - -
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A strategy is a plan so comprehensive that it cannot lose to ·the 
opposing player's action. In a word it is " " complete. This means-
that every possible eventuality-of the opposition has been provided 
for .. 
The "payoff" is another important consideration of these g.atnes. 
If there is merely an exchange of assets between the two players during 
the course of the game, then the game is cali°ed a 0 zero-sum game." 
This means that one player's winnings are the other player's losses. 
The game is thus a closed system. If, for some reason, one"player's ~ 
. ,gains do not equal another player's losses, then a third player has been 
introduced, possibly nature. This latter game is called a " non-zero- sum 
" game. 
T '' ,, he game is laid out in a game matrix. The matrix is a cross-
hatched grid with the rows representing one player's strategies and the 
colUJlllls representing the other player's strategies. Each individual 
~quare, formed by the intersection of a row and a column, represents 
the outcome of the respective strategies ~that. form the box. 
------
I 
In other words, 
if row one represents player one's first alternative 
strategy, 
and column three represents player two's third 
alternative strategy, 
then the intersection represents what would happen if 
player one used his first strategy and player two used his 
third strategy. 
--
-
• • 
--- .- - . ------ ·-- ----·--- ________ __.~--~----,-+ ;;gg.:" -
__________  ........ 
 __ 
·, 
h 
I-• 
--
- • -·. -- ._, .... " 
- --: • .,. ,••\.' '(' ,A ........ ~-- .... •• -' .i \ -:.s '; 
- t~ . 
----. - -
-- ~ --- - ----
-
-~ i-
-
-
-
--
-- - ------ - . 
- -~--
-·· --- - - .. --~ ------ ~ ~ -.. ---------- ~ ----- -----------
- ... -
198. 
~-
-i. 
This result is the payoff. A aositive payoff number means a gain for 
the player using rows and a loss for the player using colunms •. A_ 
negative number would, of course, be a loss for the row player • 
.. An example of a game matrix for a 5 x 4 game: 
ROW PIAYER · 
2 
3 
4 
5 
1 
COLUMN PI.AYER- --
2 3 4 
The numbers represent the alternative strategies. They have not been 
~ quantified, therefore no payoff figures appear in the boxes. 
The first major problem of game theory analysis is to get the data 
into the above form. The second problem is to deduce an answer. Put ,. 
ioore simply, the problem must first be defined and then solved. 
Defining the problem entails putting numbers into the payoff boxes. 
These numbers must represent the payoff values of the alternative 
strategies. To be analyzed, all the numbers must have a common unit. 
" ... 
More basically, the real life data must be quantifiable; it must l:l.!3 ...... ,---· 
measurable with sufficient accuracy. When measured, it must not lose 
_its identity with the real world. The value of the final results can 
be no better than this basic abstraction. 
Accordingly, the problems here are: what to measure, and how to 
,. 
"'. 
base analysis on these measurements. Game theory directly attacks this 
·~:;., 
,_..,. 
-- ~.--------------- .--- -- ~- - - .~ -·----·-··--w,.· --- - -- -·------------ - -, --,------ -~-
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second problem.- - It assumes that, in any game matrix.,. rational players 
should behave in some definite way. Thus the object of the informed 
"b player is to gain as much as possible from a knowledge of the definite 
optimum strategy. He, of course, assumes that his qP<>nent skillfully 
pursues an opposite goal. 
In terms of the game matrix, the essence of the confllct to be 
resolved by game theory is as follows: One player wishes to follow 
that strategy in which the least number he can win is as great as 
possible, regardless of the other player's strategy. The'l>ther player's 
comparable desire is to make the greatest number he can lose juat as 
small as possible, again, regardless of what his opponent (in this case 
the first player) may do. A complete knowledge of all the alternatives 
is assumed for both players. Within this frame, there is a way to solve 
every two-player game so that each player is optimizing his minimum 
advantageous asset change. 
In a particular game, if the first player picks one strategy, he 
may win 3 or 4, depending on his opponents move. If he ·picks his other 
strategy, he may win 4 or 5, again depending on his opponent. The 
___ opponent or second player may choose one strategy ·where he -will lose 
3 or 4 or a second strategy where he will lose 4 or 5. 
The game matrix for this problem is: 
,. •I'.,_- r ,..,, _ __;_ .. .... :_:, - -- --
. .-
FIRST PIAYER 
-- .. :._-____ ~----· 
1 
2 
.. 
SECOND PIAYER 
1 2 
3 4 
4 5 
- ,- . ,· - . -::-·:: ·~ . 
'._ ,. -! . 
I 
• 
l 
I 
.I 
. --·, ... ~ .i~. 
·, 
\ 
- ------·--- --- -- ---- - .---- -~- --~- - . 
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, Por the first player, the minimum he could gain in th~ first 
--- ----- ---~---- ...... -· . 
-.· ... - -.,-... 
. -
.... - -- ...... 
_ strategy would be 3. The minimum he could gain in the second strategy 
would be 4. Therefore the maximum-minimum is 4 ·and would be guaranteed· 
in the second strategy: 
• FIRST PIAYER 
1 
2 
SEOOND PIAYER 
1 2 
3 4 
4 5 
Row Minimum 
3 
4 (maximum-minimum) 
For the second player, the maximum to be lost in the first strategy 
· would be 4 and in the second strategy it would be 5. Thus the minimum-
- -----ilt--
v 
" . 
maximum \YOUld be 4 and VJOuld occur in his first strategy: 
. . - -- • . - - --- ···-- - - ·-" ···--'---·-'·"· it -
FIRST PIAYER 
Column Maximum 
1 
2 
-----·--
SECOND PIAYER 
1 2 
3 4 
< 
4 5 
4 5 
.--.-· ·-· • • -',r- ~ 
- --------------,--------- (minimum..:- -
.• ---
..• --.... -
- ;r-JT' ---
.. -- -- S' 
'. 
-., .. 
maximum) 
... 
-
Obviously, the first player should choose strategy number 2 while 
the second player chooses his first strategy. In this example the 
·i maximum-minimum of the first p!ayer equals the minimum-maximum of the._ 
second player. This is called a "saddle point.'' It is not uncommon 
and is an immediate solution (and the correct one). 
.. 
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. Al~- in this game, when ·played correctly, the first player-always 
.gains 4 and the second player always loses 4, 
This apparent unfairness 
is quickly remedied by requiring the first player to always pay the 
second player 4 before each game. This value is known as the value of 
the game. 
Here each player is required to use a single or pure strategy each 
I 
·and every time. This is contrasted with the more frequently occurring 
mixed strategy which will be considered next. 
form: 
A mixed strategy game might appear in the following game matrix 
FIRST PIAYER 
Colwnn Maximum 
1 
2 
SEOOND PIAYER 
1 2 
4 
7 
7 
(minimwn-
maximum) 
8 
5 I 
8 
Row Minimum 
4 
5 (maximum-
minirnum) 
."!· 
. ...,__ 
.... - --- --
------The ·1argest value for a row minimum is 5 Which corresponds to the first 
player's second strategy. If he goes with this, he knows he wi 11 never 
receive less than 5. Via a similar argument the second player could 
make sure that he never loses more than 7. Since these two figures 
are not equal, there is no saddle point. Here there is an unexplored 
area that upon further application of game theory can reap even more 
for the skilled player. 
• 
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If the-fi~st player were· to stick with the· second strategy, then 
the second player would soon catch OB, and the first player would 
receive only 5. But if the second player sticks with his second 
strategy' then .the first player could change to his first strategy and Cc 
t 
gain .. 8. 
This develops intQ quite a problem. Neither player can afford to 
sit with one strategy because the other will profit unduly. Thus the 
players must sometimes use one strategy and sometimes the other. Thus 
"-
to have a complete course of action a player must use a mixed strategy . 
... ~ 
In this case, if either player knows the other's. ioove in advance, he 
stands to gain. So the decision as to which choice to make must remain 
a secret. Thus the choice of which pure strategy to use must be left 
up to some chance device. 
a3 
Now the value of this game c~ be calculated •. Odds are determined 
by some chance device such as flipping a coin. The payoffs for a given 
strategy of one of the players is weighted by the odds. The payoffs, 
-..._ ' 
multiplied by the appropriate odds, are added together and divided by 
the sum of the odds to detennine the expected average value of the 
_game. o_.ver_ tbe :Long nm. ____ _ 
·-- ---- . ------~----- ---· - . ·-- - ---·----· --- .··-----
For the first player's first strategy (1)(4) .f (1)(8) 
.-.._ . l.f 1 = 0 -• ,_
• 
••;~\.'"~•.:.~~;La¥~~·-···--- -v-"'- - o -·- • -· - ·--- -
- cc"' ··- ~;·,. 
'For his second strategy (l)(S) f (l)(7) - 6 
1 f 1 
Thus the value of the game is 6: In other words, by followirlg a pure 
.strategy the first player would only have been sure of 5. But by follow-
ing a mixed strategy governed by chance, he can be sure of averaging 6. 
! . 
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Now to mpve-on to a slightly more complicated class of games, 
. . 
... 
. • _'ti 
·-----~-
the 2 X n games . In these games one player has two strategies while 
the other has more than two alternatives. The-·n stands for any integer 
greater than two. 
These 2 X n games may exhibit· one significant new concept_. The 
player who has more than two strategie·s may have some strategies that 
are self-evidently inferior and therefore should be immediately eliminated . 
When one of this player's strategies is superior on a box-by-box basis 
to another, it dominates this latter strategy and therefore the latter 
strategy may be eliminated from the game matrix. 
For example a 2 X n game might appear as follows: 
SECOND 
PLAYER 
(MINIMIZING 
PLAYER) 
FIRST PLAYER (MAXIMIZING PLAYER) 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 3 6 5 7 5 
-
2 4 3 4 2 5 
... 
Comparing the first player's stragegy with his fifth strategy, it 
is obvious that the fifth str~tegy is better, box-by-box. Therefore, 
-
·..,., 
--- .l. 
--- -------'---------- - -the first player's first strategy should be eliminated from the mat:r_ix. 
•---...• I 
\ -
When this player's third strategy is compared to the fifth, the 
fi~th dominates. The fifth strategy is better than, or at least as good ' 
as, strategy number three. Thus this third strategy may be eliminated. 
__, By using this dominance idea, the game is simplified to the fol-
lowi~ matrix, of the 2 X 3 variety. 
.. ,. 
f 
' '.-:: - ,· 
.. 
·•· .:i · .· 
__ ,. -- - - - -- -- --·--»--·· .. - --- ·'-"---··· - ...... --·-- - -
--· ----------·· ------- ---·--- ···------··----
----- ------------------w 
---------- ----- ~ 
-------- ----- ---- .... ------- -
--------------~---~---~ -------
-.. 
.. j 
?' - -
- - - --- • - -·· - ··--· ~- . 
.I 
.L' 
,: 
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SECOND 
Pl.AYER 
1 
2 
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FIRST PLAYER 
2 4 5 
-
6 7 5 
,. 
3 2 5 
In this example, the second player's first strategy dominates bis 
I' second strategy. The second player is attemptfng to minimize his losses, 
thus it is to his advantage to eliminate the dominating strategy, the 
• 
• -- ....... o,,·. ··~ ---· ~ .• ---·· --, ' -- -~ ~-
i~e ~roblem then further simplifies to this: 
:,.:_::-·- -- - - .. 
first one. 
SECOND 
PLAYER 
2 
FIRST PIAYER 
2 4 5 
.,. 
But now the problem is all solved, because a saddle-point exists 
,-r.. -· ,-
and the value of the game is 5. The first player should always choose 
-~ 
. 
his fifth strategy and the second player his second. 
In summary, a 2 X 2 game is searched for within the 2 X-n game 
whose solution is also a solution of the .more complex game. 
More comple?' games do not require any new conceptual ideas. 
However, they do require more w~rk·to sift and analyze while using no 
more than extensions of the ideas already explained. For example, let 
us analyze the following 3 X 3 game: 
" . 
,, . 
. "' 
,..;..:.. . 
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1 2 
- Row Minimum 
7 1 5 1 FIRST PLAYER 
l 
2 
3 
9 11 3 3 (maximum-minimum) ,• 
5 7 -1 
- -
9. 11 5 
(minimum-
maximum) 
-1 
By inspection it is quickly determined that there is no saddle-
/ llfl I ~ 
point and that the value of the game lies somewhere between 3 and ·5. 
Further inspection displays some dominant p·ure strategies. For the 
first player the third'strategy is dominated by the second strategy 
.. 
-
. .l" 
and therefore can be eliminated from the matrix. ·The second player's 
' third strategy is dominated by his ~~rst strategy. In the interests 
of minimizing bis losses the first strategy should be eliminated. 
Therefore the game simplifies to the following: 
----·. --
FIRST PIAYER 
- --~- ---
l 
2 
SECOND PLAYER 
2 3 
1 5 
11 3 
.. 
_______ F.i.r~_t __ Player_' __ s_ _Odds 
8 
----
• 
. ·-,·-·-. - __ .. 
- --.,.,--~-
- •.• --··.: ~ .......... :~ --:'1-=---ra--=----'-•,• -,·-,-,-=-:--- .--,-:~~---.,,,.., ...... -:.-:""'er-""":~-... __ ._ Second Player's 
Odds 
2 10 
. ~ The odds, the inverse of the column and *'Vi differences, can quickly 
}---
be calculated. These odds are proportional to 1:5 and 2:1 This 
-solution of the simple 2 X 2 game now is expanded the solution of the 
~ -- -- ----- ---~--~-,- -- - - ---- -· - ---- ----------- - ---1- - -
\ 
------- ------------· ----
-~------- -
---~------..::. -~ 
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original 3 X 3 game emerges. 
SECOND.PIAYBR 
to 
1 
FIRST PLAYER 2 
3 
.~ Second Player•s Odds 
" 
,, 
. -
1 
7 
9 
5 
0 
'-
This means the fi~sit player 
the odds 2:1:0. O, of course, 
2 3 
1 5 
11 3 
7 -1 
1 5 
should • his mix 
means that he 
First Player's Odds 
2 
1 
0 
.. 
strategies according 
shouldn't use this 
If he is only going to play once, he must use some 
"; device that will give these odds, and thus by chance determine the 
'\ 
strategy at all. 
/l 
actual choice. Otherwise, his opponent will be ready for him. A 
similar argument explains the grand or mixed strategy with odds of 
0:1:5 to be used by the second player. 
') 
The value of the game is determined as explained previously. Here 
it is calculated for the first player against the second player's second 
strategy. 
(2)(1) f (1)(11) f (0)(7) 13 4 1/3 
----2--f---l--f-O____ = 3 = 
Game theory is much more advanced than the presentation given up 
to this point. However, the author will not pursue the ~ubject· any 
further, since it will not offer any greater assistance with the under-_ 
- -, . ... 
Excellent references on game theory are (16), (34), (36), (19), 
(81). 
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APPENDIX 4 
Leading Investigators in _Capital Budgeting-· 
-- --Since 1950, capital budgeting has been·critically analyzed, evalu-
. -
' - -ated, and developed on conceptual and operational levels. The theorists 
wh·o have pushed ahead on the conceptual level have· been pioneers like 
Joel Dean, Ezra Solomon, Myron Gordon, Eli Shapiro, Franco Modigliani, 
·1 Merton H. Miller, James H. Lorie, Leonard J. Savage, Friedrich and 
Vera Lutzl, David Durand, and J. Hirshleifer. 
On the operational level, the following table lists some of the 
recently develope~ techniques: 
' 
TABLE VIII 
Recently Developed Operational Techniques 
For Use In Capital Budgeting 
INVESTIGATOR(S) 
1. A. Charnes 
W.W. Cooper 
M . H • Mi 11 er . 
2 • Rudolph J . 
Freund 
3. H. Martin 
Weingartner 
4 •. George W. 
Summers 
TECHNIQUE DEVELOPED 
Application of Linear Programming 
To Financial Budgeting and the 
Cos~ing of Funds. 
Linear Programming Model Which 
Incorporates Risk. 
Integer Programming for the Analysis 
of Capital Budgeting Problems 
A Mathematical Model for Financing 
New Firms 
REFERENCE 
(45) 
(53) 
(35) 
(32) 
1 
. Harry V. Robe~ts in (75, p. 198) wrote: "Two books of great potent.ial significance for business practice were published in 1951: Capital Budgeting by Joel Dean and Theory of Investment of the Firm by Friedrich and Vera Lutz . " 
Prior to 1950, two great theorists were J. M. Keynes and Irving Fisher. 
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INVESTIGATOR(S) T~HNIQUE DEVELOPED REFERENCE 
5. Frederich S. 
--- Hillier 
-Mathematical Model to lncor- (61) 
porate Risk in Investment by Use 
of an Estimate of Inexactitude of 
the Expected Value of a Prospective ·, 
C~sh Flow ~---. 
/ 
., 
6. R. F. Hespos Stochastic Decision Trees for the (5~) 
P.A. Strassman Analysis of Investment Decisions 
7. John F. Magee Use of Standard Decision Trees in 
Capital Investments 
(68)(67) 
8. David B. Hertz The Evaluation of Risk Analysis in (57) 
9. Joel Cord 
Capital Investments 
Dynamic Progranuning Model for 
· Optimally Selecting Capital 
Investment With Uncertain Return, 
and Limited Funds1 
10. Sidney W. Hess Use of Monte Carol Techniques in 
Harry A. Quigley The Analysis of Risk In Capital 
Investment · 
(46) 
(59) 
:. 
() 
1 The concept involved in the analysis are related to Markowitz?s 
work on the portfolio problem; i.e., constraint on the maximum 
average variance allowed in the final investment package. (Harry 
M. Markowitz, Portfolio Selection, John Wiley and Sons, 1959). 
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